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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study examines the roles that economic instruments might play in achieving the "virtual elimination" oi discharges
of persrstent toxic substances to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem. The specific objectives of this study are:
1. To define and assess the role of economic instruments as a means to the virtual elimination of emissions of persistent
toxic Substances to the Great Lakes environment.
2. To assess economic instruments as a means to achieve the virtual elimination of PCBs and mercury entering the Great
Lakes environment.
3. To assess economic instruments as a means to achieve the virtual elimination of persistent toxic emissions to the Great
Lak
es b
y th
e pu
lp a
nd
pap
er i
ndus
try
in C
ana
da
and
the
Unit
ed S
tate
s.
There are many types oi economic instruments for achieving environmental obiectives. The emphasis in this study is
on efi
luent
charg
es an
d tra
deabie
emiss
ions
thoug
h sev
eral o
ther i
nstmm
ents
are al
so con
sider
ed (Le
. user
. od
uct a
nd
admini
strati
ve cha
rges.
lax di
fferent
iation.
subsid
ies. d
eposit
-refun
ds sys
tems
and fi
nancia
l enio
rceme
nt inc
entive
s .
Econ
omic
instr
ument
s ar
e bes
t se
en a
s a
comp
leme
nt to
rathe
r tha
n a
subst
itute
ior t
he tr
aditio
nal c
omma
nd a
nd
contr
ol ap
proac
h. A
ccord
ingly
. the
study
inclu
des a
brief
accou
nt of
the e
xisti
ng re
gulat
ory s
yste
m for
contr
ollin
g toxi
cs in
the
Great
Lake
s bas
in.
The
study
also
revie
ws se
veral
exam
ples
of th
e use
of ec
onom
ic i
nstm
ment
s in
pract
ice a
nd c
onclu
des
that.
with
a la
w no
tabl
e ex
cept
ions
. eii
iuent
char
ges
have
only
been
used
to ra
ise i
unds
rath
er t
han t
o pr
ovid
e an
ince
ntiv
e for
abat
emen
t.
On t
he o
ther
hand
. wh
ere
trad
eabi
e em
issi
ons
have
been
used
(excl
usive
ly i
n the
Unit
ed S
tates
). r
even
ues
have
been
low
or no
n-ex
iste
nt a
nd t
he in
cent
ives
for m
ore
etfic
ient
and
spee
dier
wate
ment
, pr
ovid
ed b
y th
e ins
tnlm
ent.
have
been
more
signli
icant.
:
An e
valua
tion
frame
work,
in the
form
oi a
decis
ion t
ree. w
as d
evel
oped
for th
is st
udy.
The
iram
ewor
k is g
enera
l and
it
can
used
to as
sess
the r
ole o
i ec
onom
ic i
nstr
umen
ts io
r ach
ievi
ng e
nvir
onmn
etai
obje
ctiv
es in
a wi
de r
ange
oi ci
rcum
stan
ces.
The
most
subst
antiv
e par
ts oi
the s
tudy
addre
ss P
CBs,
merc
ury
and
all pe
rsist
ent t
oxics
enter
ing t
he Gr
eat
Lake
s
Basi
n. A
ltho
ugh
the
data
for P
CBs
and
merc
ury
is ve
ry i
ncom
plet
e, i
t is
clea
r th
at a
very
subst
anti
al p
ropo
rtio
n oi
thes
e
cont
amin
ants
reac
h the
Grea
t La
kes
thro
ugh
atmo
sphe
ric
depo
siti
on r
athe
r th
an d
irect
disc
harg
e. T
his i
actor
comp
lica
tes
any
effor
t to
achi
eve
virtu
al el
imin
atio
n sin
ce t
he s
ourc
es a
re d
ivers
e, g
eogr
aphi
call
y dis
pers
ed a
nd o
iten
unkn
own.
info
rmat
ion
on d
isch
arge
s of
pers
iste
nt to
xics
from
pulp
and
pape
r mi
lls h
as i
mpro
ved
recen
tly f
or On
tari
o ow
ing
to th
e
monit
oring
requi
remen
ts of
MISA
(Muni
c'pal
indust
rial
Strat
egy f
or Ab
ateme
nt).
Simil
ar de
taile
d ini
onnat
ion i
or di
schar
ges
irom U.S. mills is not avaiidsle.
The
foll
owin
g r
eco
mme
nda
tio
ns
are
bas
ed
on
an
anal
ysis
oi t
he
inio
rmat
fon
on
sour
ces
of p
ersi
sten
t to
xics
. o
n
abat
emen
t tec
hnol
ogie
s. p
roce
ss c
hang
es a
nd c
osts,
and
on t
he e
cono
mic
pros
pect
s of
the p
ub a
nd p
qser
secto
r:
General
1.
Effo
rts
shou
ld c
onti
nue
to e
nha
lce
the
inio
rmat
ion
on s
ourc
es,
aba
tem
ent
cost
s an
d d
ama
ges
that
is ne
cess
ary
for t
he
iurther waisal and design of economic instmments.
Mercury
2.
For
merc
ury,
prior
ity
shou
ld
be
give
n to
eco
nom
ic
inst
rume
nts
that
will
red
uce
the
use
of m
erc
ury
in m
anuf
actu
ring
proc
ess
that
are
not
clos
ed c
ydes
. M
eas
ure
men
t of
the
use
of m
erc
ury
is ia
r mo
re
reii
wle
than
mea
sur
eme
nt o
f th
e
sou
rce
s a
nd
fate
of m
erc
ury
dis
cha
rge
s.
A t
ax o
n m
erc
ury
mig
ht b
e t
he
sim
ple
st i
ncen
tive
to a
dmin
iste
r,
tho
ugh
to b
e
helpf
ul. i
t wou
ld h
ave
to ap
ply
to al
l r
ms t
hrou
ghou
t Ca
nad
a an
d th
e U
S a
nd p
ossb
iy t
o im
port
s fr
om o
ther
coun
trie
s
as well.
3.
The
leas
ibii
ity
ofa
dep
osi
t/r
eiu
nd s
yst
em
for
batt
erie
s co
ntai
nin
mer
cur
y ‘
ove
r 3
0%
oi a
ll m
erc
ury
use
d in
con
sum
er
rodu
cts)
shou
ld b
e in
vest
igat
ed.
n pa
rtic
ular
. th
e pr
ospe
cts
or d
eve
lop
ng
the
nece
ssar
y in
fras
truc
ture
shou
ld b
e
ooked at in detail.
4.
Mer
cur
y e
miss
ions
from
elec
tric
al u
tilit
ies.
cop
per
smel
ters
and
inci
nera
tors
(ove
r 8
5%
oi a
ll i
ndus
tria
l so
urce
s)
in
Can
ada
and
the
US.
cou
ld
be
sub
iec
ted
to a
n e
fﬂu
ent
cha
rge
it t
he
reil
mili
ty
oi m
oni
tor
ing
is i
mpr
ove
d.
Rev
enu
es
cou
ld b
e u
sed
to d
eal
with
con
tam
ina
ted
sed
ime
nts
in t
he G
rea
t La
kes
bas
in a
nd
oth
er b
odi
es o
i ir
esh
wate
r.
wrus
o (A
ugust
s. 19
91)
6
 PCBs
5.
PCB
S sh
OUid
b9 0
63"
With
thro
ugh
regul
ation
. Th
ere
is no
obno
us r
ole i
or th
e us
e oi
an e
cono
mic
inst
rume
nt.
Pulp and Paper
6.
it is i
n this
sector
that e
conom
ic in
strume
nts ap
pear
to hav
e the
most
to oii
er. Pr
iority
shoul
d be
given
to the
detail
ed
design and iurther analysis oi a program oi economic instruments ior the pup and paper industry consisting oi:
- Financial enlorcement incentives to support regulations designed to virtually eliminate 2.3.7.8—TCDD/TCDF.
A tradeable permits scheme to reduce the use oi chlorine.
- An eiiluent charge on adsorable organic halide (AOX).
WP+
50 (
Augu
st 9
, 19
91)
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 1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objectives
The main oblective of this study is to provide the Joint Task Force on the Virtual Elimination of Persistent Toxic
Substances with an understanding of t e roles that economic instmments might play in achieving the ‘virtual elimination' of
discharges of persnstent toxic substances to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem.
The use of economic instruments to achieve the objectives of the Great Ldtes Water Quality Agreement does not imply
any change in these objectives. The pu 059 of this study is simply to explore whether the goal of virtual elimination can be
achieved more ﬂuidity, more cheaply a or with lesssocial dismption by employing economic instruments than by only usmg
more traditional orms of environmental regulation.
The specific objectives of this study are:
1. To define and assess the role of economic instruments as a means to the virtual elimination of emissions of persistent
toxic substances to the Great Lakes environment.
2. To assess economic instniments as a means to achieve the virtual elimination of PCBs and mercury entering the Great
Lakes environment.
3. To assess economic instruments as a means to achieve the virtual elimination of persistent toxic emissions to the Great
Lakes by the pup and paper industry in Canada and the United States.
1.2 Approach
The argument for the use of economic instruments in environmental policy is one that has long been made in the
journals of the economic and legal professions. Recently, economic instruments-traceable permits in particular-- have shown
signs of becoming popular in the political and bureaucratic milieux as well.
However. actual experience with economic instruments to induce the reduction of emissions of wastes into the
environment is quite limited. As a result. policy mdters have a very limited empirical basis for deciding whether and how to
make use of economic instmments for achieving environmental objectives.
Such instruments include:
-
efflue
nt cha
rges
(a fee
per un
it of e
missio
n)
- tradeable emissions (allowing sources to trade emissions)
-
user c
harge
s
(a fee
per un
'n ofs
ervice
obtain
ed)
-
produc
t char
ges
(adde
d to p
rodua
price)
-
admini
strati
ve cha
rges
(paid
for go
vernm
ent ap
proval
s)
c
tax di
fferen
tiatio
n
(differ
ent tax
rates
for dif
ferent
activit
ies)
(grants, soft-loans and tax allowances)
(refunddile deposits charged on products)
(non-compliance fees and performance bonds)
- subsidies
- deposit-refund systems
- financial enforcement incentives
Econ
omic
inst
rume
nts
can
some
time
s be
a su
bstit
ute
for
the
more
tradi
tiona
l
ulato
ry a
ppro
ach.
Howe
ver,
in
ractlc
al te
rms.
they
shoul
d be
seen
as co
mple
ment
ary t
o rat
her t
han a
subst
itute
for s
o
throu
gh re
gulat
ion.
indee
d, on
e
impo
rtan
t cri
terio
n fo
r as
sess
ing
an e
cono
mic
inst
rume
nt is
its c
ompat
iiili
fy wi
th t
he e
xisti
ng r
egula
tions
. i
n par
ticul
ar. t
he
appli
catio
n of a
ny in
strum
ent t
o dea
l wit
h per
siste
nt to
xics
in the
Great
Lite
s will
have
to be
gain
ed on
to a
regul
ate
syst
em
deals
with s
imilar
probl
ems i
n adla
cent
and/or
compe
ting
region
s that
are no
t part
of the
t Lur
es sy
stem.
oreove
r.
these
regio
ns ma
y or
may
not c
ontai
n sou
rces
which
. thr
ough
airbo
rne d
isper
sion,
affec
t the
Great
Lates
.
wms
o (A
ugus
t 9.
1991
)
s
  
The evaluation oi economic instruments tor achieving virtual elimination oi persistent toxics is considered on two levels.
ﬁrst. a generalized lramework tor evaluation is oilered that can be used to evaluate economic instruments tor attaining
environmental agedives under a very range oi circumstances. This iramework sets out the issues which should be taken into
5
accou
nt in
con
ering
wheth
er to
mate
use oi
a art
icular
econo
mic in
strume
nt. F
or ins
tance,
an eiﬂ
uent c
harge
may o
nly be
operab
le wh
ere e
missi
ons c
an be
measu
red r
el ably
: emi
ssion
s trad
ing m
ay on
ly wo
rk wh
ere a
compet
itive
marke
t tor
the
errnits
can b
e ass
ured:
a dep
osit-r
etund
syste
m may
only b
e prac
tical
where
used
goods
can e
asily
be co
llecte
d. Th
e
ramework also gives some guidance as to what sort oi iniormation must be gathered in order to make a choice oi policy
instrument. This evaluation iramework takes the lorm ol a how chart or 'decision tree" (Figure 5.1).
While this "decision tree" sets out criteria and lntonnation requirements for decision making, it does not provide a
lormula tor producing answers automatically. The criteria span a wide range oi social, political. environmental and economic
issues and the relative weights to be given to the various criteria cannot be decided in advance. Weighing the survival oi one
industry towns against envrrcnmental damage or either one against wider macroeconomic impacts requires a sensitivity to a
wide range at considerations and should be undertaken by people who are well inlormed and responsible to those who will
leel the consequences of any resulting decision.
The second part of the report is an attempt to show how the "decision tree" can be used to stnlcture an evaluation oi
econo
mic i
nstrum
ents.
The m
erit o
i usi
ng ec
onomi
c ins
trumen
ts is
consi
dered
with r
espect
to thr
ee r
oblem
s inv
olving
rsistent toxics in the Great Lakes basin. it each case. a summary oi the available inlonnation is given; t n the iniomiation
is reviewed using thedecision tree to consider whether the use oi an economic instrument might be appropriate.
1.3 Scope
The Virtual Elimination Task Force has been charged with the task ct advising the lntemational Joint Commission on
the c
hoice
at a
strat
egy f
or th
e vir
tual
elimi
natio
n oi
persi
stent
toxic
subs
tanc
es fr
om th
e Gr
eat L
dies
Basin
Ecos
yste
m. i
n
develo
ping
such
a stra
tegy.
the Ta
sk Fo
rce is
laced
with t
he pro
blem
that a
very l
arge n
umber
at tox
ic sub
stanc
es ma
y be
accumulating and doing harm within the Great Lures basin.
This study tocuses upon the applicability oi economic instruments to a limited number oi persistent toxics. Ultimately. it
may b
e that
any c
hange
in the
rggula
tory r
egime
shoul
d appl
y to a
ll pers
istent
toxics
at onc
e rath
er tha
n be
devel
oped
one
subst
ance
by su
bstan
ce bas
is.
is lar
ger qu
estion
is not
addre
ssed
here.
A lurt
her co
nsider
ation
is that
most
attent
ion is
given
in this
. stud
y to ei
tluent
charg
es an
d emis
sions
tradin
g. Th
e role
that o
ther i
nstrum
ents m
ight p
lay is
also c
onsid
ered b
ut
in less detai.
in dev
elopi
ng a
virtual
elimin
ation
strate
gy. th
e Tas
k For
ce ha
s cho
sen t
o locu
s on
the e
leven
“Critic
al Pol
lutant
s“
identitied by the Water Quality Board oi the International Joint Commission in 1985 (Table 1.1).
Tails 1.1 IJC Critical Pollutants
Total polychlorinated b'phenyis (PCBs)
DDT and metabolites
Dieldrin
Toxaphene
2,3,7,8- Tetrachlorodibenzo-pdioxln (2.3.7.8- TCDD)
2.3.7.8- Tetrachlorodbenzoiuran (2.3.7.8- TCDF)
Mirex
Mercury
Alryiated Lead
Benzotaipyrene
Hexachlcrobenzene
Source international Joint Commission, Great Lakes Water Quality Board 0987)
Each
one
ol th
ese c
ritica
l pol
lutan
ts is
assoc
iated
with
some
detri
menta
l eii
ect o
ccurr
ing i
n the
Great
Lake
s bas
in.
These
pollut
ants h
ave a
lso be
en th
e smi
led o
i regu
lation
, so t
hat so
me le
ssons
have
alread
y bee
n tea
med a
bout h
ow th
ey
shoul
d or
shoul
d not
be r
egula
ted.
The
tact
that
none
oi th
ese
subst
ance
s ha
s yet
been
elimi
nated
irom
the G
reat
Lake
s
basin. in spite oi the iact that much eilort has gone into their control. may in ltselt be instructive.
For t
he pu
rpos
e oi
evalu
ating
scen
omic
instr
ument
s as
a too
l tor
the a
chiw
emen
t of
virtua
l eli
minat
ion.
the T
ask
Force
has
prop
osed
that
the s
tudy
locus
won
two
persi
stent
toxic
subst
ances
: P
CBs
and
merc
u .
The
Task
Fome
has
also
propo
sed t
hat ec
onomi
c inst
rument
s be
asses
sed f
or thei
r pote
ntial
as me
ans t
o indu
ce the
v rtual
elimin
ation
oi per
sisten
t
toxic emissions trom the pup and pwer industry in the Great Lates basin.
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1.4 Plan of the Report
Chapter 2 offers working definitions oi a number oi the terms used in this paper--'virtual elimination." 'zero discharge"
and “persistent toxic substance” -- and provides a description oi each economic instrument considered.
Chapter 3 descnbes the general nature oi the regulatory framework currently being applied to control emissions oi
persistent toxic substances in the Great Lakes basin and discusses the limitations oi that iramework.
Chapter 4 gives a bnei overview oi the use oi economic instruments in a number oi jurisdictions. Some conclusions are
drawn from the experiences oi these jurisdictions.
Chapter 5 presents the general evaluation iramework.
Chapter 6 takes u the speciilc issue of the applicability oi economic instruments to the virtual elimination oi discharges
oi mercury to the reat Lakes basin.
Chapter 7 does the same as Chapter 6. but for P083.
Chapters 8 and 9 provide a description oi the pulp and paper industry in the Great Lakes basin and consider the
possibility oi using economic instruments to virtually eliminate toxic discharges irom pup and paper mills.
The study concludes with Chapter 10 which otters recommendations for the consideration oi the Task Force and other
interested parties.
we
+5
o
(Au
gus
t 9
, 1
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2
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0
D
E
F
I
N
I
T
I
O
N
S
This
chap
ter
otter
s def
initi
ons o
i var
ious
term
s an
d co
ncep
ts t
hat a
re u
sed
thro
ugho
ut t
he re
port.
2.1 Persistent Toxlcs
A per
siste
nt to
xic s
ubsta
nce i
s dei
ined
in the
Great
Lake
s Wat
er Qu
ality
A re
emen
t oi
1978
as "a
subst
ance
which
can
caus
e de
ath.
dise
ase,
beha
viou
ral
abno
rmal
itie
s. c
ance
r. g
enet
ic m
utat
ions
. p
ysiol
lcal
or r
epro
duct
ive
mali
unct
ions
or
phys
ical
deto
rmit
ies
in an
y or
gani
sm o
r its
oiisp
ring.
or w
hich
can
bec
ome
pois
onou
s (ag
ar c
once
ntra
tion
in th
e io
od c
hain
or
in c
ombi
nati
on w
ith
othe
r su
bsta
nces
" (t
oxic)
and
has
a hal
t-lit
e in
wate
r oi
over
eigh
t we
eks
(per
sist
ent)
.
The
per
sis
ten
ce
oi m
any
toxi
c s
ubs
tan
ces
is p
oor
ly
und
ers
too
d.
it c
an
safe
ly b
e s
aid,
tho
u i
i, t
hat
pers
iste
nt
toxi
cs
exis
t i
n l
arg
e n
umb
ers
.
in 1
987
. t
he
Gre
at
Lak
es
Wat
er
Qua
lit
y B
oar
d i
dent
ille
d t
he
pre
sen
ce
of
332
toxi
c c
hem
ica
ls
in t
he
wat
ers
oi
the
Gre
at
Lak
es
bas
in.
01
the
se
362
. e
lev
en
wer
e
des
ign
ate
d a
s '
crit
ical
pol
lut
ant
s.”
The
se
ele
ven
are
cha
rac
ter
ize
d b
y a
dve
rse
eit
ect
s o
n m
amm
ali
an
or
aqu
ati
c s
pec
ies
, b
loa
ccu
mui
ati
on,
and
per
sis
ten
ce
at
'un
aoc
ept
abl
e'
leve
ls.
The
ele
ven
~cri
tica
l p
ollu
tant
s“
are
als
o d
eem
ed
by
the
Boa
rd
to
be
rep
res
ent
ati
ve
oi
a w
ide
vari
ety
oi
sou
rce
s.
pat
hwa
ys.
use
s.
and
che
mic
al
iam
ili
es.
'Ac
tio
n t
ake
n i
or
one
cou
ld
be
exp
ect
s
to
con
cur
ren
tly
con
tro
l:
or
q>p
ly
to
oth
er
sub
sta
nce
s w
ith
sim
ila
r p
rop
eni
es'
(ln
tem
ati
ona
i J
oin
t C
omm
iss
ion
. G
rea
t L
ake
s W
ate
r Q
ual
ity
Boa
rd
198
7).
2.2 Zero Discharge
Ann
ex
12
oi
the
Gre
at
Lak
es
Wat
er
Qua
lit
y A
gre
eme
nt
oi
197
8 s
tat
es
the
ner
al
pri
nci
ple
tha
t “t
he
phi
los
oph
y a
dop
ted
lor
con
tro
l o
i m
ut
e o
i p
ers
ist
ent
tox
ic
sub
sta
nce
s s
hal
l b
e z
ero
dis
cha
rge
."
No
iini
tion
oi
zer
o d
isc
har
ge
is c
ont
ain
ed
in t
he
A
re
em
en
t a
att
emp
ts
to
dei
ine
it a
re
un
de
r w
ay.
On
e
per
spe
cti
ve
3 t
hat
zer
o d
isc
har
ge
is
a m
ea
ns
for
ach
iev
ing
vir
tua
l
eli
min
ati
on
in
tha
t it
rei
ers
to
all
con
tro
lla
ile
inp
uts
oi
per
sis
ten
t t
oxi
cs.
Eve
n i
i z
ero
dis
cha
rge
is a
chi
eve
d t
or t
hes
e i
npu
ts.
oth
er
pos
sib
le
sou
rce
s s
uc
h a
s c
ont
ami
nat
ed
se
di
me
nt
s a
nd
run
oii
rem
ain
.
2.3 Virtual Elimination
Art
icl
e i
t a
t t
he
Gre
at
Lak
es
Wat
er
Qua
lit
y A
gre
eme
nt
oi
197
8 s
tat
es
tha
t i
t is
the
'po
llc
y'
oi
Ca
na
da
and
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
tha
t
"th
e
di
sc
ha
rg
e
oi.
..a
ll
per
sis
ten
t
tox
ic
su
bs
ta
nc
es
be
vir
tua
lly
eli
min
ate
d.‘
"Vi
rtu
al
eli
min
ati
on"
ha
s
not
be
en
dei
ine
d i
n t
he
Ag
re
em
en
t.
nor
ha
s i
t b
ee
n d
eii
ned
els
ewh
ere
.
As
a r
esu
lt.
the
ter
m h
as
co
me
to
me
an
ver
y d
iii
ere
nt
thi
ngs
to
dliierent people.
Acc
ord
ing
to
the
ion
ner
Dir
ect
or
oi
Wa
te
r
Re
so
ur
ce
s
at
the
Ont
ari
o
Min
ist
ry
oi
the
Env
iro
nme
nt,
Dr.
Jim
Bis
hop
,
rep
res
ent
ati
ves
oi
ind
ust
ry
gen
era
liy
ta
ke
the
vi
ew
tha
t
"vi
rtu
al
eli
min
ati
on
oi
a
su
bs
ta
nc
e
is
re
ac
he
d
wh
en
the
re
is
no
env
iro
nme
nta
l d
am
ag
e
oi
an
y k
ind
as
a r
esu
lt
oi
dis
cha
rge
s o
i t
hat
sib
sta
nce
'
(Bi
sho
p 1
991
).
Thi
s d
eii
nit
lon
imp
lie
s t
hat
any
reg
ula
tio
n w
ill
be
bas
ed
upo
n s
cie
nti
fic
evi
den
ce
oi i
mpa
ct
on
wat
er
qua
lit
y.
Pr
op
on
en
ts
01
thi
s v
iew
wo
ul
d a
lso
pla
ce
the
on
us
oi
pro
vin
g a
ny
inp
act
on
wat
er
qua
lit
y o
n t
he
reg
ula
tor
, h
old
ing
tha
t
unt
il
suc
h o
nu
s i
s m
et.
no
lur
the
r r
ed
ua
lo
ns
irt d
isc
har
ges
sho
uld
be
req
uir
ed.
Env
iro
nme
nta
l
oup
s.
on
the
oth
er
har
d.
lat
e t
he
vie
w t
hat
the
wo
rd
'vl
rtu
al'
is
us
ed
in
the
Ag
re
em
en
t o
nly
to
ind
ica
te
tha
t t
he
tot
al
eii
min
at
oi
per
sis
ten
t t
oxi
c s
ub
st
an
ce
s
fr
om
the
Gr
ea
t
La
ke
s
Ba
si
n
Ec
os
ys
te
m
is
not
be
in
g p
ro
po
se
d.
Tot
al
eli
min
ati
on
be
in
g
ma
de
im
pr
aa
ic
al
by
the
tac
t t
hat
so
me
per
sis
ten
t t
oxi
cs
oc
cu
r
nat
ur
in
the
Lu
re
s
as
wel
l
as
by
the
dii
iic
ult
y o
i r
em
ovi
ng
iro
rn
the
La
ke
s t
he
lar
ge
qua
nti
tie
s o
i t
oxi
c s
ws
ta
nc
es
alr
ead
y r
eie
as
.
in
thi
s v
iew
, '
vir
tua
l e
lim
ina
tio
n c
an
onl
y
be
ac
hi
ev
ed
by
pr
eve
nt
in
g a
ny
ﬂﬁ
di
ti
on
al
di
sc
ha
rg
e
oi
th
es
e (
ist
ent
tox
ic)
su
bs
ta
nc
es
(is
.
by
im
pl
em
en
ti
ng
a
ze
ro
di
sc
ha
rg
e
str
ate
gy)
...
“
(N
at
io
na
l
lit
e
Fe
de
ra
ti
on
an
d
Ca
na
d a
n
ins
tit
ute
tor
Environmental Law and Policy. 1991).
in
th
e a
bs
en
ce
of
an
y
ag
re
ed
wo
n
dei
ini
tlo
n o
i "
vir
tua
l e
lim
ina
tio
n."
it i
s r
ec
og
ni
se
d t
hat
a
lai
rty
wi
de
ra
ng
e
oi
go
al
s f
or
th
e
ab
at
em
en
t
oi
rs
is
te
nt
to
xi
cs
ma
y
ye
t
em
er
g‘
e.
Ho
we
ve
r,
for
th
e
pu
rp
os
es
01
thi
s s
tu
dy
,
it
is
as
su
me
d
tha
t.
as
a
go
al
oi
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l
po
i
y.
vir
tua
l
el
im
in
at
io
n
me
an
s
i a
t
co
nc
en
tr
at
io
ns
of
pe
rs
is
te
nt
tox
ics
in
all
di
sc
ha
rg
es
to
th
e
Gr
ea
t
La
ke
s
should approach zero.
2.4 Economic Instruments
Fo
ll
ow
in
g
Or
ga
ni
za
ti
on
for
Ec
on
om
ic
Co
op
er
at
io
n
an
d
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t
(O
EC
D
19
89
).
ec
on
om
ic
ln
st
mm
en
ts
ca
n
be
cl
as
si
ti
ed
as
ch
ar
ge
s.
su
bs
id
ie
s.
de
po
si
tr
et
un
d
sy
st
em
s.
ma
rk
et
cr
ea
ti
on
an
d
li
na
nc
ia
l e
ni
or
ce
me
nt
in
ce
nt
iv
es
.
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 24.1 Git-gas
Tra
dit
ion
all
y.
the
use
of
the
env
iro
nme
nt
for
was
te
dis
pos
al
has
bee
n '
ire
e'
In
the
sen
se
tha
t n
o f
ina
nda
l p
aym
ent
is
req
uir
ed.
Thi
s
is
on
e
exp
lan
ati
on
fer
the
exc
ess
ive
us
e
of
the
en
vir
on
me
nt
as
a
dep
osi
tor
y
for
wa
st
es
of
all
kin
ds.
By
imp
osi
ng
a c
har
ge
on
dis
cha
rge
s o
f w
ast
es
int
o t
he
env
iro
nme
nt
all
met
hod
s f
or
red
uci
ng
the
bur
den
on
the
env
iro
nme
nt
(eg
.
pro
ces
s c
han
ge.
red
uct
ion
. r
ecy
cli
ng,
reu
se
an
d w
at
e t
rea
tme
nt)
ca
n b
ec
om
e c
he
ap
er
tha
n w
as
te
dis
pos
al.
Fur
the
r.
suc
h a
cha
rge
on
eff
lue
nt n
ot
onl
y p
rov
ide
s a
n i
mme
dia
te
eco
nom
ic
inc
ent
ive
for
red
uct
ion
s i
n th
e d
isc
har
ge
of
was
tes
into
the
env
iro
nme
nt.
but
it c
an
als
o p
rov
ide
an
add
ed
inc
ent
ive
for
the
dev
elo
pme
nt
of
new
. c
lea
ner
pro
duc
tio
n
pro
ces
ses
and
mor
e e
ffe
cti
ve
was
te
tre
atm
ent
tec
hno
log
igs
.
The
prec
ts‘
e n
atu
re
of
the
eco
nom
ic
inc
ent
ive
s o
ffe
red
dep
end
on
the
typ
e a
nd
leve
l of
cha
rge
imp
ose
d.
Ch
ug
es
can
cla
ssi
fie
d i
nto
fou
r t
ype
s.
eff
lue
nt
cha
rge
s,
use
r c
har
ges
, p
rod
uct
charges and administrative charges:
-
al
l
Cl
ip
are
pha
ges
pai
d o
n d
isc
har
ges
into
the
env
iro
nme
nt
and
are
bas
ed
on
the
qua
nti
ty
and
/or
qua
lit
y o
f
dis
cha
rge
d p
oll
uta
nts
.
E
uen
t c
har
ges
are
nor
mal
l
exp
res
sed
as
$lu
nlt
of
efﬂ
uen
t d
isc
har
ged
.
Th
e r
ate
ma
y
var
y
acc
ord
ing
to
the
qua
lit
y o
i t
he
dis
cha
rge
as
me
as
ur
by
the
con
cen
tra
tio
n o
f c
ont
ami
nan
ts
or
tox
ici
ty.
-
Us
er
an
ge
l
are
pa
ym
en
ts
for
the
cos
ts
oi
col
lec
tiv
e o
r
pw
li
c
tre
atm
ent
of
eff
lue
nts
.
Us
er
ch
ar
ge
s
are
nor
mal
ly
exp
res
sed
as
Slu
nlt
of
eff
lue
nt
tre
ate
d.
Th
e r
ate
ma
y v
ary
acc
ord
ing
to
the
qua
lit
y o
f t
he
dis
dia
rge
as
me
as
ure
d b
y t
he
co
nc
en
tr
at
io
n
of
co
nt
am
in
an
ts
or
tox
ici
ty.
'
Pr
ui
tt
Gu
ys
are
es
ad
de
d
to
the
pri
ces
of
pro
duc
ts
wh
ic
h a
re
pol
lut
ing
wh
en
ma
nu
fa
ct
ur
ed
or
co
ns
um
ed
or
for
wh
ic
h t
her
e i
s a
n o
rg
an
dis
pos
al
sys
tem
.
(A
sim
ila
r a
pp
ro
ac
h i
s t
o i
mp
os
e l
owe
r t
ax
rat
es
on
pr
od
ua
s w
hi
ch
are
le
ss
da
ma
gi
ng
to
th
e
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t
so
to
en
co
ur
ag
e
the
ir
us
e.
)
i
m
GI
-g
ee
ar
e
pa
ym
en
ts
for
ser
vic
es
pr
ov
id
ed
by
the
aut
hor
iti
es
su
ch
as
for
reg
ist
rat
ion
oi
cer
tai
n
ch
em
ic
al
s
or
io
r t
he
cer
tif
ica
tio
n
of
wa
st
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t f
ata
lit
ies
.
2.4.2 at”
Sub
sid
ies
pro
vid
e
iin
anc
iai
ass
ist
anc
e
to
en
co
ur
ag
e
ch
an
ge
s i
n b
eha
vio
ur.
i.e.
act
ion
s t
o r
ed
uce
pol
lut
ion
.
Sub
sid
ies
ca
n
lat
e t
he
for
m
of
gra
nts
(no
n-
rep
aym
le)
,
sof
t l
oan
s (
at
re
du
ce
d
int
ere
st
rat
es)
an
d
tax
all
owa
nce
s
(e.
g.
acc
ele
rat
ed
dep
rec
iat
ion
on
llu
tio
n c
ont
rol
eq
ub
me
nt
.)
Th
e
rol
e
of
sub
si
di
es
in
ac
hi
ev
in
g v
irt
ual
el
im
in
al
on
is
not
co
ns
id
er
ed
In
an
y
detail in this stu .
24.3 W8,"
A
su
rc
ha
rg
e
is
im
po
se
d
on
a
pr
od
uc
t t
hat
is
re
fu
nd
ed
wh
en
the
pr
od
uc
t
is
re
tu
rn
ed
to
an
ap
pr
ov
ed
cen
tre
for
pr
op
er
treatment, reuse and/or disposal.
24.4 MTm'
Th
er
e a
re
sev
era
l w
ay
s i
n w
hi
ch
ma
rk
et
s c
an
be
cre
ate
d w
he
re
by
'
' t
o d
isp
ose
of
wa
st
es
int
o t
he
en
vir
on
me
nt
ca
n
be
bo
ug
ht
h
sol
d.
lnl
ts
tf
or
m,
al
lm
it
is
pl
ac
ed
on
th
et
qu
an
ti
ty
oi
wa
st
es
th
at
ca
nb
ee
mi
tt
ed
in
to
th
e
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ti
ro
ma
ll
so
ur
ce
s.
er
ar
ih
lh
la
lo
cd
io
nd
tt
es
to
ta
lq
ua
my
oi
wa
et
es
un
on
gs
ou
ce
sh
as
be
en
ma
de
by
a
reg
ula
tor
y a
ge
nc
y
leg
. b
y f
it
or
auc
tio
n).
the
var
iou
s s
our
ces
are
all
owe
d t
o t
rad
e t
hei
r a
llo
tte
d e
mis
sio
ns.
Su
ch
tra
des
ma
y
be
su
'
to
add
iti
ona
l r
est
ric
tio
ns
to
pr
ov
id
e a
fur
the
r l
eve
l o
f e
nv
ir
on
me
nt
al
“a
uc
ti
on
.
Aft
er
a
tra
de
ha
s
be
en
ma
de
.
ea
ch
so
ur
ce
s p
er
mi
t i
s m
od
if
ie
d t
o r
efl
ea
Its
ne
w,
al
ow
ab
ie
em
is
si
on
lirn
lt.
Un
de
r
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
.
a r
ea
ll
oc
ai
on
of
per
mit
ted
qua
nti
tie
s c
an
ta
te
pl
ac
ew
lt
hl
na
pl
um
is
lh
ln
af
ir
m o
ra
mo
ng
dif
fer
ent
ftn
nso
rot
her
sou
rce
s.
2.4.5mmm
The
re
are
two
mat
er
typ
es
of f
tnm
dal
enf
orc
eme
nt
inc
ent
ive
s:
-
m
e
h
l
c
h
a
r
e
i
m
p
o
s
e
d
w
h
e
n
po
ll
tn
er
sd
on
ot
co
mp
ty
wi
th
ce
na
in
reg
ula
tio
ns.
if
th
es
ef
ee
sa
re
rti
ona
l t
o
the
de
gr
ee
of
no
n-
co
mp
li
an
ce
.
as
me
as
ur
ed
by
di
sc
ha
'g
es
in
ex
ce
ss
oi
the
au
th
or
iz
ed
lev
el.
the
y
co
me
eq
ui
vd
en
t t
o m
eff
lue
nt
ch
ar
ge
im
po
se
d a
bo
ve
so
me
lim
ite
d l
eve
l o
f d
is
ch
ug
e.
-
P
e
r
m
Bu
lb
ar
e
pa
ym
en
ts
to
aut
hor
iti
es
in
exp
ec
ta
ti
on
of
co
mp
li
an
ce
wit
h
reg
ula
tio
ns.
Th
e
pa
ym
en
ts
are
refunded when compliance is achieved.
' E
mi
ss
io
ns
tra
din
g i
s s
om
et
im
es
ref
err
ed
to
as
a
sy
st
em
of
tra
dea
ble
per
mit
s.
ma
ri
tt
h
per
mit
s,
tra
ded
ile
rig
hts
or
em
is
si
on
rig
hts
.
Th
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e
te
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s a
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all
sy
no
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3.0 THE REGULATION OF PERSISTENT TOXICS
IN THE GREAT LAKES
The purpose oi this chapter is to provide a briei description of the existing approach taken to regulating the discharge oi
persistent toxlcs into the Great Lakes with special relerence to the pulp and paper sector.
3.1 Canada
Canadian water pollution regulation rests on two pillars: general prohibitions on the discharge oi pollutants to any
watercourse: and individualized. negotiated agreements between dischargers and regulatory authorities on exemptions irom
the general prohibition. which deiine permissible and oi the ope eliiuent loadings. Both Canadian iederal and Ontario
provmcial law place general prohibitions on the discharge oi harm ul substances to surfer» waters. in Ontario, these laws are
enlorced primarily by the provincial government.
While large numbers oi industrial and municipal dlschargers continue to produce effluents which are toxic to marine iile.
prosecutions do not normally ioliow. For instance. in 1988. nearly three decades alter the passage ol the Federal Fisheries
Act w
hich
requi
res t
hat e
liiue
nt be
non-l
ethal
to iis
h, 12
oi 18
pub
and
pape
r mil
ls di
schar
ging
to th
e Gre
at La
tes b
asin
still
produced an eliiuent that is acutely lethal to lish.
in man
y cas
es lad
x ol p
rosecu
tion i
s due
to the
tact t
hat th
e disc
harger
has ne
gotiat
ed an
indivi
dualiz
ed 'Co
ntrol
Order'
which
dellne
s per
missib
le eli
iuent
loadin
gs an
d oit
en spe
ciilc
techno
lo les
to be
used
to ach
ieve
those
limits.
These
agre
emen
ts a
re.
howe
ver.
oite
n vi
olate
d wi
thou
t at
trad
ing
pros
ecut
ion.
e pe
rmis
sibl
e lo
adin
gs d
eiin
ed b
y Co
ntro
l Or
ders
0 e
n pe
rmit
hi h
disc
harg
e ra
tes
oi c
onve
ntio
nal
poll
utan
ts a
nd
oite
n pl
ace
no r
estr
icti
ons
on t
he d
isch
arge
at p
ersi
sten
t to
xic
subs
tanc
es.
luen
t qu
alit
y st
anda
rds
can
vary
grea
tly
irom
sour
ce t
o so
urce
, ev
en
with
in a
n in
dust
ry.
Cont
rol
Orde
rs l
or
pulp
and
pap
er m
ills
sho
w pa
rtic
ular
ly g
reat
vari
atio
n.
'
it is
only
very
recen
tly t
hat t
he pr
ovinc
e oi
Ontar
io h
as b
egun
to de
velop
a det
ailed
and
syste
matic
list o
i the
toxic
subst
ances
which
are b
eing
disch
arged
to its
suria
ce wa
ters.
Once
it has
deter
mined
what
is go
ing i
nto it
s sur
iace
water
s.
Onta
rio
inten
ds,
unde
r it
s Mu
nlcp
al-l
ndus
tnai
Stra
tegy
lor
Abat
emen
t (
MISA
), t
o de
iine
the
Best
Avai
labl
e Tr
eatm
ent
Tech
nolo
gies
Econ
omic
ally
Achl
evml
e (B
ATEA
) lo
r ea
ch a
t ni
ne i
ndust
rial
sect
ors
and
lor
munl
cval
sewa
ge
trea
tmen
t
plant
s. A
ttal
nabl
e di
scha
rge
limit
s ba
sed
on B
ATE
A lo
r ea
ch s
ecto
r wil
l th
en b
e us
ed b
y th
e pr
ovin
ce t
o wri
te r
egula
tions
setting abatement limits on all dischargers in Ontario.
in th
e ne
ar l
uture
. th
e Ca
nadi
an F
eder
al G
over
nmen
t in
tend
s to
tight
en it
s st
anda
rds
lor d
isch
arge
s oi
conv
enti
onal
pollu
tants
irom
pulp
and
pape
r mi
lls.
The
Fede
ral
Gove
rnme
nt i
nten
ds t
o
uire
krait
mills
to re
stric
t em
issi
ons
oi di
oxins
and
iura
ns t
o a
non-
dete
ctio
n le
vel
by
1994
. T
he
rule
wou
ld a
lso
restr
ict
tot
orga
noch
lori
ne d
isch
arge
s.
By
1992
, On
tari
o
will l
imit k
ralt
mill
orga
noch
lori
ne d
isch
arge
s to
1.5 k
g pe
r to
nne
oi pr
oduc
tion
.
3.2 United States
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
wat
er
poll
utio
n c
ontr
ol
is b
ase
d u
pon
the
n o
i a
n a
dmin
istr
ativ
ely
sel
ect
ed
cont
rol
tec
hno
log
y t
o ac
hie
ve
plan
t an
d i
ndus
try-
elii
uent
limi
ts.
Eifi
uent
sta
nda
rds
are
det
erm
ine
d
indu
stri
al c
ate
gor
y a
nd
sub
cat
ego
ry:
the
US
.
ape
r i
ndu
str
y is
div
ide
d i
nto
33
sub
cat
ego
rie
s.
For
eac
h c
ate
gor
y.
the
us.
nvi
ron
men
tal
Pro
tec
tio
n
Age
nCy
(US
. E
PA)
es
s t
he b
est
prac
tica
l co
ntro
l t
ech
nol
ogy
avai
idal
e lo
r th
e r
edu
cti
on o
i co
nve
nti
ona
l po
llut
ants
as w
ell
as
the
bes
t a
vai
iwl
e t
ech
nol
ogy
lor
the
aba
tem
ent
cl
prio
rity
poll
utan
ts.
Elii
uent
sta
nda
rds
are
the
n b
ase
d o
n t
he
periormance that these technologies are expected to produce.
in a
ddit
ion,
mor
e st
ring
ent
elii
uent
limi
tati
ons
can
be
lace
d on
poin
t so
urce
s in
orde
r to
achi
eve
sele
cted
wate
r qu
alit
y
sta
nda
rds
.
The
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
has
set
as
a n
ati
ona
l
al
t
att
ain
men
t o
i s
wim
mda
le
and
lis
hds
le
wat
ers
.
The
att
emp
t t
o
ach
iev
e t
his
goa
l a
lon
g w
ith
the
obi
ect
lve
s o
i i
ndlv
' u
al
sta
tes
com
pri
se
the
bas
is
lor
med
ia-
qua
lit
y b
ase
d r
estr
icti
ons
on
discharges.
Eff
lue
nt
limi
ts
set
acc
ord
ing
to
the
low
er
oi
the
se
two
crit
eria
bec
ome
the
bas
is
ior
dis
cha
rge
per
mit
s w
hic
h m
ust
be
held
by
any
one
disc
harg
ing
poll
utan
ts t
o wa
ter.
The
se
penn
lts
are
nonn
aily
issu
ed b
y s
tate
poll
utio
n co
ntro
l ag
enci
es.
alt
hou
gh
unl
ess
it w
aiv
es
the
righ
t,
the
US
.
EP
A m
ay
rev
iew
ind
ivi
dua
l p
erm
its
ior
com
pli
anc
e w
ith
its
gui
del
ine
s a
nd
req
uir
eme
nts
. E
nio
rce
men
t oi
com
pli
anc
e wi
th t
he t
erm
s oi
the
per
mit
s is
don
e b
oth
by
sell
-rep
orti
ng a
nd
on-s
ite
lns
ped
lon
s.
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The US. EPA is currently in a review of technology-based effluent limits for all pup, paper and moar
mills in the United States. Best 329 Technology (BPT) and Best Conventional Pollutant Technolo Como? (BOT?
efflue
nt limi
ts lor
the re
gulati
on of
traditi
onalmo
ment
s are
under
review
for all
mills.
Best A
vaiiw
ie Con
trol
ochno
logy (
BAT)
and New Source Performance Standards l SPS) effluent limits for priority pollutants released from mills which bleach pulp
with chlorine are also under review. Pretreatment standards for chlorine bleaching mills which discharge to sewage treatment
plants are being reconsidered. The US. EPA will decide whether to revise existing regulations as well as whether to regulate
dioxins. iurans and organochlorine compounds. Final new rules are not expected to be promulgated until mid~1995.
There are several other r ulatory initiatives that will have an impact on toxics in the Great Lakes. Under the Great
Lakes Critical Programs Act oi 1 uniform water quality standards are to be prepared for the US. by June 1992. Draft
standards will be published in the Federal R later in June 1991. States are to adopt water quality standards at least as strict
as the federal standards by June 30, 1992. e Great Lakes Critical Programs Act also sets deadlines for the completion of
Remedial Action Plans in the US. and for the Lake Michigan Management Plan. Late cleanup plans are to be incorporated
into state water quality plans by 1993 or 3.5 years after designation.
On February 7. 1991 the US. EPA announced its industrial Toxics Protect. Under this protect. 17 toxic chemicals have
been identified on the basis oi seriousness oi effects. actual ex sure levels. high release volume and recognised potential for
reducing releases. (Mercury is included but PCBs are not.) he goal of this voluntary pr ram is to achieve a one third
reduction in total releases and transfers (to sewage treatment ants and landfills) of these 1 chemicals by 1992 and a one
half reduction by 1995 a ainst a 1988 baseline. A 90% vo untary reduction earns a six-year deierrai of Clean Air Act
technology-based standar s.
The emissions targeted under this program are 73.3% to air, 19.7% off-site transfer, and 7.0% to 'other media' and
over
600
comp
anie
s ha
ve b
een
aske
d to
parti
cipat
e. A
total
of 1,
402
millio
n pou
nds
of ch
emica
ls a
re in
volve
d, in
cludi
ng
mercury releases oi 320,000 pounds. The pup and paper industry's contribution is 98 million pounds.
3.3
Pro
ble
ms
Wit
h t
he
Cur
ren
t R
egu
lat
ory
Fr
am
ewo
rk
The m
ost s
triking
aspec
t of t
he cur
rent s
tate o
f toxi
c sub
stanc
e cont
rol re
gulati
ons is
the co
ntrast
betwe
en th
e very
large
numbe
rs of
chemi
cal su
bstan
ces w
hich m
ay ca
use h
uman
or env
ironm
ental
ealth
effect
s and
the ve
ry sma
ll num
ber 'o
f
toxic substances whose release is even monitored let alone regulated.
The p
ace at
which
regula
tions
are cu
rrentl
y dev
elope
d is in
some
measu
re to
blame
. Ma
ny ye
ars te
nd to
pass
betwe
en
the f
irst r
ecogn
ition
that
a sub
stan
ce m
ay b
e doi
ng si
gnifi
cant
harm
and
the a
ctual
imple
menta
tion
of con
trols
. Ad
d to
this
the
fact t
hat vi
rtual e
limina
tion h
as to
this d
ay no
t bee
n ach
ieved
for a
single
persis
tent t
oxic s
ubsta
nce be
ing di
schar
ged to
the
Great Lakes, and a trawling picture of the side of current regulation emerges.
At so
me poi
nt. th
e met
hods
of reg
ulatio
n curr
ently
used
in Can
ada a
nd th
e Unit
ed Sta
tes wi
ll hav
e to b
e ada
pted
to the
drama
tic g
rowth
in the
numb
er of
chemi
cals
and
the n
umbe
r of
sourc
es of
chemi
cals
that
need
to be
regul
ated.
Most
new
regul
atory
propo
sals.
such
as On
tario
's Cl
ean
Air P
rogr
am a
nd M
ISA
Prog
ram
and
the U
S. C
lean
Air A
ct
conti
nue t
o rel
y pri
maril
y upo
n the
detai
led p
rescr
ptlon
of po
lluti
on co
ntrol
techn
ologi
es or
plant
-spec
ific
emiss
ion s
tanda
rds
base
d up
on a
stand
ard b
eliev
ed by
gove
rnme
nt of
ficial
s to b
e ach
ievdi
ie wi
th th
e use
of a
speci
fic c
ontro
l tec
hnolo
gy.
These
new
propo
sals
contin
ue to
perpe
tuate
the u
se of
a met
hod o
f reg
ulatio
n kno
wn as
"direct
regula
tion'
or
"com
mand
and
contr
ol.‘
Direc
t reg
ulati
on ef
fecti
vely
requi
res g
over
nmen
ts to
tare
part
in de
cisio
ns t
out
the m
ore
detai
led
aspec
ts o
f pla
nt de
sign
and
redes
ign.
produ
ction
techn
ology
, r
oduct
desig
n an
d wa
ste
trea
ment
techn
ology
at ev
ery
regul
ated
facili
ty. i
n
ctice,
idors
end
tp en
gage
d in
mcnt
or ye
ars o
f neg
otiat
ion o
ver t
he de
velo
pmen
t oi
comp
lex
proce
ss c
hang
es
plant
rules.
Then
they
are r
equir
ed to
defe
nd th
eir d
ecisi
ons a
t adm
inist
rativ
e app
eals
and
in
court actions.
As vir
tually
every
mater
indust
rial
reces
s invo
lves t
he rel
ease o
f som
e toxi
c subs
tance
s. th
e task
of the
regula
tor «
if
the
task
is ta
ken
seri
ousl
y --
is ov
erwh
e
ing.
Gove
rnme
nts
have
not
had,
nor
are
they
litel
y ev
er t
o ha
ve.
the r
esou
rces
to
invo
lve
them
selv
es i
n so
muc
h d
etdl
ed d
ecis
ion-
muti
ng a
cros
s su
ch a
wide
r
e of
prod
ucti
on p
roce
sses
. T
he
cost
to
regul
ated
indus
tries
of h
aving
to wi
n sp
ecifi
c go
vern
ment
al c
ertifi
cation
of t
choic
es o
f pro
ducti
on p
roce
sses
and
technologies is also potentlaly very high.
The
use
of e
cono
mic
inst
rume
nts
has
been
prop
osed
as a
way
to i
nduc
e en
viro
nmen
tal
impr
ovem
ent
with
out
havi
ng
regul
ators
beco
me b
og e
d do
wn in
the f
iner d
etail
s of
indiv
idual
firms'
decis
ion-m
ating
proce
sses.
This
repor
t no
w tur
ns to
review the ways in whic such economic instruments might be put to use.
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4.0
ECONOMIC
INSTRUMENTS
IN
PRACTICE
 
4.1 Overview
Economic instruments are now widely used in environmental re uiation. in a survey oi 14 countries in the Organization
tor Economic Cooperation and Development. done in 1986 and 19 7, the use oi 153 dtiierent instruments was identitied
lOECD 1989). Charges. emissions trading, and other economic instruments are currently being considered ior application to
a wide variety oi environmental problems. Appendix A provides a summary of the OECD 1989 survey in tabular lorrn.
The application ol most oi these instruments to the problem oi achievin "virtual elimination” oi a toxic substance is.
however. quite limited. Most oi the instruments identitied are used largely tor lnanclal reasons -- to raise money to pay ior
administration oi programs or to pay ior cleanups. These money-raising instruments have a limited incentive eiiect.
Oi these measures which are explicitly designed to have an incentive eilect. most have been lied to shift
consumption activities in gradual ways. For instance tax dillerentiation has been imposed between leaded an unleaded luel
or between more and less energy-eiiiclent vehicles; and product charges and relundmle deposits have been applied to
containers. car hullrs and batteries.
While eiiluent char as have been applied to direct discharges oi eliluents from m r industrial and munic al sources.
in every instance but two (lite. ior water lution control in the iorrner West Germany and t e Netherlands) these c arges have
been too low to have any signiiicant e set on discharges. Even in the West German case, where these incentives have been
the most successiul. charges are levied at only mout one quarter ol average abatement costs.
The one lonn oi economic instrument which has been applied to a llutant lor the specific purpose ol reducing
discharges to a ne llglbie lovel ls emissions trading. in the United States, em sslons trading has been used to bring about a
rapid decrease in t e level oi lead in automotive luel and it is currently being used to reduce emissions oi ozone depleting
substances.
 
The use oi economic instruments to cover administrative program costs, to reduce the use oi materials whose
production creates pollution and to reduce the disposal ol tentlally harmlul products such asmercury-containin batteries
may rove oi no small assistance in achieving the "virtual e lmlnatlon' of persistent toxic discharges to the Great L as basin.
But i e dramatic reductions in discharges which are necessary to achieve 'virtual elimination“ can only be brought about by
the systematic application oi either direct regulation or economic instruments, or a combination of the two, to all at the maior
sources oi a given persistent toxic.
This chapter takes a closer look at live applications oi economic instruments lrom which lessons can be learned
regarding the potential eiiectlveness oi these instruments ior achieving ‘vlnual elimination.‘ While eliluent charges have not
been demonstrated to be able to produce the necessary reductions in and oi themselves-4i only because no government has
yet been repared to institute an eltiuent chuge high enough to induce such aresult -- the German water oilutlon eliluent
charges 0 provide an exarrple oi an instance where charges have at least hoped to encourage a sign ant degree of
pollution reduction. in addition to eilluent charges on discharges to water in West Germany, three applications oi emissions
trading are reviewed: to reduce lead in gasoline, to reduce the release oi ozone depletl substances, and to control 800
lbiological oxygen demand) disdwges into the Fox River, Wisconsin. A brlei outline ol t emissions trading provisions oi
the US. Clean Air Act is also included.
4.2 Effluent Charges in West Germany
The West German eilluent change scheme was announced in 1976 and implemented in i981. It miles on a
nationwide level to any efﬂuent source. although it is applied by provincial ('Laender') authorities.
Originally the scheme mplied to five pollutants and pollutant groups: oxygen depleting substances,
high-organic-content solids. low-org‘anlc content solids. mercury and cadmium: as well as to discharges toxic to iish. in 1989,
A X iadsorbable organic halide), c romium, nickel. lead and copper were also included.
Ever; dischar r oi a re latedfollutant is r uired to have a germit. Fees are assessed per 'damage unit" (19.20
European urrency nits (ECUyuor 40 eutsch mark i M) or $16.70 U. .) and damage units are calculated lor each r ulated
category. However, the actual lee paid also varies according to whether the disoharger meets a lederally set mnlmum
standard ior its type ol iaclllty.
wp+s
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Estimate/6.1 Fee Paid ‘
Over standard 1.0 x Expected drscharge'
75-100% oi standard 0.5 x Standard
50-75% oi standard 0.5 x Actual discharge
Under 50% ct standard No tee
Use “state oi the art technology" 0.2 x Expected disdrarge'
'ii "expected discharge” is exceeded. a corrective payment is required. Source: O.E.C.D. (1989)
West German water quality is believed to have improved signiiicantiy since 1976. By 1981. alter a long introduction
period, 10% oi dischargers met federal minimum standards. By 1987, roughly 50% oi dischargers were meeting those
standards.
While the treatment cost of German dischargers averages about tour times higher than applicrtle charges. suggesting
that direct regulation is the moving iorce behind the improvements. the charges do exceed many llnns‘ marginal abatement
costs. A number oi large dischar are known to have exceeded minimum requirements to achieve reduce payable tees
and one third oi all aliected mun‘ alittes claim that the charge was their main reason tor intensifying wastewater treatment.
In 1986. the charge system produced ECU 135 million (U.S.S 111 million), wout hall oi which was spent on administration oi
the program.
According to the Economic Councillor Europe (ECE) Council oi Experts. the German system results in a saving oi one
third in companson with a System oi uniiorm statement.
4.3 Emissions Trading In the United States
in the mid-19703 the U.S. EPA introduced an emissions trading program des nod to minimize the cost oi attaining air
pollut
ion st
andar
ds und
er the
Clean
Air Ac
t. Se
ven t
ypes o
i non
-haza
rdous
conta
m ant
s are
now r
egulat
ed un
der th
is Act
:
artic
ulate
s. su
phur
dioxi
de, c
arbo
n mon
oxid
e, ni
troge
n oxi
des,
ozone
. lea
d and
volati
le or
ganic
comp
ound
s. T
he Ac
t all
ows
or tour kinds oi trades:
Nelltg:
An internal trade where plants making modiiicatlons or additions can avoid various techno ical and administrative
requi
remen
ts by
reduci
ng em
issio
ns 'r
om ot
her p
oints
within
the s
ame
plant.
By 19
89.
.000
to 12
.000
nettin
g
transactions had taken place bringing savings estimated at more than U.S.Sl billion.
- Glad Trullg:
New
sourc
es ent
ering
a “non
-attai
nment
area'
must
arran
ge ior
an ev
en r
eater
reduct
ion ir
om exi
sting
sourc
es in
the
same
area.
By 19
86 at
least
2,000
ottset
transa
ctions
had o
ccurr
ed (
10%
extern
al), b
ringin
g savi
ngs oi
at lea
st
U.S.st million.
- Bum:
An imaginary bubble is placed over multple emission points in one or many plants or firms in an air quality district. The
total
emiss
ions
tor th
e bub
ble i
s tixe
d and
the c
ontro
ls at
each
sourc
e can
be ad
juste
d to
meet
the t
otal e
missi
ons i
n the
most cost-etiective way. in praalce. most bubbles are applied to individual plants and sometimes two. 89 State
bubbles had been approved by 1986, with savings estimated at U.S.S435 million.
m
m
llrm e
arning
emiss
ion re
ductio
n cred
its ca
n sav
e the
m ior
later u
se or
sale.
By 19
86 onl
y live
state
banki
ng
systems had been waved by the U.S. EPA.
One Canadian commentator (Environment Canada 1990) has observed that trading works best it:
- trading is introduced at the start at a program;
' the rules are stable. clear and comprehensively specilled;
- ﬁrms are allowed to lreely use internal or extemai trading to meet all emission requirements;
- the approval process is kept as simple as possible:
i at the introduction oi the program the baseline emissions tor a source do not exceed actual emissions;
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- baseline emissions are defined in terms of quantities not rates;
- actual emissions are calwlated in a manner not subject to interpretation;
' a market is estdiiished whereby buyers and sellers or permits can easily identify each other:
a banking program is established and banking regulations are designed that encourage external trading;
- the banking is secure - there is no danger that the credits will be devalued.
4.4 United States: Lead In Gasoline
‘ Perhaps the most clear cut example of an economic instrument being successfulty used to reduce emrssrons to a
desrred level is that of the U.S. program to reduce gasoline lead content.
Before 1982, United States gasoline lead limits were enforced on a refinery by refinery basis: each refinery's gasoline
output had to meet an individualized average lead content standard. in 1982. the U.S. EPA promulgated a rule which
permitted refiners to produce gasoline with a lead content h her than their original limit, if they could buy the right to do so
from another refiner who would produce gasoline with a lower ad content.
In earty 1985. a new U.S. EPA rule required that, between earty 1985 and January 1986. gasoline lead content be
reduced from 1.1 to 0.1 grams per gallon, with a midpoint of 0.5 grams per gallon to be achieved in mid-1985. The rule
paramitted refineries which reduced lead content ahead of schedule to save any excessrights for use or sale during 1986 and
1 .
During
1985.
refine
rs act
ually
banke
d 10.6
billion
rams
of lea
d right
s. Be
tween
10 and
20% 0
1 all a
vaiiml
e righ
ts wer
e
trade
d dur
ing e
ach q
uarte
r of
1985.
(Hah
n and
Heste
r. 1
9) it
has b
een e
stima
ted t
hat t
hese
lead
trade
s res
ulted
in a s
aving
of over 20% of the asst of meeting the rule (U.S.: 226 miiiion)(NEFlA 1990).
What
is mos
t inte
restin
tout
this e
xampl
e is t
hat it
is an
instan
ce in
which
trades
did ac
tually
occur
at abo
ut the
expec
ted
rate
(U.S.
EPA
ha
estim
ated
trade
s of
about
8 mil
lion
grams
), (U
.S.
EPA
1985.
) Ba
nkin
g an
d tra
ding
were
consi
dered
to be
desir
able,
in thi
s cas
e. be
caus
e so
me s
malle
r ref
ineri
es wo
uld h
ave
had
a muc
h ha
rder
time
than
most
in
meeti
ng th
e U.S
. EP
A sch
edule
for re
ductio
ns. I
t was
felt th
at U.S
. EP
A was
faced
with
a choi
ce cl:
1) del
aying
the
im l
ement
ation
of th
e nrl
e so
that
all re
finer
s cou
ld me
et th
e sta
ndard
; 2)
bring
the s
tanda
rd in
to ef
fect a
ccord
ing t
o the
same
so e
dule
and
acce
pt t
hat s
ome
refin
ers w
ould
pay
muc
h h
r cos
ts a
nd p
ossi
bly
out o
f bus
ines
s (a
lthou
h U.
S. E
PA w
as
of th
e vie
w tha
t no
refine
r wou
ld b
e put
outof
busin
ess b
y av
ing t
o mee
t the
stan
by Ja
nuar
y 198
6) (U
. . E
PA 1
985);
3)
allo
w tra
ding.
(The
re is
no i
ndica
tion
that
a var
iabl
e ti
metd
ile f
or me
etin
g a d
im:
regu
lati
on s
tand
ard w
as c
onsi
dere
d).
In co
mpar
ison
with
lead.
the l
evels
of ba
nking
and t
radin
g of e
missi
ons u
nder
the o
ld U.
S. Cl
ean A
ir Ac
t (su
perse
ded i
n
1990)
have
been
far m
ore
mode
st (H
ahn a
nd He
ster,
1989)
. it
is int
erest
ing.
there
fore.
to ce
nside
r the
reaso
ns wh
y the
y wer
e
so effective in this particular case.
For
one
thin
. tra
ding
was
virtu
ally
unco
nstr
aine
d an
d ad
mini
stra
tive
requ
irem
ents
were
mini
mal.
This
com
res w
ith
the v
ery
subs
tant
ia r
estr
iaio
ns a
nd l
ong a
dmin
istr
ativ
e de
lays
for C
lean
Air A
ct t
rade
s (D
udek
and
Palm
isan
o. 1
). Th
is is
not n
eces
sari
ly t
o sug
gest
tha
thes
e re
stri
alon
s ar
e un
reas
onml
e.
They
may
well
be n
eces
sary
to en
sure
that
the
emis
sion
s
bank
ed r
epre
sent
emis
sion
s ad
uall
y re
duce
d ra
ther
than
'pep
er c
redit
s' or
for k
eepi
ng e
miss
ions
belo
w a
stan
dard
whic
h
would normally be required by variwilly in pedormance of a pollution control system.
Also
of i
mpor
tanc
e is
the
fact
tha
the
righ
t be
ing
trad
ed c
ould
only
be
use
d fo
r a
limi
ted
time
and
the
mark
et f
or t
he
ulti
mate
prod
uct.
lead
ed g
asol
ine.
was
iy d
imin
ishi
ng.
As a
com
men
ce.
sale
of a
righ
t did
not
in a
ny w
ay s
urre
nder
the
right
of a
selle
r to
expa
nd f
uture
of th
e pr
oduc
t fo
r wh
ich
mark
et w
as g
rowi
ng,
i.e.
unle
aded
gaso
line
. T
his
situ
atio
n ca
n be
cont
rast
ed w
ith
trad
es u
nde
r th
e Cl
ean
Air
Act
whe
re s
elle
rs m
ight
be r
iski
ng r
estr
icti
ng t
heir
ture
abili
ty t
o
expa
nd.
(How
ever
. e
ach
mar
ket
is d
iffe
rent
For
exam
ple.
ther
e ar
e ot
her,
mor
e si
gnif
ican
t ba
rrie
rs t
o co
mpet
itio
n in
Nort
h
Ame
ric
an e
lect
rith
mar
ket
s so
that
trad
es i
n ri
ghts
to e
mit
$02
and
NOx
are
unli
ter
to b
e re
stri
aed
mere
ly t
o pr
otec
t fu
ture
opportunities to expend produdion.)
4.5
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
:
Pot
ent
ial
Oz
on
e D
epl
ete
re
Emi
ssi
on
trad
ing
by
pro
duc
ers
and
imp
ort
ers
oi c
hlo
rof
iuo
roc
arb
ons
(CF
Cs)
was
inp
lem
ent
ed
by
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
in
the
spri
ng
of
198
8.
Per
mit
s w
ere
allo
cate
d o
n t
he
bas
is
of h
isto
rica
l da
ta
on
pro
duc
tio
n a
nd
impo
rts.
Per
mit
s w
ere
giv
en
awa
y,
app
are
ntl
y b
eca
use
the
U.S
. E
PA
did
not
bel
iev
e th
at i
t ha
d t
he a
utho
rity
to a
uct
ion
the
m.
Per
mit
s r
eaui
red
var
y w
ith
the
ozo
ne
dep
let
ing
pote
ntia
l of
the
sub
sta
nce
invo
lved
. E
ach
per
mit
is g
ood
for
one
yea
r
and
the
num
ber
perm
its
aval
ldil
e wil
l de
clin
e on
a re
gula
r ba
sis
over
time
.
The
gra
dua
l re
stri
ctio
n of
the
avai
idii
lity
of C
FCs
is l
ikei
y to
resu
lt i
n a
n i
ncr
eas
e in
the
val
ue
of t
he
CFC
perm
its.
It is
int
ere
sti
ng
to
not
e t
hat
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
has
sou
ght
to
rec
apt
ure
som
e o
f th
is
win
dfa
ll
by
pla
cin
g a
tax
on
the
pen
nrt
s.
in
the
ory
, a
s l
ong
as
the
tax
is l
ess
tha
n t
he
mar
ket
pri
ce o
f t
he
per
mit
s,
CF
C p
ric
es
md
use
lev
els
will
not
be
att
eae
d a
nd
the
tax
will
effe
ctiv
ely
tran
ster
som
e o
r al
l of
the
wind
fall
to t
he g
ove
rnm
ent
.
WP
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 4.6 Wisconsin: Fox River Biological Oxygen Demand
Eaify in 1981. the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources instituted regulations allowing the transfer of 800
(biological oxy engsmand) discharge permits among ten puip and paper mills and four municipalities located along a 22 mile
stretch ol the ox err
in many respects. the choice at a permit trading roach seemed perfectly suited to the chosen settf . Marginal
abatement costs varied widely between dischargers: each ischarger also had a number oi options for producing ncrementai
reductions in BOD discharge. On the basis 01 studies which concluded that biological oxygen demand (800) control costs
could be lowered by 40% l reducing a predicted annual saving of $6.7 million per year), permits were issued to ten pulp and
paper mills and to four mun cipalitles.
The results of this experiment have. however. proved diswpointing. One trade was made in 1981. Since then there
have been no further trades. The unwillingness of dischargers to trade has been attributed both to the design and
administration of the trading structure (permits expire alter live years, dischar e ‘ hts may be sold only upon demonstration
that no additional abatement technology can be installed by the seller. admin trat e wproval of trades is slowi (Hahn and
Hester. 1989 and to the unwillingness of business competitors to give up permits which may be necessary to future
expansion (0 CD 1989).
WP+50
(August 9. 1991)
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5.0 AN EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
5.1 Outlining the Approach
The literature on economic instniments commonly uses several standard criteria to evaluate the instruments and
systems of direct regulation which they are intended to complement or replace. These criteria include: their capacrty to meet
environmental objectives, the level and distribution of compliance costs. administrative practicality and compatibility with the
existing institutional framework
it is usually difficult to reach conclusive results as to the instrument(s) of choice from an evaluation in terms of these
criteria Much depends on the specific environmental problems to be addressed and the circumstances within which the
instruments are expected to operate. A feature of the present study is that it is focused on a specific set of contaminants in a
well- identified region for which the environmental objectives are reasonably clear: virtual eiirnination of persistent toxics.
A second and related consideration is that the study is intended to assist in deciding whether and in what way economic
instruments can help in achieving virtual elimination of selected contaminants. Rather than simply list the strengths and
weaknesses of each candidate instrument. an «preach has been developed which shows how the evaluation criteria bear on
the choice of which instrument to use. The next section descrbes a 'decrsion tree' which systematically evaluates the options
through a series of linked questions. Depending on the yes or no answers to the questions. the selection of direct regulation
or any one of a number of economic instruments is indicated.
To be clear, it is not the purpose of the decision tree to show how the selection of a regulatory option. La. 3 of direct
regulation of one of several economic instruments ought to be made. Neither is it the purpose to show how decis s actually
are made. Rather. the decision tree is simply a way to organise the issues and criteria into a framework that is helpful for
com arin the alternative regulatory options. Obviously, the actual selection of an economic instrument cannot be reduced "to
a r ative simple set of questions to which yes or no answers can be en. However. the advantage of the decision tree
approach is that it shows how the various considerations can be ad and. depending on the circumstances, hops
determine the suitdiility of a particular instrument or molt. Also, the decision tree is general enough to be of use in
evaluating the role that economic instruments mm: play in achieving environmental ob‘ s under a very wide rangeof
circumstances only some of which are relevant to specific toxics considered in this stu .
in the next section an explanation is lgig/en of how the decision tree operates. The discussion proceeds along each
branch of the tree in turn. in later waters. main considerations that emerge from the decision tree are used to evaluate
the application of the economic instruments to the virtual elimination of mercury, PCBs and persistent toxics from the pup and
paper industry.
5.2 The Decision Tree
Figure 1 shows the decision tree. it consists of 13 pairs ofquestions (01 to 013) and sets of criteria (C1 to 01:!) upon
which answers to the questions depend. The decision tree is intended to be wplied on a contaminant-by contaminant basis.
This section of the report shouidbe readwthfrequent reference to Figure 1.
D MkaMRM?
The first question to decide is whether virtual elimination is the wopmte regulatory objective for a particular
contaminant.
m1: HMMWI‘MbNm
Within the domain of the Great Lites basin. a contaminant is to be virtually eliminaed if it is a persistent toxic
according to the definition given in section 2.1. Priority for action has been given to the if 'criticai poiiutants.‘ If virtual
elimination applies continue to question 2, otherwise deal with the contuninant under a different framework.
D MZBWMDNMW
The timing over which virtual eliminaion is to be achieved is critical for deciding whether economic instruments (apart
from non-compliance penuties) have arty role to play at all. Clearly, if it is decided that discharges of a persistent toxic
are t
o be
elimi
naed
immedi
ately.
the s
imples
t and
most
powerf
ul ap
paach
is thr
ough
an out
right
ban o
n suc
h
discharges. swported by a system of monitoring. progecution and fines. financial burdens imposed on sources by
such an approach our be alleviated through subsidies .
2The
effect
ivenes
s of d
irect
reguld
ion fo
r achi
eving
virtual
elimin
ation
from
nonpoi
nt sou
rces
is mor
e ques
tionab
le but
then
the scope of economic instruments is also more limited for dealing with nonpoint sources.
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There 1'5 0'79 Circumstance in which a tax (effluent charge or tradeabie emissions) IS
seit-evrdently intenor to a standard (direct r war/on), This is where the pollutant is so
damaging that an outnght ban on its use is caled ior...Aliemative/y, there is such uncertainty
thatjwzddteCIde it is too risky to use the pollutant, Th/s situation tits a number of ecotOxins and
00 a was.
(Pearce and Turner, 1990: 107)
Crimea WWWWMBEMWW
The pace at which Virtual elimination is to be achieved will be determined largely by the health and environmental risks
whic continued discharge oi a contaminant into the Great Lakes environment is expected to bring. Additional
considerations include the magnitude and impact oi compliance costs and the opportunity tor learning from experience
as virtual elimination is approached. At present. although the use at some substances has been banned in Canada and
the US (eg. Mirex) no contaminants that are in industrial products have been completely banned lrom entering the
Great Lakes. By implication, there is no regulatory requirement in Canada or the United States lor prohibition oi the
discharge oi any persistent toxic into the Great Lakes environment.
In Figure l. the outcome "direct regulation" (with no role ior economic instruments) lollows trom a 'yes' to question 2. A
"no" response calls tor a phased reduction in discharges and the means for achieving this reduction is pursued in
question 3.
0mmMMWNMMMW?
The review in Chapter 3 at economic instruments in practice showed that the use oi economic instmments for achieving
envrronmental objectives. as distinct irom raising revenue, has been limited. Regulatory agencies throughout the wortd
have traditionally relied on direct regulation, usually with economic instruments in a stpponing role or in no role
whatsoever. A crucial question that must be addressed therelore, is whether to rely on direct regulation lor achieving
virtual elimination oi persistent toxics? "
Orlerta3: WWMEMMMNMGIWW
The usual prelerenca lor direct regulation over economic instruments is based on a number at lactors. some oi which
are very relevant to an evaluation ot economic instruments as a means tor achieving virtual elimination oi persistent
toxics. These factors provide criteria tor helping decide whether reliance on direct regulation alone is the best way to
achieve virtual elimination.
amuse!
All parties to regulation: politicians. civil servants. industry. environmental interest groups and the general public are
iamiliar with a re ulatory woadi that sets standards and enloroes them through ovals. prosecutions and lines. it
a certain type behaviour is unwanted, most people think in terms of inlorm n/educatlon programs to secure
voluntary compliance and legislated limits to oblige those responsble to chmge their ways. Apart lrom deposit/reiund
systems tor retumwie bottles. people have a very limited experience with economic instruments as tools at public
policy and probably think that the term reiers only to these deposit/reiund systems and to subsidies.
Despite the tact that in Canada and the United States people are exposed to the decision making power at the market,
the idea oi using economic instruments. such as an etliuent charge or emissions trading. is alien to most peopie and
lacks immediate and obvious and. Moreover, by taking away some at the decision making authority oi those
administrators currently respons tor giving vats under existing 3 stems oi direct re ulation, economic
instruments may be seen as a threat to the very pe without whose support t are unlltely to be mplemented.
For all these reasons, lamillarlty with direct regulation is seen as a reason ior continuing to rely on it let achieving
environmentd obiectlves. Against this, however, is the record at direct regulation which has seldom met the obiectives
set tor it. and the growing interest in various quarters in economic instruments as a way oi promoting the achiewment
oi environmental and economic objectives.
Symbolism
Not only are people iamiliar with direct regulation but they think that It conveys the right message: something as
threat
ening
to the
envir
onmen
t and
health
as the
discha
rge oi
persis
tent t
oxlcs
should
be de
clared
tor wh
at it
is. ie.
dange
rousl
y anti
-socia
l and
anti-e
nviron
mental
. and
should
be dec
lared
illegal
and p
unishd
'ile i
n the
courts
. In
other
words. whether or not direct regulation works ettectively. it carries the message pe want to hear. Otlenng polluters
the op
portun
ity to
buy t
heir w
ay out
at red
ucing
their d
ischar
ges is
anath
ema to
sue
peopl
e and
they a
re not
prepa
red
to ent
ertain
the po
ssibili
ty that
the en
viron
ment
might
be bet
ter se
wed t
hrough
econo
mic in
strume
nts.
The oi
t hear
d but
Inappropriate use at the term “license to pollute' as a description ol an eiiluent charge testlties to this problem. After all.
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a "Cer
tifica
te of
Appro
val o
r a Di
schar
ge Pen
nlt' r
eally i
s a li
cense
to pol
lute.
Econo
mic i
nstrum
ents
merit
a diffe
rent
label.
Nonet
heles
s. t
he sy
mboli
c rol
e pla
yed
by di
rect
r ul
ation
shoul
d not
be u
nder
estim
ated
and
any
use
or
econ
omic
instr
ument
s to
achie
ve v
irtual
elimi
natio
n wil
l lll
rey h
ave
to be
acco
mpan
ied
by di
rect
regul
ation
to co
ver
abno
rmal
occu
rren
ces
such
as l
eaks
and
spill
s. bu
t als
o to
give
the
right
mess
age.
Monitoringjeguiuameots
it is s
ometi
mes b
elieve
d that
the mo
nitori
ng req
uireme
nts fo
r eco
nomic
instru
ments
excee
d that
for di
rect r
egulat
ion.
This i
s a mo
ot poi
nt. i
n the
case
of the
virtual
elimin
ation
of per
sisten
t toxi
cs it i
s likel
y that
both
direct
regula
tion a
nd
most
types
of ec
onom
ic i
nstru
ments
requi
re th
at di
schar
ges
be m
onito
red.
in ge
neral
. if
a mo
nitor
ing
syste
m is
suffici
ent to
suppor
t a s
uccess
ful pr
osecut
ion t
hen it
should
also
be su
fficien
t for
an ef
fluent
char e
or emi
ssion
s
tradi
ng. H
owev
er, t
here
are s
evera
l pos
sible
excep
tions
to thi
s pos
ition
which
could
favou
r rel
iance
on
root
regul
ation
:
'
One
or a
few
case
s oi
non-
comp
lian
ce w
ith
a re
gula
tion
can
be s
uffic
ient
to s
uppo
rt a
pros
ecut
ion
wher
eas
an
efflu
ent
char
ge r
equi
res
that
disc
harg
es o
ver
a pe
riod
of t
ime
be e
stim
ated
and
for t
his a
stati
stica
lly v
alid
sampling procedure should be used;
-
if emis
sions
are tr
aded,
the re
gulato
ry aut
hority
has to
monito
r the
trades
as wel
l as t
he ind
ividua
l disc
harges
;
A re
gula
tion
can
requ
ire t
he i
nstal
latio
n oi
certa
in t
ypes
of e
quip
ment
for r
educ
ing
disc
harg
es.
The
pres
ence
or
abse
nce
lbtrt
less
so t
he o
pera
tion
of) t
his
equ'
pmen
t ca
n m
ore
easil
y be
moni
tore
d th
an t
he d
isch
arge
s
themselves.
With
non-
poin
t so
urce
s oi
pers
iste
nt t
oxic
s. m
onit
orin
g of
disc
harg
es
can
be
impo
ssib
le o
r ve
ry c
ostl
y.
The
use
of
chem
ical
s su
ch a
s me
rcur
y or
PCB
s ca
n be
limit
ed t
hrou
gh d
irect
regu
lati
on o
r ch
arge
s on
the
use
of t
he c
hemi
cal
rath
er t
han.
or a
s we
ll a
s, o
n it
s di
spos
al.
Exce
pt
in t
he c
ase
oi c
omp
let
e a
nd
imm
edi
ate
proh
ibit
ion
(wh
ere
dire
ct
regu
lati
on a
gain
has
the a
dvan
tage
) th
e mo
nito
ring
requ
irem
ents
for e
ach
wpr
oac
h ar
e sim
ilar.
MmMMuiLments
The
admi
nist
rati
ve r
equi
reme
nts
for d
irect
regu
lati
on a
re w
ell
know
n.
Admi
nist
rati
on o
f ec
onom
ic i
nstr
umen
ts i
s les
s
well
unde
rsto
od
thou
gh m
uch
can
be i
eame
d fr
om t
he m
ore
limit
ed e
xper
ienc
es o
f the
vari
ous
juris
dicti
ons t
hat h
ave
mad
e us
e of
them
. S
ome
prop
onen
ts o
f ec
onom
ic i
nstr
umen
ts b
elie
ve th
at th
ey a
re a
dmin
istr
ativ
ely
simp
ler
than
direC
t
regu
lati
on.
espe
cial
ly i
f at
temp
ts a
re m
ade
in d
irec
t re
gula
tion
to a
chie
ve a
cost
-eff
ecti
ve o
utc
ome
. T
he
amo
unt
and
typ
e o
f i
nfo
rma
tio
n o
n a
bat
eme
nt
cos
ts
req
uir
ed
by
the
reg
ula
tor
y a
gen
cy
tha
t w
ish
es
to
min
imi
ze
tota
l c
omp
lia
nce
cos
ts.
if a
vai
lab
le
at
all,
can
onl
y b
e o
bta
ine
d a
nd
ana
lyz
ed
at
con
sid
erw
le
cos
t.
(Th
is
poi
nt
is
exp
lor
ed
fur
the
r u
nde
r
the heading oi cost minimization.)
ﬂesibliilx
Dep
end
ing
on
the
mod
e o
i di
rect
regu
lati
on.
it ca
n b
e a
n e
xtre
mely
flex
ible
ach
that
take
s a
ccou
nt
of e
ach
indi
vidu
al s
ourc
e's
circ
umst
ance
s a
s we
ll
as
suc
h f
acto
rs a
s t
he c
ondi
tion
of t
rece
ivin
g w
ater
bod
y a
nd
loca
l
ciim
atol
o i
cal
cond
itio
ns.
The
sys
tem
of
dire
ct
regu
lati
on
in O
nta
rio
has
giv
en
amp
le
opp
ort
unit
ies
for
firm
s a
nd
mun
ici
pal
s t
o n
ego
tia
te
thei
r c
omp
lia
nce
pro
gra
ms
with
the
Mini
stry
of t
he
Env
iro
nme
nt.
Thi
s i
s a
stre
ngth
and
a
wea
kne
ss
of t
he
syst
em.
it is
a s
tren
gth
bec
aus
e it
allo
ws t
he M
inis
try
to b
e s
ensi
tive
to t
he a
bilit
y oi
a fi
rm o
r
muni
c'pa
llty
to p
ay f
or th
e re
quir
ed l
evel
oi co
ntro
l wi
th c
lue c
onsi
dera
tion
beln
gtgi
xen
to th
e im
pact
oi t
he s
ourc
es'
emis
sion
s on
the
envi
ronm
ent.
it is
a we
drn
ess
bec
aus
e it
lend
s it
self
to m
anp
ula
resu
ltin
g in
unac
cept
able
dela
ys
in the achievement of the Ministry's environmental protection oblectlves.
Rec
ent
init
iati
ves
in O
ntar
io s
uch
as t
he M
unl
cba
l i
ndus
tria
l S
trat
egy
for
Aba
tem
ent
(Ml
SA)
pro
gra
m a
nd
pro
pos
ed
revi
sion
s t
o R
egu
lat
ion
308
und
er
the
Ont
ari
o E
nvi
ron
men
tal
Pro
tec
tio
n A
ct
hav
e b
een
des
ign
ed
to
emp
has
ize
pre
ven
tio
n r
athe
r th
an
aba
tem
ent
and
to i
ncr
eas
e th
e li
keli
hood
of c
omp
lia
nce
by
rest
rict
ing
oppo
rtun
itie
s fo
r in
divi
dual
cir
cum
sta
nce
s t
o b
e a
llo
wed
for.
Thi
s c
han
ge
in
wpr
oac
h
has
req
uir
ed
som
e
for
fei
tur
e o
f t
he
llex
biil
ty
tha
t w
as
characteristic oi the older system of regulation.
Pro
pon
ent
s of
eco
nom
ic
inst
ntme
nts
stre
ss t
hat
one
of t
he a
dva
nta
ges
of t
hese
inst
rume
nts
is t
hat
they
intr
oduc
e a
deg
ree
of f
lex
that
is b
eyo
nd
the
sc
e o
f a
ny
sys
tem
of
dire
ct
regu
lati
on.
For
exa
mpl
e,
emi
ssi
ons
trad
ing
sys
tem
s l
imit
tota
l
din
gs
but
sou
rce
s a
re (
riﬂe
to
det
erm
ine
thei
r o
wn
sha
re
of t
his
tota
l b
y b
uy
and
sel
lin
g t
he
righ
t
to d
isc
har
ge
con
tam
ina
nts
into
the
env
iro
nme
nt.
Furt
her.
new
firm
s e
nte
rin
g a
n a
rea
mus
t
ain
an
app
'ate
qua
nti
ty
of
tra
dea
ble
emi
ssi
ons
by
pur
cha
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g t
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e w
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hol
d t
hem
.
Thi
s e
nsu
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t to
tal
loa
din
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not
inc
rea
se
wit
hou
t t
he
reg
ula
tor
y
hav
ing
to
int
erv
ene
.
(Co
ntr
ast
this
wit
h d
ire
ct
reg
ula
tio
n w
her
e a
new
ent
ran
t
will
add
to t
otal
load
i
s e
ven
' L
A R
(low
est
achi
evab
le
emis
sion
rate
) s
tand
ards
are
met
unle
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the
r u
lato
ry
age
ncy
spec
iilc
ally
re
uce
s t
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all
owd
ale
dis
cha
rge
s a
t o
ne
or
mor
e e
xist
ing
sou
rce
s t
o o
ftse
t t
hes
e a
diti
onai
loadings.)
Eff
lue
nt
cha
es
bri
a d
iif
ere
nt
typ
e o
f f
lexi
bili
ty.
Sou
rce
s c
an
sel
ect
the
ir
own
lev
el
of
dis
cha
rge
but
mus
t p
ay
acc
ord
ing
ly.
e c
ics
of
eff
lue
nt
cha
rge
s b
eli
eve
tha
t t
his
off
ers
too
mu
ch
flex
ibil
ity
but
thi
s i
s l
ess
of
a p
rob
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if
the
regu
lato
ry a
gen
cy
reta
ins
the
opti
on o
f ra
isin
g th
e ef
flue
nt c
har
ge t
o se
cur
e wh
ate
ver
leve
l of
total
disc
harg
es i
s
required. 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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One congtderation which has traditionally favoured the use of direct regulation is the belief that such regulations bring a
degree of certainty that economic instniments lack. However, for a number of reasons expectations that requrred limits
set DY “9911mm” M" be met have often been frustrated in practice. These include: a lack resources devoted in
monitoring and enforcement, a reluctance to prosecute, unfavourable decisions in the courts. low penalties. and a
concern about the socro-economic consequences of high compliance costs. Nevertheless. the perception that direct
llmgis set bydfegulatlon bn'ng assured results remains and should be considered when a decision about direct regulation
is eing ma 9.
  
it is not only the public that wants to see direct regulation. Such regulations can reduce the uncertainties facmg
dischargers who like to know what is being required of them. At the same time, this desire to know "the rules of the
game" can also make it difficult for the politicians and administrators to change the rules even when new evidence
suggests that Such changes are justified.
Qost Minimization
Perhaps the strongest argument against relyin too much on direct regulation is that it is not cost effective. The
argument that economic instruments are cost 9 ective is directly related to the flexibility of these instruments that was
described above. Under a conventional permrttin System it can easily happen that two sources of the same
contaminant face different marginal (i.e. incrementa mate of reducing discharges. By allowing the source for which
costs are higher to increase its level of dischar e and requiring the other. lower cost source to reduce its level of
discharge from both sources, the same combined evel of discharge can be maintained but at a reduced total cost.
To achieve an economically efficient allocation of discharges through direct regulation requires that the administration
has detailed knowledge of control costs at each source. However, if the sources are allowed to trade permits, the
sources themselves, who only have to know their own costs of control, will determine whether ermit trading is to their
mutual advantage. If it is, the savings in total costs will be realized without intervention by the ministration.
A similar argument can be made in favour of effluent charges. Faced with an effluent charge per unit of emission.
sources can be expected to reduce their emissions as long as it is cheaper to do so than to simply pay the effluent
charge. Providing different sources face the same effluent charge, the will all tend to reduce their emissions to the
point that the incremental costs of doing so are equal to the effuent ergo and therefore equal to each other. This
result will minimize the total costs of reducing the combined emissions from all sources that are subiect to the effluent
charge since no reduction in the total cost of emission reduction could be achieved by transferring emissions from one
source to another.
The degree to which economic instruments will. in practice. reduce the costs of meeting an environmental obiective
depends upon many factors not least of which is the variation in incremental reduction costs among the various sources
subject to control. The greater is the variation in these costs, the greater will be the potential savings from tradeable
permits and effluent charges. in the event that these costs are very similar, there will be little or no advantage in using
an economic instrument to meet an environmental obiective.
.‘LechnoiszaisaLErmss
Although efforts have been made to mate direct regulation “technology forcing' by requiring increasingly high levels of
performance, there remains a concern mm, for the most part, direct regulation actually discourages the development of
new technologies. One agument is that, for contaminants of reatest concern, regulatory agencies require sources to
meet standards at least equal to the best treatment techn y available. Therefore. the development of a new.
expensive technolo by a firm may actuallyopenalize the firm if it is obliged to install it. Since the cost of new
technologies cannot predicted in advance their development, firms have little incentive to invest resources into
developing technologies which may tum out to be costly to implement.
A coro
llary
to this
argum
ent is
tha fi
rms ot
her th
an the
sourc
es the
mselv
es ma
y res
pond
well t
o direc
t regu
lation
which
insists on the use of the best available technology since it assures them of a market for new technologies if regulatory
agencies can be convinced of their efficacy.
Econo
mic i
nstrum
ents
seem
to hav
e a c
onside
raiie
advan
tage
over
direct
regula
tion i
n stim
ulatin
g the
devel
opmen
t
and a
doptio
n of n
ew te
chnolo
gies.
Sourc
es wit
h trad
eable
emiss
ions
or tho
se pay
ing a
n effl
uent c
harge
can m
ake o
r
save
money
by red
ucing
discha
rges.
Knowi
ng thi
s. the
y hav
e an o
ngoing
‘lnoen
tive t
o find
ways
and m
eans
of red
ucin
their
disch
arges
and o
ne su
ch me
ans i
s the
devel
opmen
t of
new
to no
logies
. Siml
i ,
firms
in the
busin
ess 0
devel
oping
new
techn
ologi
es ca
n exp
ect t
o find
a rea
dy ma
rket
for p
roduc
ts or
proc
esse
s w
reduc
e emi
ssion
s.
mammalirtual Eimiaatism
This d
iscuss
ion of
criteri
a for
decidi
ng whe
ther
exclus
ive re
liance
should
be pl
aced
on dir
ect re
gulati
on for
achiev
ing
virtual elimination began with several reasons why direct regulation may be favoured over economic instruments. The
discus
sion t
hen c
onsid
ered
argum
ents
that s
ugges
t that
econo
mic i
nstrum
ents m
ay ha
ve ad
vent
as ove
r excl
usive
relian
ce on
direct
regula
tion:
cost m
inimiz
ation
and a
stimul
us for
techno
logica
l dev
elopm
ent be
ing
e mos
t impo
rtant.
There
is one
more
reaso
n for
includ
ing ec
onomi
c inst
rument
s in a
ram t
o achi
eve vi
rtual e
limina
tion o
f pers
istent
toxics:
that is
they m
ay al
low vir
tual el
iminat
ion to
be ac
hieve
d mor
e r
y. Th
ere ar
e two
reaso
ns why
this is
so.
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 Firstly, under direct regulation where iirrns in very different financial situations may be required to incur similar. high
compliance costs. there may be a concern that some plants will be forced to close if virtual elimination is achieved too
mildly and so the reduction schedule is set according to what the highest cost abater can afford. When emissions
trading is allowed such sources can buy cheaper abatement at other, lower cost sources thereby reducing the financial
obstacle to a more rapid wproach to virtual elimination.
Secondly, the traditional reliance on permits, monitoring, inspections, prosecutions, convictions and court imposed
penalties. with each stage subiect to considerable uncertainties and possible delays. hasu‘generaily failed to bring
compliance with environmental objectives at the rate expected. An effluent charge of s icient magnitude or an
emissions trading system based on a declini total loading could greatly increase the incentives for compliance. One
reason is that under direct regulation there is ittle or no incentive to control discharges beyond the permitted level if to
do so adds to costs. With emissions trading or effluent charges there is always a financial gain to be made from further
reductions.
As stated earlier. the choice is not necessarily between direct regulation and economic instruments, only between an
exclusive reliance on direct regulation and other wproaches. As subsequent stages in the decision tree will show,
financial enforcement incentives can be grafted on to a system of direct regulation which underlines the fact that. in
reality. the choice will be between exclusive reliance on direct regulation and some mix of direct regulation and
economic incentives. (Allowing emissions to be traded does very little per se for ensuring compliance and even with an
effluent charge direct sufficiently high to offer a real incentive for reduction. direct regulation w if still be required to deal
with unusual events such as leaks and spills.)
At this point. the decision tree branches either to direct regulation as the on tool for achieving virtual elimination or to
economic instruments to play a maior role in achieving Virtual elimination. ven if it is decided that direct re ulation
should be relied upon as the primary component in a regulatory Egogmm. the decision tree subsequently cons era the
role that financial enforcement incentives could play. On the of r hand. if the arguments in favour of some form of
economic incentive for achievi virtual elimination seem compelling when applied to a specific case. then the selection
of economic instruments at this ranch in the tree should not be seen as irrevocwle. if further analysis of the economic
options reveals that. while promising,they are unsuitable for any of a number of reasons which will soon come to light.
then reversion is still possible. '
To continue, therefore, with the analysis. it is assumed that a negative answer is given to question 3: is. there will not
be exclusive reliance on dired regulation. (Question 12 pursues the direct regulation option assuming that a positive
answer is given to question 3.)
D m4z9IIHhTﬂMUMbOLmW
The main difference between emissions trading and an effluent charge is whether the regulatory agency sets the total
quanti
ty or
unit p
rice o
f emis
sions.
Under
an em
issio
ns tra
ding s
ystem
, the
re ul
atory
agenc
y est
ablish
es a l
imit o
n
total a
llowab
le emi
ssion
s and
the ma
rket
in tra
deable
emiss
ions
sets t
heir pr
ice ga
nd the
refore
the pr
ice of
discha
rging
an additional unit). Under an effluent char 0, the regulatory agency sets t e price of discharging an additional unrt of
emission and the sources themselves if on their discharges.
in principle the two schemes are symmetrical and can be used to achieve the same results although the distributional
implications may be very different if Ing on what mechanism is used for the initial allocation of the tradeable
emissions and what is done with any funds received by the government.
When a dedslon has been listen to achieve virtual elimination over a period of tlme ills to be expected that a timetable
for achieving virtual elimination wil be established. Such a timetable may be restricted to an enqziolnt by which time
virtual elimination is to be achieved. it may also include milestones. expressed in terms of reducingthe quantity and/or
concentration of discharges. so that progress towards the ultimate goal can be monitored. owever, even this
app‘roach does not require that the discl'iarges be limited directly. This is a matter doout which a decision must be
ma 9.
MtFUWMIITﬂMMNWM
The most important criteria for dedding whether waste emissions should be limited directly (to. at interim. declining
non-zero levels on the way to virtual elimination relate to what is known about a) the emission reduction cost functions
in material and one y inputs in production, d' erent tecl'inologies. differences in the age and condition of equipment.
differences in plant 3 2e and differences in operating efficiency and the damage function .
3 The emission reduction cost function (which is somewhat broader in scope than a control or abatement cost function) is a
quantified relationship between reductions in emissions and costs. The function will be different for each reflectin differences
in material and energy i uts in production, different technologies. differences in the age and condition equipment.
differences in plant size an differences in operating efficiency.
‘ A damage function is a quantified relationship between a cause and a consequence. The cause might be the level of
discha
rge of
ambie
nt co
ncentr
ation
and t
he co
nsequ
ence
might
be th
e inc
reased
incide
nce of
mortal
ity or
morbid
ity in
any
living species.
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if the emission reduction cost functions are relatively steep, small variations in the allowable total il.9. from all sourcesi
emissions can have a dramatic effect on the Costs of compliance which will be reflected in the prices of tradeable
permits. An effluent charge has the advantage in this case by avoiding UfdelY high emission reduction costs without
sacrificing much in terms of the resulting level of total emissions.
However. if the damage function displays the existence of critical thresholds above the level of virtual elimination, a
strong case can be made for limiting emissions below these thresholds in the approach towards virtual elimination. For
example. once the concentration of a persistent toxic is reduced below one such threshold some uses of the water may
be considered sale. in this case. considerable benefits could be obtained prior to virtual . ninatlon providin the total
level oi emissrons is reduced below this critical level. Fie onses to an effluent charge can only be estimatet? and may
prove to be insufficient to meet the interim threshold. here may be delays before this is known and it may be
administratively difficult. if not impossible. to raise the effluent charge quickly to secure the desired result.
in contrast, an emissions trading system can be geared directly to the achievement of interim thresholds and can give
somewhat greater assurance that they will be met. It only requires that the total permitted level of emission be reduced
from one threshold level to the next until virtual elimination is achieved. (In most cases such thresholds, if they exist at
all, are more likely to exist in a relationship between ambient concentration and effect rather than quantity or quality of
emissions and effect. This detracts somewhat from this advantage of emissions tradin over effluent chargesi
Furthermore. the market price of the tradeable emissions will reveal useful inforrnatlon on t e costs of compliance as
the objective is achieved.
The a
bsenc
e of
evide
nce o
i thre
sholds
and/or
indica
tions
of ste
eply r
ising
discha
rge r
educti
on co
st fun
ctions
will
indicate that an effluent charge may be more suitable than emissions trading for achieving virtual elimination. Another
consideration that may lavour effluent one as is the absence of a large enough number of sources to ensure
compet
ition
in the
emiss
ions t
rading
market
. ro
m an
econo
mic s
tandpo
int. t
he ben
efits
of tra
de are
more
likely
to be
achie
ved
the
more
compe
titiv
e is
the m
arket
. T
his
gener
al
rlncb
le f
rom
econ
omic
theor
y ap
plies
to tr
ades
in
emiss
ions
as m
uch
as to
trade
in an
y oth
er go
od o
r ser
vice.
erelo
re, c
onsid
erati
on sh
ould
be 'g
iven
to th
e lik
ely
numbe
r and
relativ
e str
ength
of the
likely
partic
ipants
in an
emiss
ions
tradin
market
. Pos
sibil'
fee fo
r usi
ng th
e
owner
ship
of tra
deable
emiss
ions t
o rest
rict n
ew en
trants
and l
imit co
mpetit
ion 3
uld a
matter
of con
cern.
Even
if a
persistent texlc emanates from a large number of diverse sources, not all of these sources will necessarily be abieto
partic
ipate
in 3 p
ermits
market
. it m
ay be
especi
ally d
ifficult
to des
ign a
syste
m whi
ch ca
n invo
lve no
n-poin
t sour
ces
(eg. a
gricul
tural
and ur
ban ru
noff.
ion r
ange t
ranspo
rt) an
d/or p
oint s
ource
s for w
hich n
o-one
is res
ponsb
le (e.
g. som
e
so lmentary and groundwater sourcesg.
Whereas economic considerations call for a large number of potential buyers and sellers who are free to make whatever
trade
s ar
e in
their
mutua
l int
erest
s, th
ere c
an b
e en
viron
menta
l re
ason
s for
restri
ctln
the t
rade
in em
issio
ns e
ven
thoug
h the
total l
evel of
discha
rge is
unaffe
cted.
For ex
ample
. if th
ere is
a conc
ern th
at t
combi
ned d
ischar
ges wi
thin
a sub
-regio
n ma
y be
come
exces
sive
either
tradin
g zon
es wi
ll ha
ve to
be es
twllsh
ed, w
hich
reduc
es ma
rket
compet
itiven
ess.
or all
trades
will h
ave t
o be
subjec
ted t
o che
cks t
hat sp
ecifie
d leve
ls of
local
discha
rges
and/or
ambie
nt co
ncent
ratio
ns ar
e not
excee
ded.
By r
equir
ing a
dmini
strat
ively
impo
sed l
imits
of th
is sor
t the
possib
ilitie
s for
trade
are r
educe
d and
transa
ction
costs
are i
ncreas
ed, ag
ain l
esseni
ng the
gains
from
trade.
(This
featur
e of a
n
emissions trading system is pursued further in question 7.)
As thi
s disc
ussion
has s
hown.
many
consid
eratio
ns ha
ve a
bearin
g on
wheth
er emi
ssion
s trad
ing or
efﬂuen
t char
ges
are m
ore a
ppropr
iate
for ac
hievin
g virt
ual el
iminat
ion,
assum
ing t
hat so
me lo
an of
econo
mic i
nstrum
ent is
to be
select
ed. T
he op
tion o
f usin
g an
efflue
nt cha
r O
r som
e oth
er for
m of c
harge
s sys
tem (
deposi
t/refu
nd or
produc
t
charge
s) is
tdten
is) un
der q
uestio
n 9.
At th
s poin
t. it
is as
sumed
that e
missi
ons t
rading
is ind
icated
and t
he
consequences of selecting such an instrument are explored.
D Misw‘fI—INTUHIMWM?
There
are t
wo ma
in wa
ys of
design
ing a
syste
m of
emiss
ions
tradin
g to a
chiev
e virt
ual el
iminat
ion.
The f
irst wa
y
requir
es the
regula
tory a
gency
to pro
gressi
vefy l
imit th
e tota
l quan
tity o
f trad
edale
emiss
ions a
vailab
le. T
his ca
n be
acco
mpli
shed
by is
surng
permi
ts fo
r a f
ixed
perio
d of
time
after
which
the a
llo
me e
missi
ons a
re re
vised
down
ward
until the total quantity is consistentth virtual elimination however it is defined.
A se
cond
meth
od d
escr
ibed
by T
lete
nber
g (1
985)
is fo
r th
e re
gula
tory
agen
cy t
o is
sue
perm
its
that
must
be r
etire
d
when
they
are u
sed.
The
numb
er of
permr
ts is
sued
corre
spond
s to
the t
otal a
ilowd
sle d
ischa
rge b
etwe
en th
e tim
e the
sys
tem
is i
niti
ated
and
virt
ual
elim
inat
ion
is a
chie
ved.
Tiet
enbe
rg r
efer
s to
this
as a
sys
tem
of c
umul
ativ
e em
rssi
on
permits.
The p
ermit
s the
msel
ves d
o not
have
a tim
e dim
ensio
n; th
e hol
der h
as c
ompl
ete f
reed
om wh
en
to em
it. H
owev
er,
cumu
lati
ve e
miss
wn p
ermi
ts d
o no
t reg
ulat
e em
issi
on r
ates;
they
llmlt
total
emissions (tons rather than tons per yearl in this market the permits are an exhaustble
resource; once used they are withdrawn from circulation.
(Tletenberg 1985: 29)
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 Tietenberg discusses a cumulative emission permit system in the context of "uniformly mixed acoumulat‘rve pollutants.‘
For pollutants that mix uniionnly location does not matter. if mixing ls not uniform then the scheme may have to be
mod led by imposing additional constraints on trades at the sip-regional level.
For th
e cas
e that
Tteten
berg
does
consid
er he
shows
that t
he sta
ndard
result
obtain
ed fr
om th
e theo
ry of
exhaus
tible
resour
ces éH
otelli
ng 193
1) app
lies t
o the
price
of a c
umulat
ive em
issio
n perm
it an
d to t
he tot
al quan
tify1 o
f emis
sions
per
year provi ing competition prevails. This result is that as the unused permits diminish over time. t e real price of a
permit will rise at a rate equal to the rate oi interest and the quantity emitted in each year will decline until virtual
elimination is achieved. (Technical change can modify this result.)
CrlarhS:ForDedhgontrUehWBnissimPemls
The apparent simplicity of cumulative emission permits is most obvious when the contaminants mix unilonnly and the
location of the discharges is irrelevant. Whether or not this situation applies depends on mixing patterns and on the
relevant damage functions. in the absence of the necessary information it may be wise to assume that location does
matter and that local as well as regional effects of persisth loxics are ol concern.
Even when a contaminant is persistent and toxic. it seems unlikely that the eftects of discharges on the ecosystem will
be independent oi their timing. Without additional constraints. a trading system does allow for the entire permitted
quantity of a contaminant to be discharged at one time as well as in one place. Unless there is extremely high
confidence in the belief that the tem ral pattern of discharge has no real bearing on the ecosystem effects it would be
unwise to leave decisions about tim ng exclusively to market forces. There is also the possb lit that once all permits
have been used q) pressure will be brought to beer for additional permits to be issued. T is possibility may be
sufficient to reject this tom of tradeable permits for achieving virtual elimination.
The i
mposit
ion of
local
limits
on di
schar
ges in
combi
natio
n with
cumula
tive e
missi
on pe
rmits
is tak
en up
in que
stion
7.
As Fl ure 1 shows rejection of cumulative emission permits results in the selection of a system wherein the allowable
emiss
ons d
ecline
s ove
r time
. Bot
h sys
tems
requir
e a me
thod
for al
locati
ng the
initial
allowd
sle em
issio
ns an
d this
is
the topic of question 6.
allusions: MTmhbeBudmlieExﬂthoer-ﬂe?
Under
a sys
tem o
t trad
eable
emissi
ons,
where
the to
tal pe
rmitte
d emi
ssion
s dec
line o
ver ti
me, th
e simp
lest w
ay of
initiat
ing th
e sys
tem is
to all
ow exi
stl
sourc
es to
start
tradin
g thei
r perm
itted
or act
ual qu
antiti
es (wh
icheve
r is l
ess).
To achieve virtual elimination the qua oi discharg'e allowed by aJiermIt would have to decline over time such that a
permit which allows x Kg of discharge this year wi only allow a ischarge of y K next year (y < x). Through this
means. emissions trading could tdte place but eventually virtual elimination woud be achieved according to the
predetermined timetable. One example at such a system is the trade in "emission reduction credits" used in the United
States (see section 3.2 above).
0M6: WWWTMMNMNNMWM
There
are tw
o poss
lb c
onflic
ting c
riteria
to be
consi
dered
in dec
iding
this qu
estion
: i) wh
ether
an ini
tial di
stribut
ion of
allowwie emissions equitable and ii) whether any other initial distrbution could be introduced without strong
opposition from existing sources.
There are several implications oi givlrtg the right to trade existing emissions according to the existing permits. First. it
conver
ts th
e righ
t to p
ollute
into a
right w
hich
has a
realiz
wle e
conom
ic va
lue.
This
econo
mic v
alue
accru
es to
the
polluters rather than to those aauahy or potentially exposed to the eflects of the persistent toxics. is this fair?
Secon
d. th
e larg
est re
allzdi
le ec
onomi
c val
ue am
rues
to the
larges
t sour
ces.
These
may
be th
e very
sourc
es th
at
have done the least in the past to reduce their discharges. This seems lite a perverse way to reward such behaviour
and i
t may
have
implic
ations
for fu
rther
extens
ions
oi em
issio
ns tra
ding:
sourc
es ma
y del
iberat
ely i
ncreas
e thei
r
emiss
ions
in mtl
cbatl
on of
receiv
in a
raster
share
of the
tradea
ble em
ission
s. (T
o som
e exte
nt thi
s beha
viour
can
be avoided b dlstr'butlng the mantis emissions according to some historical level oi emissions but to do so
introduces a ltional cements not only tout the current relevance of these historical levels of emissions but also about
the accuracy oi the measurements.)
Third. by conferring an economic advantage on the exislin sources, new firms wishing to establish themselves in the
Great
Lakes
basin
may b
e disc
ourage
d, ev
en it t
he tec
hno og
ies th
ey pl
anto u
se ar
e less
pollut
ing th
an th
ose of
their
competitors.
Despite the possible inequities in ailocatln tradeable emissions according to current permitted or actual emissions. it
may be infeasble to do any thing’gery d erent (e.g. auction the emissions) owing to the opposition that this might
evok
e fro
m the
sourc
es.
Even
if t
overa
ll ad
vant
ages
that
emiss
ions
tradi
ng mi
ght b
ring
is ac
cept
ed b
y the
exist
ing
sources they will be determined to reap some portion oi these advantages. a most obvious lorrn that these
wmso
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advantages will take is in cost reductions. However. no source can be assured of a cost reduction if. in addition to the
costs of reducing emissmns. they also have to pay for their initial. re—trade share of the tradeable emissions. The
possibility of imposing a tax on the level of tradeable emissions h by an source to return some of their economic
value to the government may also be difficult to introduce for this reason. i e issue of what the government might do
with the revenues accruing from an auction or a tax on tradeabie emissions is taken up under question it.)
Decisions about the initial allocation of the tradeable permits are inextricably tied to decisions about the level and
allocation of the financial burden that such schemes involve. Whatever decision is made on this matter. and the
decision tree in Fi ure 1 shows two possibilities. itrade based on existl permitted or actual discharge and a permits
auction). the quest on of additional limits to protect local areas must be ad ressed.
W7: anldUnlsmTradeebelupoeedIoPmtedLodNea?
Additional limits to protect local areas have been imposed with respect to air emissions. where trading systems have
been most extensively used. These limits are designed to ensure that ambient concentration standards are met and/or
that ambient concentration levels do not increase. There may well be a concern that ambient concentrations should be
limited even as virtual elimination is approached. One of the risks of trading systems is that. in the absence of specral
measures to protect local environments. ambient concentrations of persistent toxlcs in these environments may rise
unacceptably.
Crlerh7: FwDediliglenlsonTmhsSfuldbeWbPrMLodNeu
if there is evidence that shows a relationship between ambient concentrations leg. in sediment or in benthic
communities) and effects on species h her up the food chain that is charaderized by thresholds. then there are good
grounds for restricting trades such that t ese critical ambient concentrations are not exceeded. Even in the absence of
such evidence. it may be deemed grudent to prevent an accumulation of tradedile emissions at specific locations which
are believed to be at risk if am lent concentrations rise. Proximity to sensitive ecological areas leg. wetlands.
spawning areas. breeding grounds. municipal water empties) might be reason enough to regulate trades such that
ambient concentrations (or combined discharges) do not rise.
This concludes the discussion oi the portion of the decision tree that deals speciﬁcally with emissions trading. (The
possibility of combining financial enforcement incentives with emissions trading or direct r ulation is idien up under
question 13.) Previously. a 'no' in response to question 4 (should quantities be limited direc ?) would have lead to the
selection of effluent charges (or some other charges system) for achieving virtual elimination once it was decided that
exclusive reliance on direct regulation was unwise. There are several questions and criteria for evaluating the role that
charges might beginning with question 8.
came MmEﬂthfmebeWmErm-‘I
in principle. an effluent charge can be used to achieve virtual elimination. This can be accomplished by increasing the
level of the charge to induce greater and greater reductions in the quantity and/or concentration of emissions. An
announcement that the effluent charge will e raised periodically. say every year. until virtual elimination is achieved
may hasten the process since the expectation of an ever increasing effluent charge will justify a greater level of
expenditures to reduce emissions than an effluent charge which may or may not be raised in the future.
Crier“: FaDedlqlmEtht-pmuwaedmm
if virtual elimination is the god but the precise path towards it is unimportant (or there is insufficient iniorrnation to know
what the path should be) then an effluent charge that increases over time may be referable to emissions trading. First.
the administrative requirements of an effluent char 9 may be more modest. ( or the reasons given in response to
question 7. the local environment may only be a equately protected if trades are regulated.) Second. an effluent
charge is not wedtened if only a few sources. which may not compete effectiveiy in an emissions trading market. are
involved. Sources large or smal. many or few. all have to pay the charge end will all have an economic incentive to
reduce their discharges.
Third. an effluent charge wil generate revenues. Question 9 examines whether this is an advantage or not. it is
certainly one reason why governments are taking a iresh look at effluent charges and magmas them more acceptable
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 The iinai consideration to be considered is whether or not emissions can be monitored reliably enough to support an
eiiluent charge. Monitoring is also required ior direct re uiation but it may be less demanding to determine ii a source
is in compliance with a speciiied level at emission than t e precise level oi emission. Furthermore. it sell-monitonng is
used there would be an increased incentive ior under reporting than with direct regulation since every unit reported
would add to a source's costs.
Despite these complications, an eiiluent charge has the potential to be an extremely powerlul tool in the arsenal oi
instruments aimed at virtual elimination. What to do with the revenues is the next question it charges are to be
considered iurther.
A negative answer to this question does not necessarily entail a reiection oi all systems oi charges. One possibility is a
charge on speciiic materials to discourage their use. This possibilit is addressed in question it. For now. an
aiiirmative answer is assumed and the issue oi what. it anything, to o with the possible revenues from an eiiluent
charge is considered.
C] mam-immumm
The success oi an eiiluent charge to achieve virtual elimination oi persistent toxics will be marked by the diswpearance
oi any substantial revenues. However. belore that point is reached the potential revenues irorn a system oi eiiluent
charges could be considerable. Hence. the interest oi some governments in "green taxes."
The danger in using an eiiluent charge to raise revenues is that the achievement ol virtual elimination will coniiict with a
government’s revenue requirements and this might mdte it diiilcuit or even impossble to continually raise the charge
until all toxic emissions are eliminated.
An efﬂuent charge can be revenue neutral (i.e. generate no additional revenues ior government) it a commitment is
made to adjust other tax rates downwards so that total government revenues remain unchangz‘d. in pradice this may
be diiticuit to do because it requires adiustments to the rates irorn what they would otherwise e been in the absence
oi an efﬂuent charge and this is a matter oi speculation not tact. .
One approach to revenue neutrality that should be analyzed very careluiiy before implementation is to reimburse the
sources that pay the eiiluent c e thro h some ionn oi subsidy to hep deiray the costs oi reducing emissions. The
danger with t is approach is thatt e says may undermine rather than reinlorce the very incentives ior action that an
eiiluent charge is sipposed to olier.
Crlulat Whammth
Revenue neutrality is important it revenue generation threatens to compromise the eiiectiveness oi an eiiluent charge.
It may also be a heblu feature in persuading sources to accept an eiiluent charge because total revenues paid to
government will not be allected. (Moniehal sources may be problematic in this regard.)
Revenue neutrality may be a deilnlte handlch ii revenue generation is one oi the main reasons why a broad
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elimination.
ll revenue neutrality is reiected a dedsion must be made about what to do with the iunds generated which is the topic at
question to.
D thmmhMbMPw-u?
The revenues inom an eiiluent charge (or irom auctioned emission " hts') can be tied to speciiic government
expenditures or go into the consolidated iund as one oi many categories 0 revenue out at which government iunds its
programs.
cilarhlo: ForDedrltglmeeﬂedePIw-u
Opinion polls indicate that 'green taxes' may be the only ty oi new taxes that the public will ay without much
resistance. However. the same polls also indicate that the pu ic wants to know how the iunds will e spent. Ii these
polls show a widely held view that will endure then revenues may have to be tied to speciiic programs it there is to be
an eiiluent charge on persistent toxics.
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prospect of their funding drying up as virtual elimination is achieved and the revenue from the effluent charge
approaches zero.
The final step in the decision tree goes back to question to which asked if a charge should be put on the effluent.
Previous questions examined the implications of a positive response to this question. Question 13 examines those of a
negative response.
Cl QiesﬁmltzgnMaNmmaugebethdepedhm?
it effluent monitoring is too unreliable or too expensive to support an effluent charge. or their is a risk that a charge will
result in intermedia transfers. a reasonable alternative can be a charge on a product that is used as an input to
production providing that it is closely correlated with the emission oi the unwanted persistent lexic. (For example. a
charge imposed on the use oi mercury or P083 will discourage their use and encourage a search for aftemativesi
Altematively. a depcsmrefund system on products that can cause a release of persistent toxics (e.g. batteries) can be
useful for ensuring reuse. recycling and proper disposal.
The problem with charges on inputs is that they provide very little incentive for improved management of a material
once it has been purchased (except to make internal recovery and reuse mar inaily more attractivel In particular. input
charges do not directly penalize the action that is to be deterred which is t discharge of persistent toxics into the
environment. Therefore. their effectiveness is thought to be less than that oi an effluent charge though their range of
application may be greater. Non—point sources are seldom amenmle to an effluent charge but they can sometimes be
effectively discouraged with a charge on specific products. A charge on toxic chemicals used in agriculture is but one
example.
Product charges can also be imposed at the oint of sale to final consumers. Ideally. such a charge would be related to
the quantity of persistent toxics discharg at all stages oi production. consumption and die sal of the product.
However. unless an extremely detailed sc
production process. a product charge will generally be too remotely related to the emission oi persistent toxics to be
effective for achieving virtual elimination.
Crierhii: WWMIWMMhMme
E i
I V
v The main criteria for deciding this question are whether effluent monitoring is problematic and whether there is a close
I S
edule of charges is used. which differentiates not only y product but also by
correlation between the quant of a product purchased (either as an input or final consumption) and the quantity of a
persistent toxic released. if a lgh proportion of a persistent toxic entering the Great Lutes environment comes from
non-point sources then a charge on specific products could be useful in achieving virtual elimination. Also. some
non-point sources such as agricultural runoff. may be responsive to product charges even when effluent charges are
impractical.
Similar issues relating to revenue neutral as were discussed under an effluent charge also aply to a charge on
specific products. One way of imposing suc a charge that avoids revenue is through a deposit/refund system.
A deposit/refund system imposed on products which contain persistent toxics can hep ensure that the materials are
recovered and reused and then ultlrnately d 386 of in a arattvzl‘zmsafe manner by physical and chemical
treatment. incineration or in a secure landflﬂ. hese measures d hep nate persistent toxics from entering the
environment.
The main Criterion for assessing the solubility of a deposit/refund system for persistent toxics is whether the requisite
infrastnicture exists or can be created. Care must be taken to ensure that the various steps in the system can be
undertaken safety without risking unwanted and possbly large discharges of the contaminants into the env ronment.
This concludes the section of the decision tree that deals with economic incentives except in the loan of financial
enforcement incentives. These are a possibility in coniunctlon with direct regulation or tradeable emission permits.
Question 12 reverts to a further consideration of direct regulation assuming that the conditions for economic
instruments, particularly emissions trading and effluent charges are not met.
CI WIZMM“WTWNW
Regulations can be promulgated that llrnlt the allowed quantity that a source may discharge into the Great Lakes
environment. Such regulations leave it to the individual sources to determine how they will meet the limits imposed on
them. This is the approach usually followed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Another mproaoh is to have
regulations which specify those processes (including raw materials and produa characteristics) and/or control
technologies that are allowed or prohibited.
The first approach allows a greater range of choice to the sources sub to regulation which lowers overall compliance
costs. it also makes clear that responsibility for meeting the re ulat ns rests unambiguously with the sources. This
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WP+50 (August 9, 1991) ‘ 29
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TABLE 5.IA Summary of Evaluation Framework (Questions 1 to 3. continued)
    
QUESTION DIRECT REGULATION ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT ANSWER
2 II done at once. outright ban Financial burdens can be No, not at once so can
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well understood. More dltilcult are uncertain. Easier It
to regulate cost’etiectively goal is to regulate cost
effectively
Negotiations allow tor consld- Allow decentralized decision-
erable ilexblllty In lmplement- making about how to achieve
atlon. but may result in reduction targets
considerable delay
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 TABLE 5.1A Summary of Evaluation Framework (Questions 1 to 3, continued)
       
thresholds are likely to be ambient; setting
trademle permits with an eye to ambient
needs is more diiilcuit
will be achieved. The question becomes: is
it more costly to be uncertain mout the
resulting ievei oi watement?)
oi abatement?)
  
QUEST
ION
DIREC
T REGU
LATIO
N
ECONO
MIC I
NSTRU
MENT
ANSWE
R
I
:1 Appears to give certainty oi
(mused) result. but track record does
USE DIRECT not bear this out. Appears to
REGuATm increase predictability oi
EXCLUSIVELY? regulatory outcomes
Less
cost-
eiiec
tive.
Very
Allo
w eq
uali
zati
on oi
marg
-
.
difﬁcult to administer to gain inal abatement costs.
detailed knowledge oi control Sources have incentive to
costs minimize costs to same
marginal level. it marginal .
abatement watement costs are
similar for all Iirms. much
oi the advantage is lost.
(Still retain advantage oi
speeding the process with
economic instruments)
Deve
lopm
ent
oi ne
w con
trol
innov
ation
s will
save
mone
y,
'1
technology/technique may so are encouraged (but in
increase doaternent costs. Dis- both cases, standards are set
incentive to innovation on basis oi known technology)
Envi
ronm
enta
l obj
ecti
ves
may
.
be achieved more quickly as
all need not move at pace oi
highest cost tater. Eiiiuent
charge is a bigger incentive
to act than lines lor non-
compliance .
Continued on Tmle 5.18
TABL
E 5.1
3 Sum
mary
oi Eva
luatio
n Fra
mewor
k (Que
stion
s 4 to
13)
‘
QUEST
ION
DlSCU
SSlON
CONCL
USION
.
4. iii cost lundions are steep. eiiiuent In princple, the two schemes are symetrical
LMT charge gives better control over reduction i
W charges
BY QUANTITY oil damage iunotlon has critical threshold in the absence oi steep costs or thresholds,
ORM
AM
and ii
respo
nse to
etilue
nt cha
rge is
etilue
nt cha
rges
may b
e mor
esuit
wie.
(In
ABATBBIT uncertain. may be better to iix total practice, there will be a significant
COST discharge level with a permit. However, level oi uncertainty as to the result that
wr>+so (August 9. 1991)
Continued
32
 
 {
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
TABLE 5.18
summary of Evaluation Framework (Questions 4 to 73, continued)
 
QUESTION DISCUSSION CONCLUSION
4. (Catered) Market only won<s it there are enough sources
LMTT to ensure competltlon in the market ior permits
DlSCHARGES May be potential to use permits to exclude new
BY OUANTTTY entrants. Some emitters may not be in a pos-
OR MAXNUM ition to trade (nonpolnt oi past dumping sitesl
ABATBAENT
COST?
5. in the absence oi evidence to the contrary, it (This creates a signiiicant burden on the
TRADE: BY is salest to assume that timing and location use oi any economic instrument. Any
GMDUAL RED- oi discharges does matter. Concern that all reason to believe that cumulative permit
ucnorr 0F of pollutant may be discharged at once in one is particularly burdened?)
TOTAL PERJITS place
AVAlAﬁE OR
BY ISSUNG
ALL PBNTTS
AT 0465 AS AN
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RESOURCE?
ii Should economic value oi permit go to the class (Could auction the permrtsl
TRADE BASE oi polluters? And, in particular, to the
As CURRBiT biggest polluters? May discourage new entrants
PEMTTED on too. It may be impossible to do anything else
CURRENT ACTUAL due to opposition from existing sources. Could
DiSCHARGE? impose a tax on the permits to recover some oi
the value
7. May wish to ensure that local thresholds are
TRADES: not exceeded
LN" TO
PROTECT LOCAL
AREAS?
a ll the precise path toward virtual elimination is
EFFLUENT unimportant (or lndetermlndalel, a gradually in-
CHARGES: creasing eiiluent chage may be preierable. Wlil
USE“Bil? require less administration. Market size won't
matter. The more a charge has to be reilned to
account ior varialons in local or ambient eiiects
or tlrne or yea. etc., the harder it will be to
implement. Requiring dischargers to pay a tee
over and above abatement costs involves a redis-
tributlon oi income which will be resisted.
Monitoring requirements may be higher
9. May have political consequences -- aliectlng
EFFLUBiT grow/budget
CHARGES:
REVBOUE
PEUTRAL?
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QUESTION DISCUSSION CONCLUSION
10. Revenues required by a given program may and (Tax could be instituted to raise revenues
EFFLUENT up differing from revenues received. Revenue notwithstanding virtual elimination by
CHARGES: USE shortfall when goal achieved direct regulation)
TO FIND
SPECIFIC
PROGRAMS?
If. Spread net too widely. Don‘t locus on dlsc’n- (Does cost of further monitoring exceed
USE arge. Mates sense only where monitoring cost of casting not too wide?)
NON-REFWDARE discharge ls difficult, eg. nonpoint. It a
PMDUCT high proportion ol sources are nonpoint. may
CHANGES? be useiul. Deposit/refund option would avoid
putting burden on nondischarger and be non-
revenue raising. FIe: deposit/refund: How
easy will It be to set up the necessary
infrastructure?
1?. 9mm: Less range oi choice lirer leads
SPECIFY to higher compliance costs. Still needs to
PMCESS ensure proper operation, maintenance of
COMM equipment.
TECHOOLOGY? AWE: ll monitoring is difficult; it
sources have less expertise than government
in selecting tedinologles; may need to mandate
spill avoidance
13. Examples are performance bonds and emission
USE FNANCW. charges on excess quantities. Excess charge
NCBITIVES? is more closely tied to level of exceedence
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6.0
ECONOMIC
INSTRUMENTS
AND
VIRTUAL
ELIMINATION
OF
DISCHARGES
OF
MERCURY
At one time. the discharge oi mercury to the Great Lakes basin was almost entirely irom chlor-alkali plants. These
plants were lirequently located near pulp and paper mills. due to those mills' need for bleaching chemicals. Brine was
eiectrolyzed to mercury cells to produce c iorine as well as sodium hydroxide and hydrogen.
Today. neariy all oi the old chlor-aikali plants have either closed or they have been convened to non-mercury cell
processes and the law plants that continue to use the old process have reduced their mercury emissions markedly. However.
mercury levels in iish are still a matter of concern in many areas oi the Great Lakes basin (lntemational Joint Commission
1989} and iurther reductions in discharges of mercury to the basin are being sought.
in the early 19705, reducing merCUry discharges seemed a strai htiorward matter. In Canada. ior instance. chlor-aikali
plants were required to limit their mercury discharges to a certain quant per tonne oi chlorine production capacity. For other
industries. mercury dischages became a matter to be considered in the grantingeoi discharge permits. The lirst section oi this
chapter will indicate that a ieving iurther reductions in mercury discharges will more complex.
The mercury which is now enterin the Great Lakes basin comes irom diverse sources the relative importance of which
is pooriy understood. Contaminated s ments. the i acy oi past discharges. are certainly a prominent source. Deposition
irom the air is also important. apparently accounting or about three quarters oi depositions resulting irom ongoing human
activity. The main source oi emissions oi mercury to the air is its evaporation irom a wide variety oi mercu containing
iinished products such as batteries. paints. electrical switches. dental sippiles. control instruments and rIIghts. The
incineration oi products in which mercury has been used. in particular batteries. is also a signiilcant source 01 emissions. The
combustion oi coal also releases substantial quantities oi mercury to the air. Mercury discharged diredly to water appears to
be enterin the basin mainly through sewage treatment plants. The sources oi the mercury entering sewage treatment plants
are not we I known.
The control oi the discharge oi mercury. considered in the second section at this chwter. can be achieved In a number
oi ways. Many local memory contamination problems can probably be cleared ip by remediation oi sediments in a iew
locations u particulariy near the sites oi the old chlor-aliaii plants. The non-essential use oi mercu in products such as paint
and batteries is currently virtually unregulated. These uses could be reduced and ultimateiy en entirely. incinerators and
coal-tired power plants could install more eiiective pollution control devices to reduce mercury as well as other metal
emissions.
6.1 Sources oi Mercury
Estimates oi the quantity oi mercury discharges into the Great Lakes irom industry (direct discharges). sewage
treatment lame. and atmospheric deposition are summarized in Tables 6.1 (all ldtesl to 6.7 ior each lake and the t.
Lawrence iverl. It is important to realize that these data are iar irom complete and are not cons red to be very accurate.
Nevertheless. the overall picture that emerges is believed to be reasondaie and Is oi some use in assessing the role that
economic instniments could play in achieving virtual elimination oi mercury discharged into the Great Luise.
TABLE 6.1 Sources at Mercury Discharges to the Great Lites Basin (Total)
Tonnes/year KIlograms/day Kilograms/day Percent 9
SOURCE Dolan 1985 Dolan 1985 Dolan 1988 Dolan 19
iNDUSTRiAL DIRECT 0 05 0%
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT 1 23 12%
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 8.08 76%
TRIBUTARIES 1 27 12%
TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 10.63 100%
Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datwase, US EPA; TRI Toxic Release inventory. U.S. EPA
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Tables 6.2 to 6.7 suggest that the individual sources oi mercury are widely scattered. This is true 01 the sewage
treatment plants and the atmospheric sources. (Though it should be noted that in Late Erie, where iniormaticn ior a large
number 01 sewage treatment plants is available. six plants account ior most oi the mercury discharges.) Glass et al. (1990)
indicate that the incineration oi municipal reiuse is a signiiicant source oi the atmospheric deposition oi mercury in the Great
Lakesé incinerators in the U.S. and ten in Ontario. Five U.S. and one Canadian incinerator in the r ion have capacities over
18.000 kg/hr oi waste. The U.S. National Emission Standard lor Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAG33) aliows 3.200 g/day oi
mercury to be emitted to air b a sewage slu e incinerator. European domestic garba e has been iound to contain an
average 3-403 oi Hg/‘tonne, ut 50% oi whch is accounted ior by used batteries ( eimann 1986). Some individual
countries. so as Denmark, however, separate dry-cell batteries irom household wastes through a collection system operated
through the retail outlets where the batteries are sold.
TABLE 6.2 Sources oi Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes Basin (Lute Superior)
Tonnes/year Kilograms/day Kilograms/day Percentggg
SOU
RCE
Dola
n 19
90
STO
RET
STO
RET
1988
Dola
n 1
lNDUSTRlAL DiRECT/lNDlRECT 0.00 0%
Michigan Callahan Mining 0.0001
White Pine C 0.0079
Minnesota U.S. Steel - . 0.0008
-Ontan‘o James River Marathon) 0.0004
TE -Corunna 0.0001
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT N/A N/A
Minnesota Western Lake Stperior 0.400
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSiTiON 2.64 78%
TRIBUTARiES 0.74 22%
Ontario Black Sturgeon 0.092
Little Pic 0.065
Npigon 1.296
Pic 0.113
White 0.220
Wisconsin Nemadii 0.231
TOTAL FOR AVAiLABLE DATA 3.38 100%
Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datwase. U.S. EPA; TRi Toxic Release inventory. U.S. EPA
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This iindlng was discussed with a swim oiiicial at the Ontario Ministry oi the Environment who believed it to be correct.
However. the Ministry has very little iniormation on the sources oi this atmospheric deposition.
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mercury emissmns tor the US.7 seem far too low. What emerges from Table 6.8 is that anthropogenic sources oi air
emissions of mercury (650 lonneS/year) exceed emissions irom natural sources (500 tonnes/year). The use oi linished goods
I352 tonnesxyear. most of Which comes irom aim and electrical equrpment), coal tired power stations I113 tonnes/year).
municipal and sewage sludge incinerators l 8 and 36 tonnes/year. respectively) account lor almost 90% oi the total
anthropogenic sources. Although similar data do not exist lust tor the Great Lakes basin it is likely that a similar pattern 01
emission sources exrsts there too.
TABLE 6.3 Sources 01 Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes Basin (Lake Michigan)
TonneSIyear Kilogram/day Kilogram/day Percenta 9
SOURCE Dolan 1990 STORET STORET 1988 Dolan 19
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT 0.00 0.0251 0%
Michigan Hitachi Ma netic 0.0018
Wisconsin Bergstrom aper 0.0153
J.I. Case 0.0059
Waupaca Foundry 0.0021
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT 0.40 23%
Wisconsin Neenah Menasha 0.6400
Racine 1.1000
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 1.29 74%
TRIBUTARIES 0.05 3%
‘lndlana Burns 0.019
Trail 0.123
TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 1.74 100%
Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datmase, US. EPA; TRI Toxic Release inventory, US. EPA
TABLE 6.4 Sources 01 Mercury Discharges to the Great Lures Basin (Lake Huron)
Tonnes/ ear Kilo rams/day Kilogram/day Percent
SOURCE Dolan 1 ST RET STORET 1988 Dolan 1
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT N/A N/A
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT N/A N/A
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 2.15 91%
TRIBUTARIES 0.21 9%
-Ontario French 0.203
Mississauga 0.157
Nottgwasaqa 0.027
au 0.071
8% 0.084 .
The Cut 0.038
TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 2.36 100%
Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datwase. US. EPA; TRI Toxic Release inventory, US. EPA
7 Similar data was obtained ior Ontario irom Jacques 11987) but arenot considered very reliable. The estimated totals oi live
tons per year irom Ontario and 31 tonnes per year irorn Canada seem far too low.
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 TABLE 6.5 Sources 01 Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Erie) ~
Tom ear Kilo rams/day Ki rams/day Percent Kilogram/day A
SOU
RCE
Doia
n1
ST
RET
1985
ST
BET
1988
Doia
n1
TRI
198
8
‘
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT/iNDiRECT 0.00 0%
-indiana Gn‘dcraﬂ 0.0001
Stanscrew 0.0001
0010 BP OiI-Oregon 0.3113
LCP Chemical-Ammonia 0.0075
Summit! Comm. Fish 0.0017
-Pennsy1vania Gunnieon Bros. Tannery 0.0000
Maiinckrodt-Ene (to STP) 0.3113
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT 0.80 36%
Michigan A nac 0.0000
etroit 0.6200
Port Huron 0.0200
-Ohio Akron 0.1100
Archboid 0.0000
Aehtabuia 0.0000
Avon Lake 0.0100
Bedtord 0.0100
Bedtord Heights 0.0000
Beiievue 0.0000 -
Berea 0.0100
Blufton 0.0000
Bowling Green 0.0000
Bryan .
meme 0.0100
C e 0.0000
Conneam 0.0000
Cuyahoga 0.0500
Defiance 0.0100
003 0.0100
lyria 0.0000
Findlay 0.0200
Foetaria 0.0000
Geauga 00.. Madariane 0.0200
Kent 0.0000
Ldre Co., Mentor 0.0100
Law 00.. Madison 0.0000
Linwood 0.0100
Lima 0.0200
Lomin. East Side 0.1100
Lucas Co. 0.0100
Medina Co. $01 0.0000
Medina Co. 02 0.0000
Middleburg Hews 0.0100
ilan 0.0000
Mompeiier 0.0000
Nmoiean 0.0000
North Oimstead 0.0000
Norm Royaiton 0.0000
N.E. Ohio. Region #1 0.0000
N.E. Ohio, Region #2 0.0900
NE Ohio. Region #3 0.1100
N.E. Ohio. R ion #4 0.0400
orwak 0.0100
0dr Harbor 0.0000 ‘
Continued I
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TABLE 6.5 Sources of Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Ens. continued)
Tonnesgear Kilo rams/day Kilogram/day Percenta e Kilogram/day
SOURCE DoIan 1 85 ST BET 1985 STORET 1988 Man 19 TRI 1988
Ohio. continued
OhIo Water DeveIopment Authority 0.0000
Oregon 00000
Ottawa 0.0000
PainesviIIe 0.0000
PembervIIIe 0.0000
Pe sburg 0.0100
Port linton 0.0000
Ravenna 0.0000
Sandusky 0.0100
SoIon CentraI 0.0000
SpencerviIIe 0 0000
St. Marys 0.0000
Summit 00., #1 0.0100
Summit 00., #2 0.0000
' Toledo Bay 0.3800
Twinsburg 0.0100
Upper Sendusky 0.0500
Vennillon 0.4000
wmdronete 0.0000
Willard 0.0000
Michigan Warren 0.0200
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 1.20 54%
TRIBUTARIES 0.24 11%
-Ontano Big Otter 0.029
Grand 0.231
Sydenham 0.165
Thames 0.231
TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 2.24 100%
Data Sources: DoIan 1990; STORET (Idiom, U.S. EPA; TRI ToxIc Retenee Inventory. U.S. EPA
TABLE 6.6 Sources at Mercury DIscharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Ontario)
Tonnes/year KI s/dey KIIogreme/dey Percentgg Kilogram/day
SOURCE DoIan 1985 ST RET1985 STORET 1988 DoIan 1 TRI 1988
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT 0.03 3%
-New York Abex 0.0000
Dwont 0.0908 0.0000
Eastman Kodak 0.0000 0.0000
Hooker 0.0029 0.0030
New York Stae Electric 6 Gas
- MIIIIten 6.8. 0.0016 0.0253
- Somerset 6.8. 0.0861
Rochester Gas & Electnc
- (Indirect) 0.3709
- (DIrect) 0.0002
GMC - Fisher Body 0.0001
Evens Chemettce 0.0001
Continued
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TABLE 6.6 Sources of Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Ontario. continued)
Tonnes/year Kilogram/day Kilogram/day Percent Ki rams/day
SOURCE DoIan 1985 STORET 1985 STORET 1988 Doian 133; Tim988
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT, continued
New York Goulds Pumps 0.0004
AIIled Chemical 0.0009
Oneida Limited 0.0011
SCA Chemical SVC 0.0007
Clark Specialty 0.3796
Olin - Niagara Falls 0.0037
Olin - N.F. {to STP) 0.0299
Occidental - N.F. 0.0062
Occidental - N.F. (to STP) 0.0012
LCP Chem - Solva 0.1370
LCP Chem - Solvay (to STP‘ 0.0112
SEW
AGE
TRE
ATM
ENT
PLAN
T
0.03
3%
New York Amherst 0.0100 0.0100
Niagara Falls 0.0700 0.0400
Field Mam. WPCP 0.0700
Lockport 0.0100
Syracuse 0.0900
Niagaa Co. 0.0200
West 0.0300
wwstor WS PH 0.0100
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 0.80 90%
TRIBUTARIES 0.03 3%
Ontario Don 0.010
Etobiooke 0.006
Humber 0.020
Twelve Mile 0.274
Welland Shh 0.298
TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 0.89 100%
Data Sources: Doian 1990; STORET dwase. U.S. EPA; TRI Toxic Release Inventory, U.S. EPA
TABLE 6.7 Sources of Mercury Discharges to the Great Lute: Basin (St. Lawrence River)
Tonnes ear K rams/day K runs/day Percent
SOURCE Dolanl ST RETI985 8% ET1988 Dolan1
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT N/A
-New York St. Joe Mineral 0.0000
Ontario C.I.L. 0.0433
SEWA
GE T
REAT
MENT
PLAN
T
N/A
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION N/A
TOTA
L FO
R AV
AILA
BLE
DATA
N/A
wr=+51 (August a 1991)
Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET database. U.S. EPA; TRI Toxic Release Inventory, U.S. EPA
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 TABLE 6.8 Estimated Sources of Air Emissions oi Mercury in the US. (tonnes/year)
EMlSSiON
souace (tonneSIyear) YEAR
Natural 500 1991
Marco Mining and Smeiting <1 1983
Fossil uel Combustion Utility coal 113 1985
Industrial coal 18 1985
Commercial/residential coal 1 1985
Utility oil 1 1985
Industrial oil 3 1985
Commercial/residential oil 3 1985
Smelting Copper 41 1980
Lead 5 1980
Zinc 5 1980
incinerators Sewage sludge 36 1980
Municipal waste 68 1986
Battery Manufacture 1 1982
Mercury Recovery Retorts <1 1982
Mercury Chlor-Alkali Plants 3 1983
Use of Finished Goods 352 1980
TOTAL ANTHROPOGENIC SOURCES 650
TOTAL ALL SOURCES 1,150
Source: Bloxam 1991
One important feature of air emissions of mercury is that ditierent forms of mercury have very different deposition rates.
In particular. elemental mercury may stay in the air for many months. so that distant. even global sources can be as im hi
to local sources in determining how much mercury is deposited into the Great Lates from the air. Accordi to xom
(personal communication) the importance of extra-regional reductions in mercury emissions is indicated by a h proportion
of elemental mercury releases. Twle 6.9 shows that all of the merwry released from the use of finish products is
elemental. At the other end oi the spectrum. only 25% ct mercury from munlcpal solid waste falls into this category.
TABLE 6.9 Speciation of Mercury by Source
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
SOURCE ELEMENTAL BIVALENT PARTICULATE
HG (gaseous) HG (gaseous) HG
Finished Products 100% 0% 0%
Power Generation/industrial Coal Burning 75 20 5
Non-ier'rous Smeiling 90 10 0
Chlor-Akall Production 45 45 10
MSW 20 75 5
Source: Domier 1990.
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6.3 Appllcablllty of Economic Instruments
This section considers the mplication of economic instruments to achieve the virtual elimination of mercu enterin the
Great Lakes based on the information given above. The analysis follows broadly the analytical framework of hapter but
concentrates on the issues most pertinent to mercury.
it is clear that mercury is an apgrggnate candidate for virtual elimination in that it is a persistent toxic and has been
identified as a critical pollutant by the L 08. While efforts to reduce the discharge of mercury into the environment have a
long history in Canada and the U.S., no generalized prohibition has been introduced. A phased reduction of mercury
discharged into the Great Lakes reflects an attempt to find a balance between protection of the environment and the benefits
obtained from the use of mercury in modern economies.
There are two considerations which affect any attempts through direct regulation or economic incentives to achieve
virtual elimination of mercury discharge into the Great Lakes:
- the available data for mercury on uses (especially in Canada), sources. quantity discharged and quantity entering the
Great Lakes is very partial and unreliable:
' much of the mercury entering the Great Lakes is transported by air from sources outside the Great Lakes basin.
Any effective approach to reducing mercury in the Great Lakes must begin with a better reciation of where the
mercury is coming from than the lnlorrnation currently available allows. Furthermore. any 3 me to achieve vrrtual
elimination oi mercury discharged into the Great Lakes will have to be applied to jurisdictions that are outside of the Great
Lakes basin. Conceivably, national programs in Canada and the US. might be required just to solve a regional problem.
However. reductions in mercury discharges anywhere in the two countries might well bring benefits that would justify programs
that are continental in scope.
Although recise uantitative information is unavailable. it is clear from the tabl9s presented earlier in this Chapter that
mercury is use in a wi e range of industrial and agricultural sectors. Much of the mercury ends tp in finished products en
route to the environment unless the roducts are recycled and the mercury recovered, or they are disposed of in secure
landfills. This suggests that there is l eiy to be very substantial differences in the costs of reducing the mercury emanating
from these various sources. Also. it is possible that there are good prospects for substitutions to be made and for new
technologies that can be developed to reduce the use of mercury and its discharge into the environment. As ex alned in
Chapter 5. these considerations: large differences in discharge reduction costs andI“Liossbilities for tec nological
developments. provide important grounds for using economic instruments to achieve virtual ell atlon.
all MTraﬂIgormMCfi-p?
The main criterion suggested in Chapter 5 for choosing between these two types of economic instruments concerned
the shapes of the discharge reduction cost functions and the damage functions. Based on the limited lnlorrnation available.
and given the general downward trend in mercury use suggested by Table 6.11, there is no compelling reason to select
emissions trading over an effluent charge. or vice versa. Both instruments can hep secure a continuing reduction in mercury
discharges.
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dime
nts s
ome
of wh
ich
could
possi
bly b
e dr
edged
, tre
ated
and/o
r dis
posed
of in
a sec
ure l
andfil
l. Th
is is
a
costl
y pro
cedur
e th
at mu
st b
e un
dertd
ren
with
great
care
since
dredg
ing
can
stir W
the
sedim
ents
and
aggra
vate
the
proble
m. Ho
wever
. the
possibi
lity o
f usin
g rev
enues
from a
n effl
uent c
harge
to fur
ther e
limina
te mer
cury f
rom th
e res
t Lake
s
could be attractive. (Revenue from auctioned permits could also be used for this purpose.)
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The previous discussion of emissions tradl and effluent charges was predicated on an assum ion that steps can and
would be taken to drarnaticaiiy improve the reliabiity of information on sources of mercury entering t Great Lakes. In the
absen
ce of
such
data.
all re
gulato
ry wp
roach
es wh
ich f
ocus
on th
e disc
harge
of mer
cury
will su
ffer.
An al
ternat
ive wh
ich
should be considered is to apply economic instruments to the use oi mercury. Two 0 tions are: tradeable permits or product
charges to reduce the use of mercury in manufactured products. Table 6.10 shows t at a relatively small number of product
categories account for most oi the mercury consumption in the US. with batteries alone. accounting for mout one third oi the
total. A System oi tradedale input permits similar to that used to eliminate lead in gasoline could also be effective in this case
Similarly. a charge on the use oi mercury would also stimulate a reduction in its use.
Finally, the possibility of a oslt/refund System for some gas oi products containing mercury should be considered.
in Toronto. for example. a limited nfrastructure for retumlng us batteries for proper disposal is already in place and is
operated entirely on a voluntary basis. it would have to be substantially expanded and regulated to cope with a
comprehensive de sit/refund system just for batteries. If the system was extended to other products the complexity of the
infrastructure requ red could greatly increase.
6.3.3mEdamW
Effective direct regulation of mercury discharges to achieve virtual elimination is handicmped by the same data
problems as the use of emissions trading and effluent charges. However. if these problems are solved and the advantages of
these economic instruments found not to be compelling, there may still be a role for financial enforcement incentives to
increase the likelihood that r ulated sources will, in fact. comply, with the increasingly stringent discharge limits that will be
required to achieve virtual ellmnation.
wp+5r (August 2. 1991)
 
  
7.0 ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS AND VIRTUAL
ELIMINATION OF DISCHARGES OF PCBs
Polychionnated biphenyls iPCBs) are odourless. colourless organic chemical compounds synthesized from the reaction
oi bipnenyi with anhydrous chlorine. Characterized by a high degree oi stability and resistance to heat and pressure. PCBs
make excellent lubricants and hydraulic iiuids lor industnai processes such as aluminum die casti where h' h pressures are
exerted. in addition. PCBs have been lound useiul as insulating fluids in transiormers and C8386 013, 83 DastICIZBFB Where
iieme resistance is requrred. as constituents oi ink and paints. as hardeners in metallurgical processes and even as dust
suppressants.
It has been estimated that by the late 19603, when PCB use reached its highest levels. about 61% oi US. use was in
'closed' electrical systems. 13% was used in "nominally ciosed' processes (largely hydraulic iiuids) and 26% oi use was in
'open' systems (ior instance. ink) (Lamay 1990).
Since that time, growing concern over the health shoots of long term exposure to PCBs has lead to increasing
restriction upon their production and use. By the late 19703 the manuiacture. im nation and resale oi PCBs were banned in
Canada and the United States iexe tions were and are available ior narrow deiined research uses). The storage and
disposal oi PCBs is also strictly contro led in both countnes. However, the use d PCBs in materials or equpment where they
are already in service continues to be permitted. in Ontario alone. as oi 1989, there were 7,800 tonnes oi high-level PCBs
and 13.300 tonnes oi low level PCBs in service. and 11,000 tonnes oi PCBs in storage (Dilon 1989). Equlvlent estimates tor
the United States have not been iound.
The uantities oi PCBs entenn the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem have iailen signiiicantiy over the past decade.
Levels oi P 83 iound in Great Lakes i and aquatic mammals have also been decreasing. But these declines wpear to be
levelling oil at undeslrmly h levels. Fish in all oi the Great Lakes continue to be iound with PCB levels exceeding the
Great Lures Water Quality greement obiectlve (0.1 mg/kgé (international Joint Commission) Greu Lakes Water Oudty
Board 1989). Concem over the continuing presence 0 P Bs throughout the Lates has led regulators to seek lurther
reductions in their discharge.
in deciding how to reduce discharges oi P083 to the Great Ldtes basin, regulators first have to identity where the PCBs
are coming irom. The answer to this question is iar trorn clear. PCBs are slightly heavier that waer. md so East discharges
have left large quantities oi PCBs deposited on river and 18m bottoms. About 50% oi PCBs now entering the rest Lures are
robwiy releases lrom those sediments. A iurther 30% are probdnty the Ldies by means oi drborne deposition.
olatiiizatlon oi iiuids iedted lrom transiormers. electrical power generation lndustrld fuel combustion are believed to be
among the main sourrns oi emissions oi PCBs to the air. The final 20% are airtuted to direct it es and unknown
sources. Probably less than 5% at dlsdierges are directly irom point source disdierges to water. although is low number is
at least in part attrtutwie to very low levels oi monitoring. T e next section oi this chmter provides lurther detail on the
rather ragged state oi knowledge oi PCB discharges.
7.1 Sources at PCBs
Estimates oi the quantity oi PCBs discharged into the Great Lakes irom industry (deed disch ), sewage treament
plants. and atmospheric deposition 8e sunmutzed in Tales 7.1 to 7.7. The due are not con ered complete or very
accurate but they 0 give some idea at the various sources.
Table 7.1 shows thl. emordng to Ddlt (1985). atmospheric deposition oi PCBs accounts ior about 60% oi the total.
The more recent iJC report (1988) wee e dlilerent impression and atrbutee 28% to atmo heric deposition which is
consi
dered
to be
a mor
e ree
sondi
le est
imate.
Uniort
unetel
y. thi
s repo
rt do
es no
r prov
ide e
ates
oi the
source
s that
account tor the rerhﬁiihg 72%.
TABLE 7.1 Sources at PCBs to the Gred Laces (Tot!)
Tonnes/year Tonnes ear Tonnes/year Percentggg Percentage
SOUR
CE
Doian
1985
IJC 1
98
W08
1989
Doian
1
U0 19
88
lNDUSTRlAL OUTFALLS 0,04 3%
SEW
AGE
TRE
ATM
ENT
PLAN
TS
NA
0.15
N/A
ATMO
SPHE
RIC
DEPO
SITI
ON
0 81
1.944
82%
28%
TRIBUTARIES 0 45 35%
OTH
ER
5.043
72%
TOTA
L FO
R AV
AILA
BLE
DATA
1 30
6.987
100%
100%
Sources: Dolan 1985; MC 1988
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TABLE 7.2 Sources 01 PCBS to the Great Lakes (Lake Superior)
 
Ton
nes
/ye
ar
Ton
neS
/ye
ar
Kilo
gram
s/da
y
Per
cen
tag
e
Per
cen
tag
e
SOU
RCE
Doi
an1
985
IJC
198
8
DoI
an1
985
Doi
an 1
9 5
IJC
198
8
IND
UST
RIA
L DI
REC
T
0.00
0%
Wisconsin American Can 0.0041
SEW
AGE
TRE
ATM
ENT
PLA
NTS
N/A
N/A
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 0.12 0.545 80% 90%
TRIBUTARIES 0.03 20%
-Ontario LIttIe Pic 0.029
Pic 0.048
OTHER 0.061 10%
TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 0.15 0.606 100% 100%
Data Sources: Doian 1985; IJC 1988
TABLE 7.3 Sources 01 PCBs to the Great Lakes (Lake Michigan)
Tonnes/year Tonnes/ ear Kilogram/day Pementgge Percentage
SOU
RCE
Doia
n 19
85
IJC
198
Doia
n 19
85
Doia
n 1
5
IJC
1988
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT 0.03
Wisconsin Badger Die Cast 0.0000
Ber srtom Pmer 0.0024
Fort award Pwer 0.0492
Kimberiy Ciark 0.0025
Scott Pwer 0.0040
Wisconsin Tissue 0.0261
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS N/A
ATMO
SPHE
RIC
DEPO
SITI
ON
N/A
0.39
7
58%
OTH
ER
0.288
42%
TOTA
L FO
R AV
AILA
BLE
DATA
0.03
0.685
100%
Sources: DoIan 1985;1JC 1988.
TABLE 7.4 Sources 01 PCB: to the Great Lakes (Lake Huron)
Ton
nes
/ e
ar
Ton
nes
/ e
ar
Kil
ogr
am/
day
Per
cen
tag
g
Per
cen
tag
e
SOUR
CE
Doian
1 85
IJC 1
98
DoIan
1985
Doian
19
IJC 1
988
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT 0.01 2%
Michigan GMS~Chev MetaI 0.0118
GMS-Chev Motor 0.0048
SEW
AGE
TRE
ATM
ENT
PLA
NTS
N/A
N/A
ATMO
SPHE
RIC D
EPOS
ITIO
N
0.56
0.496
90%
78%
TRIB
UTAR
IES
0.05
8%
Onta
rio
Saug
een
0.03
9
Severn 0.108
OTH
ER
0.140
22%
TOTA
L FO
R AV
AILA
BLE
DATA
0.62
0.63
6
100%
100%
Data Sources: Doian 1985; IJC 1988
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TABLE 7.5 Sources of PCBs to the Great Lakes (Lake En‘el
TonneS/year Tonnes/year Kilogram/day Percenta 9 Percentage
SOURCE Dolan 1985 IJC 1988 DoIan 1985 Dolan 19 5 IJC 1988
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT 0.00 0%
Michigan Ford WIxom 0.0001
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS N/A N/A
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 0 12 0.328 57% 13%
TRIBUTARIES 0.09 43%
Ontario Big Otter 0.020
Grand 0.125
Thames 0,080
Kettle 0010
OTHER 2.192 87%
TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 0.21 2.520 100% 100%
Data Sources: Dolan 1985; IJC 1988
TABLE 7.6 Sources 01 PCBs to the Great Lakes (Lake OntarIo)
Tonnes/year Toma/gear Kilogram/day Percenta 9 Percentage
SOURCE DoIan 1985 IJC 1 DoIan 1985 Dolan 19 5 IJC 1988 -
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT N/A N/A
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS N/A N/A
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 0.01 0.178 3% 7%
TRIBUTARIES 0.28 97%
-Ontario Don 0.009
Etoblcoke 0.005
Humber 0.016
Twere MIle 0.367
Welland Shlp 0.364
[Nlagara River] [10.541]
OTHER 2.362 93%
TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 0.29 2.540 100% 100%
Data Sources: DoIan 1985; IJC 1988;
Note: OTHER attributed but non-momma to Ilsted sources.
TABLE 7.7 Sources 01 PCBs to the Great Ldtes (St. Lawrence)
Tonnes/year Tonnes/gear KIIogrems/day Percentggg Percentage
SOU
RCE
DoIan
1985
IJC 1
98
DoIa
n 198
5
DoIa
n 1
IJC 1
988
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT
-New York Chev Motor 0.0001
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION
SEDIMENTS
GROUNDWATER
TRIBUTARIES
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The importance oi tributary loadings oi P085 is Suggested by some estimates oi PCB pathways into Lakes Michigan that
are summarized in Taste 7.8.
TABLE 7.8 PCB Pathways to Lake Michigan
Pathways Kg/yeer Percent
Tributaries (include sediment releases and direct dumping) 1.150 75.0
Atmospheric 380 24.7
Direct Discharges to Lake (industry & STPs) 5 0.3
TOTAL 1.535 100.0
Source: National Wildliie Federation and Canadian Institute ior Environmental Law and Policy (1991).
Acc0rdlng to Lamay (1990), 76.4% oi all tributary loadings to Lake Michigan is "sediment-bound" and so considered to be
deposited to the Lake irom the sediments as o osed to irom current discharge sources. No individual discharger to Lake
Michigan is releasing more than 2 kg/year. A iu her bredtdown 01 Lake Michigan tributary loadings is given in Table 7.9.
TABLE 7.9 Lake Michigan Tributary Loads
Pathways Kg/year Percent
Fox 520 38.0
Grand Calumet 191 14.0
Kalamazoo 1 14 8.4
Waukegan 20 1 .5
TOTAL ' 845 61 .2“/.'
.' Note that Shebo gan Harbor, whose sediments are heavily contaminated with P083. has been omitted. "because oi clean-
up activities aire y under way. Source: National Wildiiie Federation and Canadian institute tor Environmentai Law and Policy
1991.
7.1.1 SoreueeiWDWchh
Atmospheric
However. it is still 3
in Ontario and Eastern N. America
TABLE 7.10» Air Emissions oi PCBs in Ontario and Eastern North America in 1985 (kg/yr)
osition accounts for a smaller proportion oi total PCB: entering the Great Lakes than tor mercury.
ientiy important to examine its origins. Tables 7.10 to 7.12 gives estimates oi air emissions oi PCBs
Eastern
Emission Category Ontario North America
Stationary Fuel Combustion 6.9 446
Solid Waste incineration 1.2 42
Open Sources 36.9 517
TOTAL 45.0 1.005
Source: Ortech 1990
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TABLE 711 Ontario Air Emissions oi PCBs in Detail. 1985 (kg/yr)
CATEGORY/SECTOR
POINT
AREA
TOTAL
RANK
Stationary Fuel Combustion
Electrical Power Generation
6.8
6.8
2
industnai Fuel Combustion
0.1
0.1
6
Sub-Total 6.8 0.1 6.9
Solid Waste Incineration
Municipal Waste incineration
0.4
0.4
S
Sewage Sludge incineration
0.3
0.5
0.8
4
industrial Waste incineration
0.0
0,0
7
Commercial institutional Waste incineration
0.0
0.0
8
Sub-Total 0.7 0.5 1.2
Open Sources
Transiorrner Leaka 9
33.6
33.6
1
Munic'pal Reiuse-Land ill
3.3
3.3
3
Sub-Total 36.9 36.9
TOTAL
7.6
37.4
44.9
Source: Ortech 1990
TABLE 7.12 Eastern North America Emissions 01 P083 in Detail. 1985 (kg/yr)
CATEGORY/SECTOR
EMISSION
Stationary Fuel Combustion
Electrical Power Generation
337.6
industrial Fuel Combustion 108.1
Sub-Total 445.7
Solid Waste incineration
Municipal Waste incineration
11.2
Sewage Sludge incineration 3.6
Industrial Waste incineration 6.9
Commercial/institutional Waste inc. 3.0
Waste Oil Combustion 17.0
Sub-Total 41.5
Open Sources
On-slte incineration
8,2
Transtormer Lear a 440.5
Munlc'pai Reiuse-Landi 68.7
Sub-Total 517.4
TOTAL
1,004.7
Source: Ortech 1990
Data for 1989 iron the US. EPA Toxic Release inventory Data (TFil) shows that total air emission releases from "Lake
Michi an Slates'. (Western Michigan. Wisconsin. indiana and llilnols) totalled 8.56 it yr. TFti includes only manutacturin
iaciiites that produce.Tgraces: or use over 10.000 lbs oi one oi the 332 TFii listed emlcais or over 50.000 be oi all TR
chemicals combined. ese data are presented In Table 7.13.
Given the estimated air emissions oi 350 kg/yr (Lamay 1990) these point source loadings in the TFil account ior under
3% oi atmospheric loadings.
Lamay cites an estimate by Murphy et ai (1985) that the contribution of MSW plants. due to the lack ot restriction on
burning oi materials containing small quantities 01 P063 (such as carboniess copy paper. capacitors on ﬂuorescent light
ballasts. starting cwacitors on reirlgerator and washing machine motors is .25 kg/yr per stadr. Lamay (1990). without
knowing the actual number oi incinerators In the region. estimates total MS emissions a about 120 k Iyr with 13-117 kg/yr
deposited to Late Michigan. Sewage sludge incinerators are estimated to emit 50 kg/yr oi which 0- 2.5 kg/yr enter Lake
Michigan.
WP+51 (August 2. 1991) 49
 
 
 TABLE 7.13 Air Emissions oi PCBs in the Lake Michigan States
RELEASE
STA
TE
FAC
lLl
TY
(kg/
yr)
lllinois SCA Chemical Services 1.09
Album. Inc. .09
AMCE International .1 8
Northwestern Waste Ener y 540
Wisconsin City oi Sheboygan Department oi Public W0 3 .54
ntercommunity Incinerator Dist. .63
City oi Waukasha .18
lndiana East Chicago Municipal .18
8th Adhesrve .27
TOTAL 8.56
Source: TRl; Lamay 1990
7.2 The Control of PCB Discharges
Proven chemical and incineration technologies are available to remediate and treat PCB i uids and solids. industrial
waste
water
. an
d gro
undwa
ter.
Tech
no
ies a
re al
so av
ailwi
e to
treat
soil c
onta
mina
ted w
ith P
C 5
but t
hese
are e
xpens
ive.
PCB
conta
minat
ed se
dimen
t is m
ore d
ill ul
t to tr
eat an
d eiie
ctlve
techn
o le
s hav
e not
yet be
en de
monst
rated
on a
large
scale. Removal and treatment oi subsurface contamination may not be techn ly leasbie.
Prevention rather than treatment is likely to be the most cost-eiiective woach ior reducing PCBs entering the Great
Lakes. This requires a reduction in the use at PCBs and the elimination oi stocks in storage.
7.3 Applicability of Economic instruments
As in
the pr
evious
chapt
er on
mercu
ry. th
is sec
tion i
ollows
the an
a lc
al ira
mewor
k oi C
hwte
r 5 in
asses
sing t
he rol
e that
economic instruments might play in achieving the virtual elimination oi CBs entering the Great Lures.
PCBs are one oi the 11 critical llutants identified by the lJC and. as a persistent toxic that bioaccumulates in iatty tissue.
the g
oal o
i vir
tual e
llrni
natio
n
indee
d. th
e ban
on th
e pro
ducti
on, i
mport
ation
and
sale
oi PC
Bs i
n Ca
nada
and
the
Unit
ed S
tate
s in
the
late
1970
s de
mons
trat
es t
he c
ommi
tmen
t th
at g
over
nmen
ts i
n bo
th c
ount
ries
have
mad
e to
elim
inat
ing
PCBs
irom
the e
nviro
nment
. Ho
weve
r. a
s the
previ
ous s
ectio
ns ha
ve sh
own.
signi
ﬁcant
quant
ities
oi PC
Bs c
ontin
ue to
enter
the G
reat
Lake
s en
viro
nmen
t iro
m a v
ariet
y oi
sourc
es. t
he mo
st im
porta
nt oi
whic
h are
belie
ved t
o be
irom
conta
minat
ed
sediments in tributaries and deposition irom the air.
Even
thou
gh t
here
is a
mple
oppo
rtun
ity
to i
mpro
ve t
he d
ata
on P
CB
load
ings
ente
ring
the
Grea
t Lu
res.
and
such
impro
vemen
ts ar
e a pr
o-requ
isite
ior in
troduc
ing a
ny ty
pe at
econo
mic i
nstrum
ent, i
t is un
likely
to aii
ect th
e over
all pi
cture
which
show
s tha
t the
m
at PC
B so
urces
are n
ot re
adily
man
tle
to ec
onom
ic in
strum
ents.
The
singl
e lar
gest
categ
ory
oi PC
B lo
ading
s in
the
reat
Ldte
s is
irom
cont
amin
ated
sedi
ment
s whi
ch m
ay a
ccoun
t ior
50%
or mo
re o
i tota
l loa
dings
.
These
sourc
es ar
e bey
ond t
he con
trol o
i eco
nomic
instru
ments
and d
irect
regula
tion u
nless
the s
edime
nts a
re the
legal
property or responsblllty at a corporalon. municpality or individual. This is seldom the case.
An un
known
propor
tion o
i the
trbilt
ary lo
adings
, per
hng a
s muc
h as
25%
at tot
al loa
dings.
come
irom
point
sourc
e
disch
arges
. Th
ese
could
be am
enab
le to
econ
omic
instr
ument
s ii d
etail
ed ln
ionna
tlon
on th
em wa
s ava
ilabl
e.
Som
e 2
5-30
% oi
total
PCB
load
ings
in th
e Gr
eat
Lake
s co
me i
rom
air e
miss
ions
. T
rans
iorr
ner
leak
ages
and
muni
cipa
l
iandii
lls a
re be
lieve
d to
repre
sent
about
50%
oi th
ese
emiss
ions
and
these
could
not e
asily
be co
ntrol
led t
hroug
h ec
onom
ic
inst
rume
nts.
Stat
iona
ry i
uel
comb
usti
on,
espe
cial
ly i
or e
lectr
ical
powe
r g
ener
atio
n. c
reat
es a
bout
45%
oi t
he t
otal
air
emis
sion
s an
d in
cine
rati
on t
utes
care
oi m
ost
oi t
he r
emai
nder
. E
cono
mic
inst
rume
nts
coul
d be
mpli
ed t
o th
ese
last
two
cate
gori
es o
i so
urce
s bu
t th
eir c
ombi
ned
cont
ribu
tion
to th
e to
tal P
CB
load
ings
is on
ly a
bout
15%
oi th
e tot
al.
Most
oi th
e
remai
nin
PCBs
enter
ing t
he Gr
eat L
ates
wpea
r to
come
irom
munic
ipal
sewa
ge t
reatm
ent p
lants
which
might
also
resp
ond
to centre through economic instruments.
in su
mmar
y. t
herel
ore,
less
than
40%
(poss
ibly
much
less)
oi th
e tot
al P
CB l
oadin
gs in
the G
reat
Lake
s ca
n ev
en b
e
cons
ider
ed
as
tent
laii
y su
ltai
le i
0r c
ontr
ol t
hrou
gh e
con
omi
c i
nstr
umen
ts a
ssu
min
g th
at l
et b
ette
r da
ta t
han
are
curr
entl
y
avail
able
coul
rfobe
obta
ined
on t
he s
pecii
ic p
oint
sour
ces
res
nslbl
e.
Furt
herm
ore,
as w
ith
merc
u ,
the
situa
tion
is
comp
lica
ted
by t
he t
act
that
man
y at
the
sour
ces
oi a
irbo
rne
emi
s
ns o
i PC
Bs
are
situ
ated
outs
ide
oi t
he
reat
Lak
es b
asin
.
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in view oi the fact that PCBs
are no longer permitted to be manufactured.
imported or resold anywhere
in Canada or the
United States twlth minor exceptions lor researchl there is no need to rely on economic instruments to provide incentives to
develop less harmful substitutes or alternative production processes. Likewise. there is little opportunity for economic
instruments to capitalize on differences in abatement costs for P083 given that strict controls on emissrons are already In
existence The problem seems to be those at monitoring and enforcement which would not be lessened by the introduction of
tradeable permrts or effluent charges.
Given the current state of knowledge it seems that the greatest reductions in discharges can probably be achieved by
cleaning up the more severely contaminated Great Lakes basin sediments. However. such clean ups are currently quite
expensrve. Accelerating the removal of PCBs irom electrical egu' merit through regulation. supported by lines or financral
enlorcement incentives. would also reduce future emissions signi cantly providing the P083 so removed are disposed of
effectively. The exemption allowing wastes containing under 50 pans per million of P085 to be exempted from strict PCB
disposal controls. found in both in Canadian and US. aw. could be removed Other reductions could be achieved by tighter
control of direct discharges to water and discharges to sewa e treatment plants. strict quality control at PCB destruction
facilities and other currently permitted 'ciosed' system uses of 083 could be restricted or eliminated. Actions such as these
can be best be implemented through direct regulation.
in summary. even if better data on sources were available. the prospects for using economic instruments to achieve the
virtual elimination oi PCBs in to the Great Lakes, except in a supporting role of ﬁnancial enlorcement incentives. seems limited.
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8.0 AN ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE PULP AND
PAPER INDUSTRY IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN
V
The pulp and paper industry has historically been characterized by slow. steady market growth and limited technological
innovation. Recently. however. the industry has been showing signs of moving into a period of rapid technological change.
The “globalization” of pulp and paper markets. involvin free trade between Canada and the United States as well as
the emer ence of low cost third world reducers is bringing eavy pressure on the industry to become more efficient. The
advance age and relatively small sc 9 of Ontario‘s pulp and paper facilities make them particularly vulnerable to these
pressures.
’ The need to reduce acute and persistent toxic emissions from pulp and paper mills will require this industry to make
significant process changes. in particular, new chiorine~free bleaching technologies may have to be adopted. New air and
water pollution control equrpment will also have to be purchased.
Growing pressure from governments and consumers to increase the recycled fibre content of paper products is
increasing the need for mills which can reuse waste papers. in combination with demand for reduction in the over all use of
packaging materials. the demand for recycling may also reduce the market for pulp and pater products made with virgin fibres.
While the need to adapt to new circumstances will create financial risks. it will also present innovative pulp and paper
producers with great opportunities. Currently many companies. particularly those operating in Canada. are suffering the
effects of a recession. but on the whole the industry is believed to be generally sound and healthy (Pulp and Paper. January
1991; US. Department of Commerce 1990; Value Line. Janua 1991). Companies are believed to be in a position to make
the investments that will be necessary to survive in a global. ecorzigicaliy sustainable market.
8.1 Pulp and Paper industry Products
Pulp. paper and board making constitute the most important sector of the North American forest products industry. in
terms of tonnes of product as well as dollar value. The sector also serves the lumber and plywood manufacturing sectors as a
maniet for by-products of their production.
For most purposes. pulping processes can be categorized as either chemical or mechanical. although the two
processes are sometimes used in combination. The levels of use of these methods of pulping in the United States. Canada
and the rest of the world can be seen in Tables 8.1. 8.2 and 8.3. respectively.
Mechanical pulping involves fuming wood into fibre by means of grinding or beating. Between 85 and 95% of the wood
furnished to a mechanical process is actually used in the product. As a result of retaining most of the wood content, individual
tibres retain a high ilgnln content and are relatively stiff. The resulting pup has relatively few contact points between fibres
and so produces paper with a relatively low strength.
Chemical puping can produce a relatively strong product from virtually any sort of wood. Lignin and some
hemiceiluloses are removed from the wood by chemicaidpuping, producing more fiexbie and better bonding fibres. Typical
kratt pulp uses about 45 to 55% of the wood fumishe to the process. Sottwoods produce stronger kratt pup than do
hardwoods.
Mechanical pub is characterized b its opacity. ink absorbtivity. resilience and stiffness. These characteristics make
mechanical pup desirable as a source newsprint (typically containing 80 to 100% mechanical pu i. printing and writing
pa rs (including supercalendered m azine paper). lightweight coated paters (typically containing 0 to 60% mechanical
pug, and folding caton boards (norm 30 to 50% mechanical pup).
Semlchemlcal pup is used mainly for corrugating medium. Semlchemlcai pop is desirable for this use due to its ability
to resist compression and crushing.
Recycled fibre has most commonly been used as a furnish for padraging papers and boards. if is also used in sanitary
and creped fpapers. The use of recycled furnish for making newsprint is rqoidly increasing. Some use is now also being made
of recycled ibre in printing papers.
Chemical pulp is distinguished by its length and strength and is used as a reinforcement fibre in nearly all 'wer and
board grades. Softwood chemical pub is stronger than hardwood pup. Hardwood chemical pu . on the other h is slightly
cheaper and has good surface formation characteristics. About 50% of chemical pup used w wide is bleached.
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8.49
9
8.90
3
Unc
oat
ed
ree
She
et
10.9
66
11.0
81
11.4
98
12.4
03
13.0
22
Tiss
ue
5.30
1
5.63
6
5.73
3
5.97
2
6.12
7
Pack
agin
g 8
indus
trial
Conv
erti
ng
4.95
5
4.92
5
4.66
9
5.47
5
5.60
0
Oth
er
1.7
98
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Total Paper 36.876 38.256 39.009 42.649 44.342
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TABLE 8.2 Canada Paper and Paperboard Production and Capaa'ty
(Th
ous
and
s oi
Shor
t To
ns)
‘
198
7
198
9
199
0
199
0
199
1
test.) (max. pract.
Capacity)
WOODPULP
Dlss
olvi
ng 8
Spec
ial
A
ha
266
301
254
278
278
Che
mic
al P
ub.
Pme
r
rade
s
13.8
90
13.7
38
12.7
92
15.3
68
15.8
38
Su
hite
. b
lea
che
d
500
458
455
530
530
Su
h e
. u
nbl
eac
hed
1.4
28
1.3
35
1.1
56
1.4
22
1.3
89
ratt.
unb
lea
che
d 1
.624
1.48
1
1.34
5
1.72
0
1.72
0
Kraf
t. s
emi
-bl
eac
hed
10,
338
10,
464
9,8
36
11,
696
12.
199
Sem
ich
emi
cal
389
374
433
565
565
Mec
han
ica
l
10.7
64
11.5
38
11.7
84
13,7
60
14,6
09
Tot
al
Woo
dpu
lp
25.
328
25.
965
25.
271
29.
971
31.
290
Continued
WP+
51
(Aug
ust
2. 1
991)
53
L
l
 TABLE 82
Canada Paper and Paperboard Production and Capacity (continued)
(Thousands of Short Tons)
1987 1989 1990 1990 1991
test.) (max. pract. capacrty)
PAPER
Newsprint 10.653 10.667 10.400 12.161 12.744
Printing 8 Writing) 2927 3.515 4,076 4,453 4696
Kralt Packaging apers 625 579 567 576 594
Tissue 8. Specialty 503 537 535 722 752
Total Paper 14,708 15.298 15,578 17,912 18,786
PAPERBOARD
Containerboard 2.154 2.143 2.244 2.483 2.507
Boxboard 818 803 783 1.005 1.073
Total Paperboard 2.972 2.946 3.027 3.488 3.580
GRAND TOTAL 43,008 44,209 43,876 51,371 53.656
Source: LockwoodsPost (1990)
TABLE 8.3 Global Share 01 Production. Papermaking Flaw Materials. 1985
Raw Material Share (°/.)
Chemical pulp. softwood 32
Chemical pulp, hardwood 13
Mechanical pulps (mainly softwood) 16
Semichemical pulps (mainly hardwoods) 4
Recycled libre 22
Chemicals. tillers, synthetic fixes 7
Pulps irom non-woody plants 6
TOTAL 100%
Source: Ebellng 1987
Table 8.4 indicates the levels 01 global consumption 01 various sorts at over and paperboard products. Tailes 8.1 and
8.2 may also be reterred to for levels 01 production oi those products within the United States and Canada
TABLE 8.4 Total Global Consumption oi Paper and Board, 1985
Consumption
Paper Board Grand (million tons/year)
Printing and Writing 49
New rint 28
Soft issue Paper 11
Sad Paper 6
Total Paper (55%) 105
Linerboard 30
Corrugating Medium (lluting) _ 15
Total Board (45%) 86
GRAND TOTAL 190
Source: Ebellng 1987
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 8.2 The Economic Significance of the Pulp and Paper Industry
8210”
The pulp and paper industry is one oi Ontario’s most important industries. In the past several years the industry’s
growt
h has
been
slowe
r than
that o
i the
provin
cial e
conom
y as
a whol
e. res
ulting
in a d
ecline
in the
indust
ry's s
hare 0
1 total
provincial production and employment. Nevertheless. changes in demand ior its oducts still have widespread implications
tor the Ontario economy. In particular. communities in Northwestern Ontario and a rip the shore at Lake Superior are heavily
dependent upon pulp and paper production
Employment
In 1985. the "Paper and Allied Industries.” comprised oi pup. pagzr and pwerboard makers as well as manuiacturers
oi asp
halt r
ooting
, dire
ctly e
mploy
ed ap
proxim
ately
41,00
0 peo
ple i
n t
ario.
This
amoun
ts to
aprox
imate
iy 1.
2% oi
the
Ontari
o work
force.
Oi the
se. wp
mxima
teiy
20,00
0 wer
e emp
loyed
in the
pub a
nd pw
er se
ctor.
11,00
0 wer
e emp
loyed
in the
specia
lty an
d iine
paper
sector
{not i
nclude
d in p
ulp an
d pape
r), 1
0.000
were
emplo
yed in
the pa
perbo
ard a
nd ba
g sect
or and
600 were employed in asphalt rooting manuiacture (Coke 1988).
Employment in the Paper and Allied Industries has been declining slightly over the past twenty years. This change is
largel
y attr
ibutab
le to
the mo
derni
zatio
n oi t
he pul
p and
newspr
int mu
ting
sector
s. St
atisti
cs Ca
nada
estima
tes th
at a f
urther
57.000 jobs are indirectly stimulated by the Ontario Paper and Allied Industries (Coke 1988).
v Provincial Gross Domestic Product
The
Pape
r an
d All
ied I
ndust
ries
contr
ibute
d ab
out
C325
billio
n to
the p
rovin
ce‘s
total
manui
actur
in
value
-add
ed in
1985
. O
i thi
s, w
out
031.
5 bi
llion
cam
e ir
om t
he p
u
and
pwe
r se
ctor,
C35
34 m
illio
n ir
om p
rodu
ctio
n oi
i he
and
speci
alty
pape
rs (
not
incl
uded
in p
up
and
pape
r),
C343
1 mi
ll
irom
the
pape
rboa
rd a
nd p
ater
bag
sect
Or a
nd C
361
milli
on f
rom
asphalt rooting manulacture.
Appro
ximat
ely 2
.7% 0
1 the
Ontari
o Prov
incial
Gross
Domes
tic P
roduc
t has
histori
cally
been
gener
ated b
y the
Paper
and
Allied industries (Coke 1988).
National Pmer and Allied industries
in 19
87, O
ntari
o pro
duce
d 24
% oi
the t
otal v
alue
at Ca
nadi
an pu
lp an
d pm
er s
hipm
ents
(034.
2 bil
lion).
as we
ll as
23%
oi the
value
adde
d an
d 25
% oi
total
natio
nal e
mplo
ymen
t in
the i
ndust
ry (C
anad
ian P
ub a
nd P
aper
Assoc
iatio
n 198
9).
- Exports
.
In 1
985,
Cana
dian
expo
rts
oi p
up
and
pape
r pr
oduc
ts e
arne
d 03
10.3
billi
on do
llars
. C
354
billi
on (
031.
1 bi
llion
from
Onta
rio
cam
e ir
om t
he e
xpor
t oi
news
prin
t, 0
33.4
billi
on $0
30.5
billi
on i
rom
Onta
rio)
irom
the
sale
01 p
up a
nd C
315
billi
on
1030.5 iliion irom Ontario) irom the sale at other paper an paperboard products (Coke 1988).
' Regional Economies
Need
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alue
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d by
the P
ater
and
Allie
d ind
ustri
es In
Ontar
io is
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Centa
i Ont
ario.
while
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one
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is ge
nera
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in No
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rn O
ntar
io.
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e
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otal
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e-a
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Sou
thw
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ern
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or t
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eve
r,
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0%
01 a
ll ma
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in t
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lied
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lue a
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n the
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rthea
stern
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iaau
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ymen
t (Co
ke 19
88).
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ion
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Envir
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-time
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In Michi an, during 1987, the production oi Paper and Allied Products directly created 20,600 )obs (3% of state total)
produced US, 17 billion dollars in value added (3% of state total) and shipped US$36 billion worth of products (2.5% oi
state total) (US. Department oi Commerce 1990).
in WlSCOHISln. '0 1987. the Paper and Allied Products Industry employed 43.000 people (8% oi state total). produced
U 8.939 billion in value-added (12% 01 state total) and shipped products with a value oi US$88 billion (13% of 81818 total)
(U 8, Department oi Commerce 1990).
TABLE 85 Direct Economic Contribution to the Area of the Undertakln tor the Ontario Class
Envrronmental Assessment oi Timber Management. Made by the Forest. ining and Primary Metals.
Tourism and Fur Industries, 1986
VALUE OF SALES VALUE OF SALES
VALUE OF SALES PER FULL-TlME
EMPLOYMENT OR EXPENDITURES EQUIVALENT
(person-years) (SC-millions) (SC-0003)
Forest industry Logging 7.470 985 132
Forestry Servrces 3,865 60 16
Wood industry 9.500 1,215 128
Paper 8 Allied industries 15.045 2.430 162
- Total 35,880 4,690 131
Mining and Primary Metals Mines 15.745 2.475 157
Primary Metals 13.335 1.665 125
Total 29.080 4, i 40 142
Tourism Total 27,100 1 ,310 48
Fur industry Total 700 14 20
Source: Peat Marwidr 1989
In Ohio, durl 1987. the production oi the Paper and Allied Products Industry employed 30.000 people (3% oi state
total). produced US. 1.9 billion in value-added (3% ol state total) and sh'pped products with a value 01 US$44 billion (3% oi
state total) (US. Department 01 Commerce 1990).
In New York. during 1987, the oduction oi Paper and Allied Products employed 40.000 rsons (3% 01 state total).
created US$22 billion in value-a (3% 01 state total) and produced shipments worth U.S.$4. billion dollars (3% oi state
total) (US. Department of Commerce 1990).
While the Michigan pub and pater indust is located entirely within the Great Lutes basin, on a part 01 Wisconsin,
Ohio and New York's pub and paper it acllities are within that area. in llinois. lndiana and innesota. only a small
portion at pulp and paper industry 1 are located in the Great Ldres basin.
Table 8.6 indicates the total levels 01 pulp, paper and Paperboard production in the region which includes the Great
Lakes basin, as well as giving an indication ot the importance 0 the region to the U3. pup and purer industry as a whole.
TABLE 8.6 Pwer. Pwerboard and Woodpulp Productlon, North Central Region
(Thousands 01 Short one, 1987)
Paper Pwerboard Pup
North Central 8,076 4,949 4.647
Total
US.
36.13
4
36,99
0
62357
Source: Lockwood-Post (1990)
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 8.3 Industry Structure
Produ
ction
iaciii
ties
in th
e pul
p an
d pm
er s
ector
tend
to be
very
large
due
to th
e cap
ital
inten
sive
natur
e oi
new
cap
aci
ty
cons
truc
tion
.
Env
iro
nme
nta
l.
ene
rgy
and
aut
oma
tio
n c
ost
s p
er
unit
of o
utp
ut
are
gen
era
lly
low
er
In l
arge
r m
ills
.
Incre
asing
ly, l
oggin
g. pu
ping
and p
apen
ndri
ng fa
ciliti
es ar
e bei
ng in
tegra
ted t
o tak
e adv
anta
ge oi
econ
omie
s in
trans
pon a
nd
materials costs.
Inves
tment
In su
ch l
arge
inte
rated
facili
ties
carri
es an
inher
entl
high
inves
tment
risk
not e
asily
born
e by
small
er
comp
anie
s (Ta
ble 8
.7).
In ad
ditio
n. t
9 hig
h ca
nal
costs
oi th
ese l
arge
acilit
ies le
ave t
hem
relati
vely
inilex
lble i
n the
face
of
dema
nd c
hang
es i
nduce
d by
the b
usine
ss cy
. As
a co
nseq
uenc
e 01
these
facto
rs. t
he No
rth
Amer
ican
pulp
and
pape
r
indust
ry sh
ows s
trong
signs
oi inc
reasin
g con
centra
tion
of own
ershi
p. Th
is is
partic
ularly
true o
f the
pulp
and n
ewspri
nt
sectors oi the industry
TABLE 8.7 Capital Cost 01 Pulp and Paper Facilities. 1984 (1984 US dollars)
Facility Size Cost
Facility Type (tons/day) (1984 U.S.$)
Pulp
Mill
Unbl
each
ed kr
ait
1.000
3385
00.0
00
Bleached irraft mill 1.000 414.500.000
Bleached sultlte 1.000 407,100,000
Thermomechanical 1,000 171 £00,000
Pape
r Mil
l
News
prin
t
1.00
0
2540
00.0
00
Fine paper 1.000 280.100.000
Source: Tillman 1985
Comp
etit
ive
effo
rts
in t
he i
ndus
try
tend
to f
ocus
on r
educ
ing
manu
iact
urln
g pr
ices
and
cite
d
disc
ount
s o
n pu
blic
ly
adve
rtis
ed p
rices
. T
here
has
histo
rical
iy b
een
little
com
tltlo
n fo
r te
chni
cal
lead
ersh
p in
the
in us
try.
The
indus
try
is
char
acte
rize
d by
rela
tive
ly o
ld t
echn
olog
y.
Pup
and
we
t
ndus
try
prod
ucts
are
also
cons
ider
ed b
y th
e in
dust
ry t
o be
mor
e or
less
subs
titu
tmle
withi
n ea
ch p
rodu
ct g
rade
. it
is no
t en
tirel
y cl
ear
why
the
pup
and
pape
r in
dust
ry h
as s
hown
so l
ittle
comp
etit
iven
ess
in d
ist
uish
lng
prod
ucts
. A
num
ber
01 i
acto
rs a
re
cite
d as
pos
sbl
e e
xpla
nati
ons:
the
indu
stry
‘s b
asic
tech
n
y is
rela
tive
ly o
and
avai
labl
e to
any
one
; c
ust
ome
rs c
onsi
der
the
rodu
cers
’ pr
oduc
ts w
ithi
n ea
ch
cate
gory
to b
e
clos
e s
stlt
utes
: m
ark
ets
are
well
estd
siis
hed
and
grow
ing
stea
dily
. s
how
ng
con
sum
ers
' c
onte
ntme
nt
with
the
type
s o
f
- products they are receiving.
Low
leve
ls o
f te
chno
logi
cal
inno
vati
on a
nd
new
prod
uct
crea
tion
are
also
asc
rbe
d to
a n
umb
er
oi o
ther
caus
es.
In
arti
cula
r:
high
cwit
al r
isks
invo
lved
in w
pty
lng
new
manu
iact
urln
g pr
oces
ses-
- as
deve
lopi
n a
prod
ucti
on t
echn
o
y fr
om
mor
alm
y te
stin
g to
ben
ch s
cale
, pi
lot
scal
e. p
roto
type
and
llnai
iy e
stab
lish
ed u
se t
ypic
ally
is a
rig
(5 t
o 10
year
s)
cost
ly
proc
ess;
redu
ctio
ns in
cash
flow
s re
sulti
ng ir
orn
the
lad
that
the p
up
and
pate
r in
dust
ry h
ad a
bout
ten
lean
year
s be
iore
a
profi
t ju
mp i
n th
e la
te 1
980:
. T
he f
act
that
equ
ant
and
pro
ces
s de
vel
opm
ent
tend
s to
be b
y e
qub
men
t bu
ilde
rs r
athe
r th
an
the pulp and paper industry may also be oi slg mce.
The dttierent sectors oi the pup aid paper industry reflect varying degrees at concentration.
Newsprint
The
North
Amer
ican
newsp
rint
mark
et c
an b
e ch
aract
erize
d as
oiigop
ollsti
c. T
en f
irms
contr
ol 6
7% 0
1 ne
wspri
nt
capa
city
and
six
com
pan
ies
cont
rol
47%
(Mc
cwb
ln
1990
).
A to
tal o
i 62
mitt
s ar
e op
erat
ed i
n No
rth
Ame
ric
a by
31 c
omp
ani
es.
Incre
ased
use
01 re
cycle
d ne
wst
h wil
l off
er 3
nliica
nt op
portu
nitie
s for
new
entra
nts.
New
recyc
ling
mills
can
be
loca
ted
clos
e to
urba
n ar
eas
and
are
econ
omic
al t
o bu
r d o
n a
smal
ler
and
less
expe
nsiv
e sc
ale.
This
may
well
attra
ct n
ew
entrants into newsprint production.
Shor
t te
rm o
ver
cwa
cit
y oi
virg
in f
ibre
news
prin
t ca
paci
ty m
ay
prev
ent
prod
ucer
s ir
orn
usin
goth
eir
oiig
opoi
y si
tuat
ion
to
pas
s o
n pr
ice
incr
ease
s in
the
shor
t te
rm.
But
in t
he l
onge
r ru
n. o
iigo
poli
stlc
cond
itio
ns s
houl
d at
w p
rodu
cers
to p
ass
on a
significant portion oi environmental control costs.
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- Market Pulp
Market pulp production is also characterised by an oligopollstic structure. Within Canada 28 market kratt pulp
producing mills are controlled by 'roughly 20' com antes (McCubbin 1990). Across North America. levels 01 concentration
Similar to those in the newsprint sector are found: T 9 top five companies in the industry control 39% 01 market share and the
top ten companies control 59% (Pulp and Paper. October 1990).
Capital costs 01 building an optimally sized new kratt pulp mill. which would produce 1200 tonnes of pulp per day. are In
the area 01 031.4 billion (McCubbin 1990). This is a signiﬁcant barrier to entry. Environmental control costs may also
contribute to the dittiCUlty ol entry. in addition. a mill must have access to a very large area of forest. over a long period of
time. in Northern Ontario. McCubbin estimates that an optimally sized pulp mill would require access to about 63,000 acres 01
forest every year.
- Printing and Writing Papers
The printing and writing papers sector is lar less homogeneous than the newsprint and pulp sectors. producing a wide
variety of product types. However. market niches within this larger sector tend to be dominated by small numbers 01
companies. For instance. in the North American market lor coated tree-sheet paper (used in magazines. catalogues.
commercial printin and some books) three com antes hold 53% oi the market share. the largest live hold 66% and the top
ten companies hot 99% (Pulp and Paper, July 1 90).
U 8. production in this sector is tar larger than Canada's. Trade between Canada and the United States in this sector is
relatively small. although this may be attributable to the past existence at significant tariti barriers.
- Other Sectors
Like the printing and writing sector. the rest 01 the pulp and paper indust shows a significant level of diversity while at
the same time small numbers at companies dominate the production 01 individua products (Taste 8.8).
TABLE 8.8 Market Share in Selected U.S. Pub and Paper Markets
TOP FIVE TOP TEN TOTAL MARKET
MARKET MARKET MARKET CAPAClTY
MARK
ET AN
D LEA
DING
PROD
UCER
SHAR
E
SHAR
E
SHAR
E
(000 s
hort T
/y)
Kralt Paper Stone Contalner 23.1% 69.0% 96.0% 2,745
Bleached Paperboard lntemational Pmer 19.7% 65.4% 92.4% 4,838
Kratt Linerboard Stone Contalner 14.0% 49.7% 78.4% 20.339
Tissue Scott Pqeer 19.1% 75.1% 92.2% 6,113
Corrug
atlng
Mediu
m
Georg
ia-Pa
dﬂc
19.5%
47.9%
67.9%
8.200
Source: Pulp and Paper, various issues.
- Companies
The o
verall
North
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ket is
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numbe
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ies (
Table
8 9).
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howe
ver,
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ery
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t tha
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oard
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ing s
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s.
Each 01 these sectors tends to be dominated by a small number at producers.
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 TABLE 8,9 The 20 Largest North American Paper Companies. 1989
(millions of US Dollars)
PAPER AND ALLIED RANK BY
PRODUCTS SALES TOTAL SALES TOTAL SALES
N
A
_
.
.
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International Paper
James River
Kimberly-Clark
Stone Container
Scott Paper
Georgia-Paciﬁc
Champion International
Great Northern Nekoosa
Weyerhaeuser
Noranda Forest
Boise Cascade
Union Camp
Westvaco
Mead
Canadian Paciiic Forest Products
MacMIllan Bloedel
Domtar
Temple-inland
Bowater
Abltibi-Price
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and
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pan
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ten
ds
to
be
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sma
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num
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f i
nve
sto
rs
(Tw
le
8.1
0).
So
me
oi
the
lar
ger
US.
com
pan
ies
hav
e d
omi
nan
t s
har
eho
lde
rs:
the
Sto
ne
iam
ily
hol
d 2
5%
of
Sto
ne
Con
tai
ner
, W
arr
en
Bui
tet
t a
nd
Lau
ren
ce
Tis
ch
hav
e
tak
en
siz
eai
ie
pos
iti
ons
in
Cha
mpi
on
lnt
ema
tio
nal
.
the
We
erh
aeu
ser
lam
iiy
mai
nta
ins
a
slg
nil
lca
nt
sta
ke
in
Wey
erh
aeu
ser
-- b
ut m
ost
at t
he
larg
er U
S.
com
pan
ies
app
ear
to b
e in
ly h
eld.
TA
BL
E 8
.10
Own
ers
hip
01 O
nta
rio
Pu
b a
nd
Pap
er
Mill
s. 1
990
Mill
s
Prin
cipa
l Sh
areh
olde
rs
Abit
ibi
Pri
ce
Oly
mpi
a a
nd
Yor
k
-
78%
Bea
ver
Wo
od
Fib
re
Ge
Ia P
aci
tic
-
10
0%
CPF
P (
Thu
nde
r B
ay
Mill
s)
Can
ad
an
Paci
fic
-
85%
Dom
tar
Pub
lic
-
56%
Quebec Government - 44%
ES.
Edd
y
Geo
rge
Wes
ton
-
100
%
Fras
er
Nora
nda
-
100
%
Jam
es
Riv
er (
Mar
ath
on
Mill
)
Jam
es
Riv
er
-
80%
Buchanan - 20%
Kim
ber
ly C
lar
k oi
Can
ada
Kim
ber
ly
Cla
rk
-
100
%
Macm
illa
n Bl
oede
l
Nor
and
a
-
50%
Que
bec
2; O
nta
rio
Pap
er
Chi
cag
o T
rib
une
-
10
0%
St.
Mar
ys
Pap
ers
Pri
vat
e
-
75
%
Rauma Rapola - 25%
Tren
t Va
lley
Pap
erb
oar
d
-
N/A
Source: McCubbln 1990
Source; Lockwood-Post 1990
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TABLE 8.11 Pup. Paper and Paperboard Mills in the Great Lakes
RE
CE
IV
IN
G
PR
OD
.
LOCA
TION
AND
MILL
WAT
ER
MILL
TYPE
lt/d)
TREA
TMEN
T
NOTE
S
LAKEamBASH
Oralio
Thunder Bay Abrtibi-Price Fine Papers Thunder Bay Groundwood 125 P Total, 442 W line and
Harbour coated papers
Thunder Bay Abitbi Price, Ft-Wiiliam Thunder Bay gagndwood 21;: P Total, 383 W newsprint
1
Thunder Bay Abitibi-Prioe, Thunder Bay Thunder Bay Groundwood 320 P Total, 442 W newsprint
Suiphlte 120
Thunder Bay CPFP Kaministirwia Groundwood 910 P Total, 1,170 t/d newsprint
River Subnite 300
Kraft 1,300
Red R
ock
Domta
r Pac
kagin
g N
bigon
Bay
Kraft
600
P
Total,
600 W
iinerb
oard
Groundwood 150 200 Ud newsprint
Semi-bleached kralt 50
Terra
ce Ba
y
Kimbe
rly-C
lark
Jadd
lsh B
ay
Kralt
1.200
P. S
Total
. 12
00 W
blead
red
Wt Pulp
Mara
thon
Jam
es R
iver
Peni
nsul
a
Kraft
«0
P
Total
, 44
0 t/d
blea
ched
Harbour kralt pup
Whoa-it
Supe
rior
Supe
rior
Fibr
e
Lak
e St
peri
or D
etbr
atln
g
140
P: C
los
ed
Hard
boar
d, 1
40 W
(Sub
s. o
l Ge
orgi
a-Pa
ciﬁc
)
sys
tem
Ashl
and
Jam
es R
iver
Cheq
uarn
egon
Deiri
r an
d Bl
each
65
P, S
Tiss
ue,
Napk
ings
. 65
W
Bay
will
Ont
ona
gon
Sto
ne C
om
mr
Ont
ona
gon
Sem
i-c
hem
“
575
P, S
Cor
rug
an
Med
ium
. 55
0 W
River
Muni
sing
Kimb
erly
-Cla
rk
Lak
e Sl
per
lor
(Pm
er M
il)
P
Spec
ialt
y P
m.
98 W
P . Primary; S - Secondary; tld - tonnes/day
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TABLE 8.11 Pup, Paper and Pwer’ooard Mills in the Great Lakes (continued)
RE
CE
lV
lN
G
PR
OD
.
LOC
ATI
ON
AN
D M
ILL
WA
TE
R
MlL
L T
YPE
(t/d
)
TR
EA
TM
EN
T
NO
TE
S
LAKE MDHIGAN BASH
Wiscms'n
Gre
en B
ay
Fort
How
ard
Pap
er
Fox
Rive
r
Dein
king
N/A
P.S
Indu
stri
al a
nd p
erso
nal
Green Bay Green Bay Packaging Fox River
service paper, 7 ud
Semi-Chemical 220 P: Closed Corrugatlng medium.
(NSSC) system specialty board. «110 t/d
expanding to 700
Gree
n Ba
y
Jam
es R
iver
Fox
Rive
r
Suip
hite
160
P, 8'
Tiss
ue. t
owel,
napk
in
470 t/d
Gre
en B
ay
Proc
tor
& Ga
mbl
e P
ape
r F
ox R
iver
Sulp
hite
(idle
)
Tiss
ue,
hou
seh
old
pap
er
Groundwood (idle)
De
Pete
Nico
let
Pme
r
Fox
Rive
r
(Pap
er M
ill)
P
Spec
ialt
y kr
ait
pap
ers
(Div
isio
n oi
inte
mati
onai
Pwe
r)
140
t/d
Kau
kau
na
Thi
lma
ny P
ulp
and
Pap
er
Fox
Rive
r
Krai
t
420
P, S
Krai
t. c
onve
rtin
g an
d co
ated
(Div
isio
n oi
inte
rnat
iona
l Pa
per)
pape
rs.
550
W
Kimb
erly
Mldt
ec P
ate
r
Fox
Rive
r
Gro
und
woo
d
180
P, 8
Boo
k an
d sp
ecia
lty
paw
s,-
1,14O t/d
Appl
eton
Kerw
in P
wer
Fox
Rive
r
Blea
ch &
Dein
k
P, 8
"
Fine
pape
rs,
120
W
(Subsidiary at Riverside Paper)
Combined Locks Appleton Papers Fox River
Chemi-mechanic 200 P, S
RECEiVlNG
, LO
CAT
lON
AND
MlL
L
WAT
ER
NOT
ES
LAKEmmBASH. CONNIE)
thunsit allW
Nee
nah
. W
i
Kimb
erly
Clar
k
Fox
Rive
r
Abo
ut 5
-10
mile
s ms
tma
m oi
leto
n
Men
ash
a. W
I
Wis
con
sin
Tiss
ue M
ills
Fox
Rive
r
Abo
ut 5
-10
mile
s in
str
eam
oi A
pple
ton
(opp
osit
e e
ene
h)
Nee
nah
, W
I
Ber
iro
m P
m
Lak
e B
utt
e D
es
Mor
tes
Abo
ve
Lat
e O
shk
osh
, t
hen
ce
to F
ox
Riv
er
Nee
nah
. W
I
K m
ber
iy
Cle
rk
Litt
le L
ake
But
te D
es
Mor
tes
Abo
ve
Lat
e O
shk
osh
. t
hen
ce
to F
ox
Riv
er
Sha
wan
o.
Wl
Sha
wan
o P
wer
Wol
i R
ive
r
Dis
tan
t tr
ibut
ary
oi F
ox;
ove
r 7
0 mi
les
ups
tre
am
oi O
shk
osh
Pesh
tigo
, Wi
Badg
er P
mer
Pesh
tigo
Rive
r
A ie
w mi
les u
psat
ream
: int
o nor
th e
nd a
t Gr
een
Bay
Oco
nto
Fall
s. W
i
Scot
t Pa
per
Oco
nto
Pap
er
Abo
ut 1
5 mi
les
wst
rea
m; i
nto
nort
hern
part
at G
ree
n Ba
y
Min
omi
nee
, Ml
Min
omi
nee
Paa
r
Mon
omi
nee
At m
out
h oi
Gre
en B
ay.
nort
h en
d
Mari
nett
e. W
I
Scot
t Pa
ter
Mon
omi
nee
site
Men
omi
nee
Niag
ara.
Wl
Nia
gar
a
Men
omi
nee
Ove
r 60
mile
s up
str
eam
oi M
arin
tett
e
Dic
ken
son
Coun
ty.
Ml
Cha
mpi
on
Trib
. to
Men
omi
nee
in s
ame
gene
ral
area
s as
Ni
ara
Mani
stiq
ue,
Mi
Mani
stiq
ue P
ut:
a P
QO!
Mani
stiq
ue R
iver
Nort
h an
d oi
eke
Esc
ana
ba.
Ml
Mea
d
Esc
ana
ba
Riv
er
Top
oi G
ree
n B
ay
File
r Ci
ty,
Ml
Pac
kag
ing
Corp
. oi
Ame
ric
a
Lak
e Mi
chig
an
East
-cen
tral
lake
Kal
ama
zoo
, M
I
Bro
wn
Kal
ama
zoo
Rive
r
Abo
ut 4
0 mi
les
ups
tre
am o
i ea
st s
ide
of l
ake
Kal
ama
zoo
. M
i
Alli
ed P
wer
Port
age
Cre
ek
Osi
ego
& Pl
ainw
ell
are
10-1
5 mi
les
dow
nst
rea
m oi
Kal
ama
zoo
Ost
ego
, Ml
Mea
d
Kal
ama
zoo
Riv
er
Ost
ego
. Ml
Men
ash
a
Kal
ama
zoo
Riv
er
Piainwell. Ml Piainweil Pater Kalamazoo River
Wate
rvli
et,
Mi
Wate
riie
t P
wer
Paw
Paw
Rive
r
Sout
h-ea
st s
ide
oi l
ake
Nile
s. M
l
Fre
nch
Pap
er
St.
Jos
eph
Riv
er
Abo
ut 2
5 m
ile
s ir
om
sou
the
ast
com
er
oi l
ake
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TABLE 8.11 Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Mills in the Great Lakes tcontinued)
RECEIVING
LOCATION AND MILL WATER NOTES
.
LAKE HUI-KN BASH
Ontario indm
Sault Ste. Mane. ON St. Marys Groundwood 220 Total. 350 t/d specialty
St Marys Paper River Groundwood
Espanoia. ON EB. Eddy Spanish River Kralt 1,040 P. S. 02 Total. 900 t/d bleached kralt
Forest Products 120 Ud specialy, 20 t/d line
Sturgeon Falls, ON Macmillan- French River NSSC 200 124 km to Lake Huron
Bioedel via Lake Nipisslng. 200 Ud
Mechanical 110 co atlng medium
I 10 d hardboard
Cheboygan. Ml Proctor and Gamble Cheboygan River Just southeast of Straights
oi Mackinac
Paper Products
Alpena. Ml Abitibi Thunder Bay River West side at late
Alpena, MI Fletcher Paper Thunder Bay River
LAKE 81E BASH
Ohio maW
Port Huron. Ml Port Huron Pwer Black River into St. Clair River; over 70 miles to Lake Erie
Paimyn‘a. Mi Simplex Industries River Raisin South oi Detroit; over 40 miles inland
Ggpsum. OH US. Gypsum Lake Erie Near Sandusky
C agrin Falls. OH Chase Bay Chagrin River Eastern edge oi Cleveland
RECEIVING PROD.
LOCATION AND MILL WATER MILL TYPE lt/d) TREATMENT NOTES
LAKEMAM BASH
Orllio
Thorold Beaver Wood Fbre Twelve MI. Creek (Pmemoard) Produce 273 W pwerboard
from purchased waste pwer
Thorold Domtar Constmction Twelve Mi. Creek
St. Cat
harine
s Do
mtar
Fine P
mer
TwelV
e MI.
Creek
Fine P
aper)
P
Produ
ce 20
0 t/d l
ine pi
per
Thorol
d
Fraser
Twelv
e MI.
Creek
Fine P
ater
S
from
purch
ased
pup
and
waste
Thoro
ld
Queb
ec an
d
Twel
ve MI
. Cre
ek T
MP
460
Prod
uce 6
00 li
d new
sprin
t
Ontario Pwer Deinking 540
St. Ca
thari
nes
Kimbe
rly C
lark
Old W
ella
nd
(Tiss
ue/Fi
ne)
Prod
uce 5
0 W
tissue
. 35
W
Can
al
1/2
W t
ine
pap
er
Trento
n
Domta
r Pkg.
Trent
River
Semi-
chemi
cal
130
.
Produ
ce 28
2 W c
orrug.
overy medium
Trent
on
Trent
Valle
y T
rent
River
(ane
rboa
rd)
Prod
uce 2
50 W
pwer
boar
d
Pwer
boar
d
from
recy
cled
pwe
r &
boar
d
P a Primary; 8 - Secondary; t/d - tonnes/day; Continued
wP+51 (August 2, 1991)
62
 
 TABLE 8.11 Pup, Paper and Pwerboard Mills in the Great Lares (continued)
RECEIVING PROD.
LOCA
TION
AND
MILL
WATEF
I
MILL
TYPE
It/d)
TREA
TMEN
T
NOTE
S
LAKE MARIO,WE)
Ornate, mired
Camden East Twp. Strathcona Papequmnee Ftiver (Box board) P, S Produce 165 t/d box board
New York
Lyons Falls Georgia-Pacific
Lyonsdale Burrows Pmer
Deteriet St. Regis P or
Croghan Latex F‘ or
Brownville Latex Fiber
Richiand Schoeller Technical
Volney Armstrong Cork
Oaklleld U.S. Gypsum
M
Cornwall, ON Domtar
New York
Gouvemour Groveton Papers
Newton Falls Newton Falls
Potsdam Potsdam Pwer
Norfolr Simplicity Pattern
from waste paper & board
Black River Over 70 mi. upstream ol Watertown
Moose River Just upstream of Lyons Falls
Bladr Filver About 30 miles upstream of lake
Beaver River Flows into Black River about 15 mi. upstream of Detenet
Bladt Riover At river mouth
Salmon River Southeast comer of lake
Oswego River About 10-15 miles upstream of Oswegho and lake
Whitney Creek Between Buffalo and Rochester. about 20 miles south of lake
ST.LAWRB€E RIVER”
St. L
awre
nce
Kraft
400
P
Prod
uces
600
W f
ine
.
River paper, 200 W paperboard ‘
Oswegatchie River Over 50 miles upstream of St. Lawrence in at Ogdensburg
Oswegatchie Fllver Over 30 miles upstream ol Gouvemour
Raquette River About 15 miles upstream through Messlna’
Raquette Fliver About 10 miles upstream at Norfolk
P - Primary; 8 - Secondary; t/d - tonnes/day;
While the pulp and pmer industry already wpears to be let
concentrated, further consolidation may lie ahead. Many
Cana
dlan
mills
are w
ell b
elow
opti
mum
size
and
use
relati
vely
an
uated
equb
ment
(Tmi
es 8.
12 an
d 8.1
3).
Many
of th
ose
are a
lso n
ot in
tegra
ted w
ith p
up p
roduc
ers (
and s
o are
vuln
eMIe
to si
gnifi
cant
pup
price
lluau
atlon
s).
As ta
rii‘fs
conti
nue t
o
decline and as environmental costs 90 w, these smaller operations will be vulnerdue.
TABLE 8.12 Age of Newsprint Machines Operating in Canada, the United States and Scandinavia. 1983.
DATE COMMENCED
OPE
RAT
ION
CAN
ADA
UNI
TED
STA
TES
SCA
NDI
NAV
IA
Prior
to 19
50
58%
28%
7%
1950
to 19
70
19
45
50
After
1970
23
27
43
Source: Sinclair (1990)
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TABLE
8.13
Annual
Production
capacity
of Canadian,
US.
and
Scandinavian
Newsprint Machines.
1983
TONNES PER YEAR CANADA U.S.A. SWEDEN FiNLAND NORWAY
Under 100.000
50%
15%
0%
30%
40%
100.000 to 150.000
35
55
20
30
40
Over 150.000
15
30
80
40
20
Source: Sinclair 119901
it should be noted that. the size and concentration of the pulp and paper industry may prove advantageous to the
industry if it is forced into large capital expenditures. if producers are able to influence market prices. the costs of
environmental protection measures are relatively more likely to be passed on to paper and board consumers rather than being
absorbed entirely by producers.
‘ Ownership of Forests
in Ontario forest land used in timberdproduction is owned almost entirely by the ovincial government. Allocation of
timber rights is normally non-competitive an involves long term supply arrangements. gs province deals with a number of
large purchasers who do not seem strongly motivated to compete with one another. The high levels of cwitaf invested in
production facilities Creates strong incentives to bid only for cutting rights on nearby lands.
The fees paid to the government for timber cutting rights, known as stumpage. have historically been too low to cover
provincial forest management costs. According to Atkin (1988). the Ontario government lost 03139 million or 054.79 per
cubic meter of timber arvested in the province during the fiscal year 1986-8 . Stum age revenues equalled C385 million
while forest management expenditures equalled C3224 million. Stumpage fees chargedpto pup mill owners in Ontario varied
between 031.04 and $4.55 at that time. s
The government has been criticized for not monitonng harvesting activities more closely (Atkin 1988). Ontario is heavily
reliant upon information provided by the forest industry on actual harvesting practices. inspection of and quality control over
reforestation efforts has also been insufficient to revent a significant level of tree crop failure. However. Ontario does appear
to have adequate forest supplies to meet current evels of growth in the flare needs of the pth and paler industry iAtkin 1988).
Private ownership of forest land plays a much more si nificant role in the United States than in Canada. Originally, all
of the forest land was publicly owned in the US. but over i a years ownership shifted to private ownership in many areas.
Since about World War 1 the are of forest land in the US. has roughly stwifized and large shifts in the future are not expected.
iClawson 1979)
8.4 Pulp and Paper Market Trends
Pu and pwer mariiets will have overcqiacity for several years in all but some coated r and uncoated free sheet
grades. its total US. industry capacity is expected tgq/grow at a compound annual rate of 2.9 over the next three years.
Broducf consumption is ex ed to grow by about 0 per year over the next five years Value Line 1991 and US.
apartment of Commerce 1 1). Overall prices are expected to be restrained by recent and co nulng increases in capacity.
The share that Ontario producers will fate of any market expansion will be shaded by fluctuations in the price of the Canadian
dollar.
' Pulp
High inventories. increasing cmdty Including significantI“growth in low cost South American pulp production.
decreasing operating rates (percentage of meaty actually used) a sipping prices characterize the current state of the pulp
production business.
Chemical pulps sales are also increasingly being cut into by sales of mechanical pups. New developments in the
production of mechanical pups. also known as 'alphabet pups" because of the confusing array of acronyms used to describe
the various pulpingprocesses (CTMP, chemi~thermomechanlcalepuping; TMP. thermomechanicai pggalngé FtMP, refiner
mechanical pulping; and others). have increased their quality and w l as the cost effectiveness of their pr uc n.
Secondary fibres will also be used increasingly. The relatively low costs of secondary and mechanical pup fibre will
create continuing pressure to keep prices low.
Pulp shipments are expected to increase b about 1% in 1991 and about 2% per year overthe next five years. Demand
for high quality bleached pub, in particular the orthem Bleached Softwood Kraft produced in Ontario. should be strong due
to growing demand for high grades of printing and writing paper.
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Employment levels in the sector are expected to decline siightiy or stay constant.
' Paper and Paperboard
Over
all
sale
s in
this
sect
or a
re e
xgec
ted
to in
orea
se b
y 2.
5% i
n 19
91 a
nd b
y 2.
3% p
er y
ear
over
the
next
iive
year
s.
Coat
ed p
aper
. re
pres
enti
ng 2
0%
oi U
. .
pwe
r sh
ipme
nts.
has
been
in s
tron
g de
man
d re
centl
y.
Howe
ver,
Incr
ease
s in
capac
ity
will
exce
ed Lg
rowth
and
shoul
d le
ad to
flat o
r dec
linin
g pn
ces
in th
e sho
rt t
erm.
Unco
ated
tree
sheet
paper
.
repr
esen
ting
29%
01
.8.
pap
er s
hipm
ents
. co
ntai
ns a
t le
ast
90%
krai
t ii
bre.
and
its u
se h
as
also
bee
n gr
owin
g ta
ster
than
overa
ll gr
owth
in pw
er c
onsum
ption
. Co
nsum
tion
oi un
coat
ed ir
ee sh
eet p
wer
is ex
pect
ed to
grow
2.9%
in 19
91.
This
compa
res w
ith pr
ojecte
d GNP
growt
h oi u
nder
/.. Ne
wspri
nt pro
ductio
n. rep
resent
ing 1
7% oi
U.S. p
aper
produc
tion.
is iiat
with little increase loreseen in newspaper uses.
in general. while the recession ls likely to remain throu hout 1991. the industry is expected to recover and resume
stead
y gro
wth o
ver 1
992-98
. B
the ye
ar 20
01. g
lobal
virgin
fibre
use is
expec
ted t
o rise
world
wide
by 8
5milli
on ton
s and
waste paper use is expected to so by 55 million tons (Uutela 1990).
Area
s in
which
growt
h in
the d
eman
d lor
virgin
iibre
is ex
pect
ed ar
e: pr
intin
g and
writi
ng a
pers.
with
an in
creas
e 01
23
million
tons (
nearly
two th
irds o
i the
expec
ted i
ncreas
e in d
emand
): ii
nerboa
rd an
d iiut
lng, 6
m llio
n tons
(largel
y unb
leach
ed
pulp)
: ca
rtonb
oards
, 9
milli
on to
ns; n
ewspr
int.
2 mil
lion
tons;
tissu
e. 2
milli
on to
ns.
Dema
nd t
or us
e 01
virgin
pulps
in
unbl
each
ed g
rade
s is
expe
cted
to de
clin
e by
abou
t 2
milli
on to
ns (
Uute
la 1
990)
.
This
increa
se in
the d
emand
tor vi
rgin ii
bre u
lp will
beneli
t both
chemi
cal a
nd me
chani
cal p
ulp p
roduce
rs. i
t curr
ent
trend
s con
tinue
. mos
t oi
the i
ncrea
sed d
eman
d will
met b
y ble
ache
d kra
it pul
ps, b
ut in
creas
ingly
strin
gent
pollu
tion
contr
ols
may encourage a shift to modern mechanical pulp production.
Dem
and
ior m
echa
nica
l u
lp wi
ll g
row
mode
rate
ly a
nd n
ew m
echa
nica
l pu
ttin
g cw
acit
y wil
l be
cons
truc
ted
large
ly to
prod
uce
comb
ined
recy
cled
an
ther
rnom
echa
nlca
l pu
lp i
umis
h (r
epla
cing
suli
lte-
grou
ndwo
od i
umis
hes)
.
- Markets ior Ontario Producers
The
main
mark
ets
for O
ntari
o pu
b an
d 5pa
ter p
roduc
ts a
re th
e No
rthea
stern
and
North
centr
al U
nited
State
s an
d
Onta
rio.
Expo
rts
to t
he U
nite
d St
ates
con
sum
e
6%
of O
ntar
io p
up
and
p
r pr
oduc
tion
. A
not
her
41%
is c
ons
ume
d wi
thin
Ontar
io. O
nly 3
% oi
Ontar
io pr
oduct
ion l
eaves
North
Ameri
ca. (
Ande
rsen
19
; 98
6 iig
ures)
Per
omi
ts c
ons
ump
tio
n oi
pup
and
pap
er p
rodu
cts
has
gro
wn
subs
tant
iall
y du
ring
the
t de
cad
e.
US.
dem
and
lor
news
prin
t ha
s gr
own
irom
44 k
ilog
rams
per
pers
on i
n 19
81 t
o 1
kilo
gram
s pe
r pe
rson
in 19
7 (1
4%).
Dem
and
ior p
rinti
ng
and
writi
ng pa
per
in th
e Un
ited
Stat
es h
as g
rown
irom
58 t
o 80
kilo
gram
s pe
r pe
rson
(27%
) ov
er t
he s
ame
peri
od.
Onta
rio
supp
lies
abou
t 1
3%
oi t
he 1
23
mill
ion
(met
ric)
ton
ne U
nite
d St
ates
news
prin
t ma
rket
. sh
ippi
ng a
bout
1.6
mill
ion
(metr
ic)
tonn
es i
n 19
87.
Onta
rio'
s sh
are
oi t
he U
S.
news
prin
t ma
rket
has
decl
ined
irom
abou
t 1
5%
"1 1
981.
Onta
rio
consumes about 0.6 million tonnes oi newsprint
Onta
rio
supp
lies
abou
t 3%
at U
S. p
rinti
ng a
nd w
ritin
g pa
ter
dema
nd,
or m
oot
0.5
milli
on to
nnes
.
Popu
lati
on g
rowt
h is
an i
mpor
tant
dete
rmin
ant
oi d
ema
nd
tor
pulp
and
pwe
r pr
oduc
ts.
In t
he U
nite
d St
ates.
the
popu
lati
on i
s ex
pec
ted
to g
row
at a
rate
01 0
.72%
lyea
r,
prod
ucin
g a
atio
n i
ncre
ase
oi 2
2 mi
llio
n pe
ople
bet
wee
n 1
988
and
2000
, re
sult
ing
in a
tota
l po
pula
tion
oi 2
67
mill
ion
in 2
000.
n
anad
a.
popu
lati
on i
s ex
pec
ted
to i
ncre
ase
at a
rate
oi
03.
5%
per
ear.
prod
ucin
g a
pop
ula
ion
incr
ease
oi m
out
3 mi
llio
n ov
er t
he s
ame
peri
od t
or a
total
, in
the
year
2000
, oi
29
m ion rnh itants.
Production Costs
r m
ills
are
capi
tal
inte
nsiv
e a
nd
hav
e i
atri
y c
ons
tan
t r
unni
cost
s.
Thi
s m
ean
s t
hat
mill
tail
s to
mar
ket
cond
itio
ns.
To
the
ext
ent
that
new
, l
ess
omi
ta
inte
nsiv
e p
upi
ng
tec
hno
log
ies
oi proiit levels which characterizes the industry could be reduced.
Current pup and p
operations are not easily a
can be developed. the vola
Ande
rsen
(198
8) h
as e
stim
ated
the
cost
01 p
rodu
ctio
n oi
pulp
and
news
prin
t (T
wles
8.14
and
8.15)
. In
comb
inat
ion
with
Tabl
e 8.
16,
whic
h in
dica
tes
comm
odit
y pr
ices
in t
he U
S.
mark
et.
thes
e ta
les
indi
cate
in ro
u h
way
the
poten
tial
proiit
abiilt
y oi t
he in
dustr
y. C
osts
01 en
viron
menta
l con
trol
can a
lso b
e con
sider
ed in
the c
ontex
t oi
these
igure
s.
O
)
0
1
h
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
WP+51 (August 2. 1991)
  
U
‘
1
V
y
y
V
y
1
5
y
TABLE 8.14 1986 Newsprint Production Costs per Metric Tonne
UNITED
ONTARIO CANADA STATES U.S SWEDEN SWEDEN
Wood Costs'
03157
03155
US$93
03109
SKl.061
C3222
Energy
74
77
75
88
538
112
Labour
120
113
67
79
408
85
Other
65
68
80
94
425
89
Total Mill Cost
416
413
315
370
2,432
508
Corporate
24
27
16
19
115
24
Delivery
75
86
27
32
381
80
Total Delivered Cost
515
526
358
421
2.928
612
Expressed in Canadian 3
515
526
421
421
612
612
031 assumed = US$0.85 SK4.78
' includes purchased kratt pulp
Source: Anderson 1988
Note: if the Canadian dollar was worth 80 cents US. as in 1986. the equivalent
cost of US. production would be 3449. At a Canadian dollar worth 70 cents
US, costs would be about equal.
ITABLE 8.15 1986 Kraft Pulp Production Costs per Metric Tonne
Eastern Eastern Interior US. South Sweden
Canada Canada 8.0. (Softwood) (Softwood)
(Hardwood) (Softwood) (Softwood) (03) (03) .
Wood Costs 03150 03206 03146 03134 03360
Energy 35 30 38 34 17
Chemicals 47 55 51 42 40
Labour 58 62 61 53 58
Other Materials 45 45 52 48 42
Mill Cost 335 398 348 312 517
Delivery 44 44 so 59 33
Total Delivered Cost 379 442 428 370 551
Canadian Dollar - US$0.85 - SK4.78. ll 03- U.S.3.80. U.S. cost - 03394.
Source: Andersen (1988)
TABLE 8.16 Commodity Prices (US. 3 per Metric Tonne)
1986 1988 1990
Newsprint 3545 3650 685
Market Pub (Bleached
Softwood Northern Kraft) 450 725 800
Groundwood Printing
Paper (directory) 735 850
Printin and Writing
Paper ?bond) 725 925
Sources: Andersen (1988) and Pup and Paper various issues
Profit levels in the pub and paler industry have historically been low relative to other manufacturing industries. Given
the level of risk involved in the industry. this is also an important influence on levels oi investment in the industry.
in the immediate future. industry profit leveis will be particularly low. Over the rest of 1991 many companies are
expected to show low profits or losses. A return to more normal profit levels is expeded in 1992 and 1993 as slack created by
recently created overcqiacity is taken w by a steady increase in demand (Value Line 1991).
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8.5 Capital Spending
The r
ecent
downt
urn in
pulp a
nd pw
er in
dustry
cash
ilows
has le
d to si
gnific
ant cu
ts in
plans
for cap
ital s
pendi
ng in
the
indust
ry. H
oweve
r, cw
iial
spend
ing pl
ans co
ntinue
to be
high i
n comp
ariso
n to t
he lev
els oi
t 9 pa
st ten
years.
Accor
ding t
o
a surv
ey do
ne by
Pug a
nd a
per at
the e
nd oi
1990
(Pulp
and P
r, Jan
ua
1991.
All fi
gures
in this
sectio
n are
derive
d
irom that survey). U. . companies currently have plans to invest .S.$17.0 bi lion in mill improvements, which is 5.5% less
than w
as pl
anned
a yea
r earl
ier.
In Can
ada.
compa
nies
have
lane t
o inve
st 051
0.2 b
illion
on mil
l impr
oveme
nts o
ver th
e
next two years. This is 21.1% less than spending plans ma e at the end oi 1989. Relatively deeper cuts to Canadian
investment plans are attributed to wedxness in markets ior Canada‘s two most important products, newsprint and market pulp,
as well as the high value oi the Canadian dollar.
These proposed capital ex nditures are broken down as iollows (see also, Tables 8.14 and 8.15). Startups oi new
mills and new uipment in the .8. account ior U.S.S7.1 billion in 1990. iatlin to U.S.SSJ billion in 1991. U.S.52.4 billion in
1992
and U
.S.s
.4 bill
ion in
1993.
in Can
ada.
startu
ps co
nsume
d 034
.6 bil
l on i
n 1990
, and
will sh
rink t
o 053
.2 bil
lion in
1991, 031.4 billion in 1992 and 051.0 billion ior 1993 and beyond. This is a reversal irom strong increases in investment in
new iaciiities over the past iew years.
Spend
in d
riven
by en
viron
menta
l con
cerns
, in c
ontras
t, is
expec
ted t
o rise
signiii
cantly.
in the
U.S.,
spend
ing o
n
envir
onmen
tal i
mprov
ement
s to o
ld mil
ls will
accou
nt ior
11.1%
oi all
new c
apital
spendi
gg. T
his is
w iro
m 6.9
% in 1
990 a
nd
5.0%
in 19
89.
In Ca
nada
, en
viron
ment
relat
ed in
vestm
ents
are p
roiec
ted t
o rise
to 24
.9 .
oi all
tanne
d inv
estme
nts.
up ir
om
15.9% in 1990 and 5.5% in 1989. Canadian costs are driven by the need to install secondary reatment. already in place at
U.S.
mills.
as we
ll as
by th
e sam
e pre
ssure
as ex
ists
in th
e U.S
. to r
educe
toxic
emiss
ions.
Oi U.
S. en
viron
ment
relate
d spe
nding
over
1990-9
2, U.
S.$1.1
billion
will be
ior wa
ter qu
ality
impro
vemen
ts (u
p 54%
irom 1
990).
U.S.S
TSB mi
llion
will be
ior air
qualit
y imp
rovem
ents
(up 51
.1%)
and U
.S.S7
4 mill
ion wil
l be s
pent t
o man
age s
olid
wast
e Sip
25.8
%; i
n Can
ada,
water
quali
ty re
lated
spend
infsw
iil t
otal
031.
9 bill
ion (
up 18
.9%
irom
1990,
but u
p ove
r 50
0%
irom
1 89)
, 05
5 2
will b
e spe
nt on
air po
lluti
on co
ntrol
(up
4%)
and
spen
ding
on so
lid w
aste
dispo
sal w
ill b
e 05
68 m
illion
(dow
n 2.9
%).
Thes
e ii
res m
ay b
e an
under
estim
ate o
i l
anned
envir
onmen
tal s
pend
ing
in th
e se
nse
that
const
nicti
on oi
new
mills
and
intro
duct
n oi
more
mode
rn p
roduc
tion
equ
ent i
s olt
en at
least
partia
lly d
riven
by th
e ne
ed to
meet
tighte
r
environmental controls.
in the
U.S.,
pup
mill e
xpans
ion a
nd mo
derni
zatio
n will
consu
me U
S$62
billion
, or
41%
oi tot
al 19
90-92
cwital
spend
ing.
None
01 th
e ma
lor
cwao
lty
expa
nsio
n pr
otect
s pla
nned
to co
me i
nto p
roduc
tion
behw
een
1990
and
1992
are
locat
ed in
the G
reat
Lake
s reg
ion.
Howe
ver,
a 20
0 (sh
ort)
ton d
einki
ng mi
ll ior
mark
et pu
lp pr
oduct
ion w
ill b
e com
plet
ed b
y
Fox River Fibre at Kaukauna. Wisconsin in 1991.
in Ca
nada
. 05
4.5
billio
n will
be s
pent
on pu
mill e
xpan
sion
and
moder
nizat
ion,
oi wh
ich 0
5776
millio
n will
be zp
ent i
n
Ontar
io.
With
the p
ossib
le ex
cepti
on oi
a pro
pose
new
150,
000 (
metri
c) to
nne p
er ye
ar C
TMP
prop
osed
by Sh
in Ho
anad
a
tor T
hunde
r Ba
y an
d the
recent
ly
d 17
8,500
(metri
c) to
nne p
er ye
ar pr
opose
d exp
ansio
n oi
the J
ames
- Rive
r-Mar
athon
krait
mill at
Marat
hon,
Ontari
o, the
Atlant
ic Pac
kagin
g Mill
which
is abo
ut to
open,
is the
only p
lanne
d maj
or
capacity expansion on the Ontario side oi the Great Lakes basin.
While
virgin
newsp
rint
produ
ction
cmac
ity i
s in
exce
ss oi
requi
remen
ts,
dema
nd i
or se
cond
ary l
ibre
caus
ed b
y sol
id
waste
dispos
al pro
blems
acros
s the
contin
ent is
creati
ng a m
elt to
dev
recycl
ed lb
re ovi
aclty.
A 250
,000 (
short
ton pe
r
year
recyc
led c
ontai
nerbo
ard m
ill is
plan
ned
by Du
nkirk
Conta
inerb
oard
or Du
nkirk
. Ne
w o
rk (o
n La
te Er
ie) a
nd e
ilers
on
Smuri
it in
tends
to bui
ld a
250,
000
metri
c) to
nne r
ecycl
ed ne
wspri
nt mi
ll at
an un
speci
iled
locat
ion in
New
York
state.
Start
up
date
s ha
ve n
ot b
een
anno
unce
d o
r th
e la
ter
two
acts.
in O
ntar
io,
Atlan
tic
Pack
agin
g Pr
oduc
ts w
ill c
om
to a
new
recyc
led t
issue
(35,0
00 me
tric
tones
per y
ear)
and
recy
newsp
rint
(150,
000 m
etric
tonn
es pe
r yea
r) mi
ll in
Wh
y, on
Lake
Ontar
io in
1991.
Abltl
bi-Pr
lce h
also
anno
unce
d pla
ns to
add
deink
lng c
qmci
ty to
its ne
wspri
nt op
erati
ons a
t Thu
nder
Bay,
Ontario.
Const
ructi
on oi
new
pwer
mach
kies
will r
equir
e 31
% 01
U.S.
spen
ding
betw
een
1990
and
1992.
Many
01 th
ese
new
mills
are be
ing co
nstruc
ted in
the Gr
eat L
akes b
asin.
in 199
0, an
80.00
0 (sho
rt) to
n per
year
recycl
ed tis
sue mi
ll was
opene
d
by C
hesa
pea
e at
Mena
sha.
Wisco
nsin.
Fort
Howa
rd p
aler
is al
so pl
annin
g co
ns ru
ction
at a
new
recyc
led t
issue
mill a
t
Gree
n Ba
y an
d Lak
e Su
per
ioe
r ha
s
ed to
add
a ne
w p
r mac
hine
at Du
luth,
Minne
sota.
Cana
dian
expen
ditur
es
on n
ew p
aper
mach
ines
are e
xpec
ted
to to
tal 0
81.3
billio
n ove
r t
1990
-92
perio
d. wi
th 0
3245
milli
on oi
that
sum
being
spent
in On
tario
. Ca
nadi
an P
acili
c For
est P
roduc
ts is
repla
cing
two o
lder
mach
ines
with
a 240
,000
metri
c ton
ne p
er ye
ar
paper machine (net capacity addition will be 60,000 tpy).
Spen
din
on p
aper
mach
ine
modiﬁ
catio
ns an
d im
prov
emen
ts in
the U
nited
State
s wil
l amo
unt
to U.
S.52.
5 bil
lion o
ver
1990-
92 (up
3. %).
in Can
ada.
expend
itures
on ma
chine
modiii
cation
s over
the sa
me pe
riod w
ill tot
al 057
25 mil
lion. o
i whic
h
03206 million will be spent in Ontario.
U.S.
coni
aine
rboa
rd c
apac
ity
is be
ing
incr
ease
d la
rgely
by r
ebui
ldin
g ol
d ma
chin
es.
insta
llati
on 0
1 a
new
tech
nolo
gy
known
as wi
de-nip
press
es al
lows
expan
sion
at tar
lower
than
could
be ac
hieve
d by
buildi
ng ne
w laci
litles.
Green
Bay
Packaging. at Green Bay, Wisconsin is the only Great Lutes mill currently undergoing such modiiication.
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Power plant improvements will cost (1.3.51.1 billion (down 225%) over the 1990-92 period in (he Untied States. Lower
energy costs are seen as the reason for declining spending in this area. The purchase oi co eneratec power irom pnvate
producers has been a Stargicam factor in keep") power costs low. in Canada. energy productgon investment over the same
penod will total 03559 mi n. 01 which (3151 miﬁlon will be spent in Ontario.
TABLE 8.17 US, and East North Central Region Capital Expenditures ior 1990-92+, By Type ot Facility (in 0.8.3000)
East North Central Total US.
Production Wood/Fibre 11.900 (4%) 284.624 (100%)
Related Expenditures Pulplng 255.941 (4%) 6165.478 (100%)
New Machines 875.000 (19%) 4.670314 (100%)
Machine Modiiicatlon 416.666 (17%) 2451.789 (100%)
Energy 174.250 (17%) 1.053.542 (100%)
Miscellaneou3/Piant 129.233 (25%) 512.727 (100%)
Total 1.862.990 (12%) 15.138.474 (100%)
Environmental Spending Water 109.905 (10%) 1.055.489 (100%)
Air 20.135 (3%) 758.350 (100%)
Solid Waste 7.785 (11%) 74.131 (100%)
Total 137.825 (7%) 1,887,970 (100%)
Grand Total 2.000.815 (12%) 17.026.444 (100%)
Source: Pulp and Paper (January 1991)
TABLE 8.18 Ontario Reported Capital Expenditures tor 1990-92+. By Type oi Facility (in C3000)
Ontario Canada
Production-Related Wood/Fibre 12.100 (4% 301.775 100%)
Expenditures Pulping 775.829 (17% 4,471,525 100%)
New Machines 245.000 (19%) 1.320.200 (100%)
Machine Modliication 205.530 )28% 724.561 (100%)
Energy 151.250 27% 559.061 (100%)
Miscellaneous/Plant 1.500 (1%) 252.241 (100%)
Total 1.391.209 (18%) 7.629.363 (100%)
Environmental Spending Water 119.601 6%) 1.893.684 (100%)
Air 16.020 3%) 561.830 100%
Solid Waste 510 1%) 67.835 100%
Total 136.131 5%) 1.527.340 (100%)
Grand Total 1.527.340 (15%) 10,152,712 (100%)
Source: Pulp and Pmer (January 1991)
' Trends in Mill Modernization
The age oi North American and. in particular, Canadian newsprint machines has already been noted in Table 8.11.
Most oi the pulp and paper mills in the Great Lakes basin are comparatively small and are older than might be desiraiie.
Overca
pacity
and g
eneral
ly we
ek lo
ng ter
m per
forma
nce h
ave e
ncour
aged
modern
izatio
n at e
xistin
g plan
t over
new m
ills.
in
iuture. priority will be placed on increasing the scale oi production iacllities as well as on modemlzing production equipment to
make more eiiiclent use oi wood 32mins. Mills will also emphasize the production of higher value grades oi paper. the use oi
recycled ilbres and the use oi iow- ent technologies.
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 The
marke
t sha
re of
mech
anic
al pu
ip sh
are i
s exp
ected
to in
creas
e sig
nifica
ntly.
This
will o
ccur
as a
result
of a
numb
er
of ad
vant
ages
whic
h me
chan
ical
pu
ing p
roce
sses
have
over
chem
ical
pug
ng.
Mech
anic
al p
ulpi
ng m
ake
s re
lativ
ely e
fﬁcie
nt
use
of f
ibre,
usin
g w
out
90%
of a
ll i
re g
ot
into
the
mill,
as o
ppo
sed
to
out
50%
for c
hemi
cal
pulp
ing.
The
capi
tal
cost
of
cons
truc
ting
a ne
w m
ech
ani
cal
mill
is a
bout
% o
f th
at o
i a
new
chem
ical
pulp
mill.
Mec
han
ica
l pu
lpin
g cq
aaci
ty c
an a
lso
be
ad
de
d i
n s
mal
ler
inc
rem
ent
s t
han
ca
n c
hem
ica
l p
ulp
ing
cap
aci
ty.
impr
ovem
ents
in th
e str
ength
chara
cteri
stics
of me
chan
ical
puips
may
allow
a red
uctio
n in
pape
r bas
is we
ight.
which
woul
d me
an t
hat l
ess m
ateri
al wo
uld h
ave
to be
used
to pr
oduc
e a g
iven
produ
ct.
The
high
stren
gth o
f the
newe
r me
chani
cal
puips
also
mean
s tha
t the
re wi
ll no
rrnal
iy be
no n
eed
to ad
d an
y sem
i- bl
each
ed s
oftwo
od p
up t
o rei
nforc
e it f
or ne
wspri
nt
use. as was required for earlier mechanical grades.
Mechanical mills are also more amenable to automation, producing lower labour Costs. and they are better able to meet
more stringent environmental r ulations. Chlorine bleaching is not necessarily required. reducing dioxin, iuran and
organo
chlori
ne emi
ssion
s and
tota l
evels
01 rel
eases
of con
ventio
nal an
d acut
ely to
xic su
bstan
ces a
re sig
niiican
tly lo
wer th
an
with chemical pulping liar ely because more fibre is used and less is released as effluent). Already mechanical pulp is often
the least expensive virgin urnlsh for newsprint.
Techno
logica
l adv
ances
in mec
hanic
al pul
ping a
nd us
e of r
ecycle
d fibre
iinciu
ding d
eclini
ng man
ufact
uring
costSi
and
chemi
cal pu
lp ov
ercapa
city m
ay in
duce
innova
tion t
o decr
ease
chemi
cal pu
ping
manuf
actur
ing c
osts.
Capac
ity in
crease
s at
chem
ical
pulp
mill
s ar
e li
kely
to b
e re
stri
cted
to e
xpa
nsi
on o
f ex
isti
ng m
ills.
As a
resul
t of
thes
e de
velo
pmen
ts,
the
use
oi wo
od h
as b
eco
me s
ignif
icant
ly m
ore
effic
ient.
Muc
h oi
the
rece
nt g
rowt
h
in pu
lp a
nd p
aper
manuf
actur
ing
has
been
acco
mpli
shed
simpl
y by
incre
asing
the u
se o
f log
ging
and
wood
mili
resid
ues.
inte
ratio
n oi
sawm
ilil
ng a
nd p
ulpi
ng m
ills
mak
es u
se o
f wo
od w
aste
s ea
sier
and
more
econ
omic
al.
Impr
ovem
ent
in th
e
qual
y of
mech
anic
al p
ulpi
ng a
lso
prom
ises
to re
duce
wast
age
of w
ood
fibre
. Be
tter
pxie
r ma
chin
es a
re a
lso
redu
cing
the
nee
d fo
r pu
lp a
nd p
ape
r st
reng
th.
w i
ch w
ill a
llow
pwe
rs
to b
e li
ghte
r in
weig
ht.
Cha
nge
s t
o bl
eac
hin
g t
ech
nol
ogi
es
are
con
sid
ere
d in
Cha
pte
r 9.
as.1
Wef
rec
ydi
g
'
Atkin
(1988
) est
imate
s tha
t Can
ada'
s p
r rec
overy
rate
is un
der
30%.
in th
e Uni
ted S
tates
the r
ecove
ry r
ate i
s
esti
mate
d to
be 4
2%.
Thes
e ii
ures
comp
are
w h
an 8
2%
reco
very
rate
in J
n (9
3% o
f all
news
prin
t an
d 75
% of
cont
aine
r
grad
e pa
per)
. It
Japa
nese
leve
s at
reco
very
coul
d be
achi
eved
in
orth
Ame
the
efiec
t on
mark
ets
for v
irgin
pape
r co
uld
be dramatic.
Worl
dwid
e us
e of
recyc
ied f
ibre
is ex
pect
ed to
grow
from
75 mi
llion
tons
in 19
88 to
100 m
illio
n ton
s in
1996
and
to 13
0
millio
n ton
e by
2001.
This
woul
d me
an t
hat r
ecycl
ed ii
bre w
ould
acco
unt f
or 41
% oi
all fl
are u
se in
the y
ear 2
001
(Uute
la
1990).
in ge
nera
l. b
ecau
se m
ixin
g re
cycl
ed f
bre
into
pwe
r th
reat
ens
the
stre
ngth
of th
e res
ultin
g pa
per
prod
uct.
reCy
ciln
g wil
l
incr
ease
the
use
of i
ong-
iibr
e ra
ther
than
shor
t-fl
are
pup
s.
This
is s
ome
th
of a
n a
dva
nta
ge
for
the
Nort
hern
Ble
ach
ed
Soft
wood
Kraft
pup
prod
uced
in th
e Gr
eat
Lake
s be
am a
nd i
n On
tari
o in
part
far.
Howe
ver.
impr
ovem
ents
to m
echa
nica
l
pulp
ing
tech
niqu
es a
s wel
l as
inno
vati
ons
in th
e pr
oduc
tion
of fi
bre-
bond
ing
chem
ical
s ma
y re
duce
this
adva
ntag
e.
The
diffe
rent
sect
ors
oi th
e pu
b an
d pa
per
indu
stry
will
be a
ffec
ted
in di
vers
e wa
ys b
y th
e in
crea
sed
use
of re
cycl
ed
fibre.
' Newsprint
Majo
r ch
ange
s ar
e co
min
g? N
orth
Amer
ican
news
prin
t pr
oduc
tion
due
to a
n in
crea
se in
the d
ema
nd i
or po
st-c
onsu
mer
was
te
cont
ent
in n
ews
pme
rs.
a c
ons
equ
enc
e of
the
fact
that
disc
arde
d n
ewq
uie
rs
mak
e u
p w
pro
xim
ate
ly 6
-7%
oi a
ll
soli
d w
ast
e d
isp
ose
d of
in N
ort
h A
mer
ica
n l
andf
ills
. m
any
juri
sdic
tion
s ar
e ac
ting
to r
edu
ce
the
dis
pos
al o
f ol
d n
ews
pme
rs.
A
num
ber
of U
S.
stat
es h
ave
alre
ady
pas
sed
or a
re i
n th
e pr
oce
ss o
f pa
ssi
min
imu
m se
con
dar
y i
bre
requ
irem
ents
for
loca
lly
sold
new
spw
ers
. T
oron
to i
s se
riou
sly
cons
ider
ing
a 30
- 5
0%
sec
ond
ary
lbre
requ
irem
ent
ior
all n
ews
pap
ers
sold
in s
tree
t
vending machines.
Appr
oxim
atel
y 8
45%
of re
cycl
ed n
ewsp
rint
ends
up a
s sl
udge
after
dein
king
. T
he r
emai
nin
85-
92%
is re
usab
le.
As it
is t
echn
ical
ly f
easi
ble
for
news
prin
t to
be
pro
duc
ed e
ntir
ely
from
old
new
sp
era
the
pote
ntia
l re
uctl
on i
n de
man
d io
r vi
rgin
fibre
news
prin
t of
an i
ncre
ase
in r
ecyc
led
cont
ent
is dr
amat
ic.
Nort
hern
ntari
o ne
wspr
int
mills
will
suffe
r th
e ad
diti
onal
pro
ble
m th
at w
ast
e n
ewsp
rint
is g
ene
rat
ed l
arge
ly i
n th
e Un
ited
Stat
es (
Can
ada
con
sum
es
only
abo
ut 1
.1 o
f th
e 1
0 mi
llio
n
ions
8; n
ews
nnt
that
it is
can
als
of p
rodu
cing
annu
ally
); t
he c
ost
of s
h'pp
ing
that
was
te p
ate
r to
Thu
nde
r Ba
y or
Mar
ath
on
may proh ive.
in p
ract
ice.
mill
s ar
e ex
pec
ted
to o
pera
te w
ith
som
eth
ing
clos
er t
o 5
0%
was
te g
wer
. W
ast
e p
mr
coll
ecti
on m
ay
also
cont
inue
to le
ave a
si ni
tican
t
rtion
of us
ed n
ewsp
aier
s un
coil
ecte
d th
e Ca
nadi
an
u a
nd P
er As
soci
atio
n pro
tect
s th
at
old n
ewsp
aper
coile
on e
fiic e
ncy
will
incr
ease
to 4
6%
in 1
993-
-up
mm
25%
in 1
and
ii .
in 1
988;
US.
reco
very
is
proje
cted
to be
52%
by 19
95--u
p fro
m 38
% in
1989i
. Bu
t the
threa
t to d
istan
t. ol
d new
sprin
t mill
s is u
nmist
dteab
ie.
W
P
+
5
1
(
A
u
g
u
s
t
2.
1
9
9
1
)
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Printing and Writing Pmers
Only a small lncreasa in the use oi wastepaper is seen ior supercalendered or lightweight coated papers. The demand
for high brighiness and 900d Printability qualities currently makes the incorporation oi waste papers into these grades difficult.
Advertisers and other users continue to demand higher quality standards lrom these papers.
opportunities lor the sale oi recycled papers in this sector are for listing paper. envelope paper. paper for 'a small.
environmentally conscrous part ol the business papers market. largely lor public authOrities' (Uutela 1987).
However, the pure potential for recycling oi pnntin and writing paper sis high. According to the Canadian Pulp and
Paper Association. 37% oi the solid waste stream in No America consists ol these high iibre quality papers. A signiiicant
upgrade ol collection of these papers. in particular from oiilce waste streams, could provrde the lumish necessary to produce
a high quality recycled wntlng or printing paper.
~ Tissue
The use oi wastepaper is already high in the manufacture of tissue grades. In luture. waste paper is expected to be
used across a wider range oi tissue grades and the overall use oi secondary iibres in tissue-makln is expected to increase
signriicantly. As a result. many virgin ibre based tissue mills are expected to be required to invest in sinking plants.
- Linerboard and Fluting
Kraft liner is expected to include a higher proportion oi old corrugated containers as more waste material becomes
available. The number ol grades oi iinerboard may also increase to accommodate the various types and qualities ol wastes
which will become available.
- Cartonboards
Recycled libre is already heavily used in cartonboard production. Growing interest in waste grade loldlng cartonboard
ma lead to the development ol new waste-based grades. At the same time, the use at virgin libre is actually increasing at the
hig -end oi the cartonboard market. due to a demand lor brighter wpearance and improved periormance characteristics, A
growing market lor liquid packaging boards also iavours virgin ilbre. Generally. lood packaging legislation currently inhbits
the use ol recycled fibre lor lood padtaging.
~ Wastepaper Business
A growing demand lor waste paper content is encoUraglng s tiers to secure supplies oi waste paper. This is
improving wastepwer business prospects as well as creating iurther mand lor waste papercollection. An increase in
sorting at source will also improve waste paperquality and value. The long term pr ct ls lor tar greater price stability.
partlculariy as mills try to lock in supplies at wastepaper. In the short term. until adequate mill emotty is available. increasing
numbers ol waste separation and recycling programs may produce an oversrpply of some grades at paper.
The export oi old wastepaper lrom U.S.A to Canada is expected to provide new opportunities. High quality old
corrugated cardboard and deinking grades at waste pwer may also be imported to North America to help meet demand.
- Equpment and Chemical Scppliers
Waste aper deinklng is expected to increase signiiicantly worldwide. Much oi the growth will be at US. and Canadian
newsprint mils. As a result. demand lor delnklng chemicals is lorecast to grow by 8 to 0 percent per year. Fibre cleaning
and upgrading equ'pment will also be in demand, as will improvements to pmer machines to accommodate waste paper.
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9.1
The
Pulp
and
Paper
Industry
Persistent
ToxIcs
Problem:
Emission
Sources
The pulp and paper industry discharges a wide range oi toxic substances to the environment.
Most prominent among
these discharges
are the class 01 substances known as organochlorines.
Normally measured
as adsorbabie or anic halide
iAOX), chlorinated organics include large numbers oi known toxins as well as a wide range 01 poorly understood su stances.
01 the organochiorines, two highly toxic dioxin and iuran cogeners 2.3.7.8- tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin i2.3.7.8- TCDDZ
and 2.3.78 tetrachlorodibenzoiuran (2.3.7.8-TCDFi have been singled out by the intemationat Joint Commission as 'Criticai
pollutants in the Great Lakes basin.
This Chapter iocuses on the possibilities oi using economic instruments to virtually
eliminate the discharge oi those two substances and AOX in general.
The critical substances list oi the NC is intended to be representative oi classes at pollutants and sources oi pollution in
the Great Lakes basin. in this case. the presence of 2.3.7.8- TCDD/TCDF is associated with the presence oi other persistent
toxins iTabie 9.1). Emissions oi dioxins and iurans as well as organochion‘nes in general are associated only with those mills
at which chlorine is used to bleach pulps. Norrnaliy these are krait mills, although chlorine is also used to brighten suilite and
other pulps.
The number oi miiis using 31 niiicant quantities oi chlorine in the Great Lakes basin is relatively small (Table 9 2i.
Notably. with the exception ot two m is in Thunder Bay. each 01 these mills discharges to a different area oi the Lakes and no
two ml is are known to impact on any one particular area.
TABLE 9.1 Priority Pollutants Detected in Ontario Kraft Mill Eiliuents. 1990
AVERAGE
CONCENTRATION
( g/L except
FREQUENCY OF ioxin/Iuran EB. EDDY JAMES RIVER
DETECTION (°/.) ng/L) ESPANOLA MARATHON
PERSiSTENT BIOACCUMULATIVE SUBSTANCES
Total Tetra- Furans
67%
.14
.03
.49
Total Oota- Dioxins
54
.20
ND
.60
Nickel
43
11.09
31.50
8.33
2.4.5- Trichlorotoiuene 35 .15 ND .01
Camphene 34 5.36 ND 3.08
Mercury 33 .09 ND .68
Hexachiombenzene 30 .15 ND .01
Pentachiorobenzene 23 .09 ND ND
1.2.4.5- Tetrachlorobenzene 20 .02 ND .01
Total Hexa-7- Dioxins 19 .02 ND .18
Total Penta- Furans 19 .04 ND .29
Total Tetra- Dioxins 19 .03 ND .07
1.2.3.4- Tetrachlorobenzene 15 .02 ND ND
Total PCB 13 .03 ND ND
Fiuoranthene 1 1 .42 ND .40
Pentachiorophenoi 1 1 .17 .18 .20
Total Penta~ Dioxins 11 .00 ND .04
1.2.3.5- Tetrachlorobenzene 9 .03 ND .01
Pyrene 9 .25 ND ND
Total Hexa-6- Furan 9 .01 ND .08
Total Octa- Furan 7 .01 ND .05
Total Hexav6- Dioxin 7 .01 ND .07
Continued
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TABLE 9.1 Priority Pollutants Delecled In Ontario Kraft MIII Efﬂuenls. 1990 (continued) i
AVERAGE
CONCENTRATION
(pg
/L e
xcep
t
.
FREQUENCY OF dloxIn/Iuran EB. EDDY JAMES RIVER
DETECTION (%) ng/L) ESPANOLA MARATHON
PERS
ISTE
NT BI
OACC
UMUL
ATIV
E SUB
STAN
CES.
CONT
INUE
D
'
2.3.7
.8- T
etra
- Dl
oxin
6
.00
ND
.02
Tolal
Hexa-
7- F
uran
6
.01
ND
.06
Chry
sane
4
.05
ND
ND
Anth
race
ne
2
.03
ND
ND
Benz
lala
nlhr
acen
e
2
.02
ND
ND
GE
NE
RA
L P
AR
AM
ET
ER
S
In m
g/L
Adsomable Organlc
Hali
de (
AOX)
100
21.7
5
8.49
55.6
6
BOD
, 5
day
100
131.
14
18.3
0
203
.67
Tota
l Su
spen
ded
Soll
ds
100
65.0
0
29.3
6
41.7
8
ACIDS
Dehy
droa
blel
lc
85
.47
.01
.06
Chl
oro
deh
ydro
wlet
lc
68
.09
.00
.25
Iso
pim
anc
68
.14
.00
.06
Dic
hlo
rod
ehy
dro
abl
ell
c
66
.06
.00
.07
Ma
de
66
.04
.00
.03
Able
llc
64
.23
ND
.14
Ole
lc
64
.08
.01
.14
Neoa
blel
lc
60
.19
.00
.09
Lavo
pima
ric
35
.01
ND
.06
OTH
ER
PAR
AME
TER
S
In p
g/L
Chl
oro
1or
m
100
437
.71
17.
08
1,1
26.
67
' Al
umi
num
100
1,83
4.52
930.
31
258
.40
Phe
nol
47
19.2
0
.25
1.93
‘
Bro
mod
lch
lor
ome
lha
ne
8
.26
ND
ND
246
- T
rlc
hlo
rop
hen
ol
51
4.5
6
3.4
7
ND
2.4-
chh
lor
oph
eno
l
51
2.08
.37
ND
Source: Ontarlo Mlnlstry ol the Envlronmenl 1991
TABLE 9.2 Chlodne Using M1113 In lhe Great Lakes Basin
2.3.7.8 2.3,7,8 Total T0181
TCDD TCDF PCDD PCDF
MIL
L A
ND
LOC
ATI
ON
(PP
O)
(PP
O)
(pg/
L)
(pg/
L)
NOT
ES
Polla
lch
Cl
uet M
N
24
46
n.a
n.a.
Munic
ipal
Lak
e
man
or
sec
ond
ary
treatment.
CPFP
Thun
der B
ay O
N
ND'
ND'
190
60
Proc
ess o
nly
Lake swerlor 52% kralt.
Abll
lbIP
rlce
Thun
der
Bay
ON
ND'
ND'
4,78
0
1,23
0
Blea
ched
Lake Superlor groundwood
989°13-
Continued
WP
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2 (
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8/9
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 TABLE
9.2
Chlorine
Using
Mills
in
the
Great
Lakes
Basin
(continued)
  
2.3.7.8 2.17.8 Total Total
TCDD TCOF PCDD PCDF
MILL AND
LOCATION
iPPQ)
iPPOi
(pg/Li
lpgiLi
NOTES
:
Domtar
Red Rock ON
ND'
ND'
240
ND
Process 6%
I
Lake Superior
bleached.
i
Kimberiy-Clark
Terrace
Bay
ON
ND'
ND'
690
410
Lake Superior
James River-
Marathon ON
ND'
ND'
960
970
’
Marathon
Lake Superior
Mead Paper
Escanaba Mi
ND
51
n.a
n.a
Lake Michigan
Champion
Ouinessec MI
9
66
na
na
Oxygen deilg.
international
Lake Michigan
being installed.
1
Scott Paper
Muskegon Ml
ND
42
na
n.a
Eiliuent
Lake Michigan
discharged by
spray irrigation
James River
Green Ba Wi
19
72
n.a.
na
Municipal
Lake Mich an secondary
treatment.
6.8. Eddy
Espanoia
ND'
ND'
ND
30
Oxygen deilg'n
Lake Huron and other
measures.
Domtar
Comwali. ON
ND'
ND'
200
40
Flow diluted by
Lake Ontario newsprint
effluent.
‘
ND'- Not detected, but Ontario detection level
' 1 ng/L is approximately equal to 1 ppt (part per trillion)
Sources: MlSA H991), NCASl (1990)
1 IL is mproximately equal to 1 ppb (part per billion
1 ugx. is wproximately equal to 1 ppm (part per million
it should be noted that the pup and pan industry persistent toxlc emissions problem goes beyond the 2.3.7.8- dioxin
and turan cogeners. Other dioxin and iuran oogeners are also significant health risks (Table 9.3). Levels oi AOX and some
other toxic substances remain signiﬁcant even where dioxins have been virtually eliminated. (See, ior instance, E.B. Eddy, in
_ Table 9.1)
'
TABLE 9.3 PCDD Toxic Equivalencies
Cw WeM
2,3.7,8- TCDD 1
Other TCDD 0.01
’
1.2.3.7,8 PeCDD
0.5
12.16.70 HxCDD 0.04
1.2.3.703 HxCDD
0.04
1.2,3.4,7,8~ HxCOD 0.04
Other HxCDD 0.0004
0000 0
Source: Exner (1987)
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Sour
ce s
pecif
ic i
nfor
mati
on o
n ot
her
sour
ces
of d
ioxi
n an
d fu
ran
emis
sion
s to
the
Grea
t La
kes
has
not
been
foun
d.
alt
hou
gh
emi
ssi
ons
are
ass
oci
ate
d w
ith
woo
d p
res
erv
ing
faci
liti
es,
haz
ard
ous
was
te
site
s (
des
Ros
ter
s
1987
).
and
air
emi
ssi
ons
fro
m m
uni
cpa
i a
nd
ind
ustr
ial
was
te
inc
ine
rat
ion
. r
esi
den
tia
l f
uel
wmb
ust
ion
and
pow
er
gen
era
tio
n (
Ort
ech
199
0).
Kraf
t pu
lpi
ng
bla
ck l
iquo
r re
cov
ery
boil
ers
are
also
sign
ific
ant
sou
rce
s of
PCD
Ds
and
PCD
Fs
(Or
tec
h 1
990
).
9.2
Mil
l P
ro
ce
ss
es
an
d P
ers
ist
ent
Tox
ic
Di
sc
ha
rg
es
in kr
aft
pulp
ing
a li
quid
cont
aini
ng N
azs
and
NaO
H.
know
n a
s wh
ite
liquo
r. is
used
to s
epar
ate
llgni
n an
d re
late
d
mate
rial
s fr
om w
ood
cell
ulos
e fi
bres
. T
he
mate
rial
s th
us s
epar
ated
alon
g wi
th t
he s
pent
cook
in
liqu
or.
kno
wn
at th
is p
oint
as
bla
ck
liqu
or.
are
was
hed
awa
y f
rom
the
rem
ain
ing
woo
d c
ellu
lose
and
any
part
iall
y c
ook
or
oth
erw
ise
unsa
tisf
acto
riiy
ble
ach
ed
mate
rial
is s
cre
ene
d ou
t.
Thi
s ef
flue
nt m
ater
ial
is t
hen
trea
ted
for
che
mic
al
rec
ove
with
was
tes
bei
ng
inci
nera
ted.
Bla
ck
liqu
or n
ot
rem
ove
d is
ulti
mate
ly d
isc
har
ged
to t
he
mill
sew
ers
.
It is
high
ly t
oxic
to a
qua
t
life
and
is a
lso
diff
icul
t to
trea
t
biologically.
Los
ses
from
the
was
hin
g a
rea
vary
wide
ly w
ith
the
qual
ity
and
age
of t
he w
ash
ing
and
scre
enin
g pr
oce
sse
s u
sed
in a
mill.
Olde
r mi
lls
may
hav
e l
osse
s te
n ti
mes
high
er t
han
thos
e of
new
mills
. S
pill
s an
d ot
her
plan
t up
sets
may
resu
lt i
n fr
om
one
third
to o
ne
half
oi al
l bl
ack
liqu
or r
elea
ses
to s
urro
undi
ng w
ater
s (S
incl
air
1990
).
Acco
rdin
gly,
sp l
l con
trol
pro
ced
ures
are
of g
reat
imp
ort
anc
e in
red
uci
ng
emi
ssi
ons
. S
pill
s of
any
size
may
also
inc
apa
cit
ate
a ml
ll's
biol
ogic
al t
rea
tme
nt
sys
tem
for
a
number of days.
Was
hed
pulp
is b
lea
che
d to
rem
ove
the
rema
inin
g ii
gnin
cont
ent.
typi
call
y ab
out
7%
of t
he f
ibre
at t
his
poin
t.
Norm
ally
.
chlo
rine
is u
sed
to s
epa
rat
e o
ut
the
lign
in a
nd
the
n i
t is
was
hed
out
with
caus
tic
sod
ium
hyd
rox
ide
. T
his
pro
ces
s is
the
n
repe
ated
. of
ten
with
chlo
rine
diox
ide
or h
ochi
orit
e.
All
oi t
he o
rgan
ochi
orin
es f
ound
in m
ill
efﬂu
ents
are
pro
duc
ed
at t
hese
sta
ges
. a
s is
app
rox
ima
tel
y o
ne
half
of e
uen
t b
iol
ogi
cal
oxy
gen
dem
and
(BO
D).
The
leve
l oi
bri
ght
nes
s t
o wh
ich
pul
p m
ust
be
ble
ach
ed
has
a v
ery
sign
ific
ant
effe
ct o
n e
fflu
ent
lave
ls.
Pul
p u
sed
in
inte
grat
ed
pro
ces
ses
is g
ene
ral
ly
ble
ach
ed
to a
bri
ght
nes
s o
f 8
5 l
SO
unit
s.
Mar
ket
kraf
t. o
n t
he
oth
er
han
d.
is n
orm
all
y
ble
ach
ed
to 9
0 1
80.
in p
art
this
diff
eren
ce
is a
cco
unt
ed
for
by
the
fact
that
sto
red
pu
will
gra
dua
l
los
e s
ome
brig
htne
ss.
But
to
som
e e
xte
nt
this
dif
fer
enc
e w
oul
d w
pe
ar
to
res
ult
sim
ply
fro
m a
tte
mpt
s t
o d
ere
nti
ate
pr
uct
s f
or
sal
es
pur
pos
es
rath
er t
han
bec
aus
e o
f an
y r
eal
diff
eren
ce i
n us
efu
lne
ss
or q
uali
ty o
f th
e p
rod
uct
(Mc
Cub
bin
199
0).
Des
ign
ing
a p
roc
ess
es
for
pro
duc
ing
pul
p wi
th l
ow o
rga
noc
hio
rin
e ef
flue
nt l
evel
s is
sign
ific
antl
y ea
sie
r if
the
req
uir
ed b
rig
htn
ess
is o
nly
8
rath
er t
han
90.
Eff
lue
nts
fro
m s
ulfi
te c
hem
ica
l
upl
ng
and
the
var
iou
s f
orm
s o
f m
ech
ani
cal
pup
lng
are
pre
sum
e t
o v
ary
pro
por
tio
nat
ely
with
the
per
cen
ta
e o
f th
e i
nco
min
g i
bre
that
is a
ctua
lly
use
d.
Whi
le
this
rela
tion
ship
is k
now
n t
o ex
ist
for
80
0 l
evel
s. t
here
is i
nsuf
fici
ent
ev
enc
e to
pro
ve t
hat
toxi
city
leve
ls a
re a
ctua
lly
simi
larl
y pr
opor
tion
al.
Typi
call
y, s
ulfit
e pr
oce
sse
s yi
eld
just
und
er
50%
of t
he
woo
d p
roc
ess
ed,
whi
le
mec
han
ica
l p
ulp
ing
yiel
ds
on
the
ord
er
of 9
0%.
As
a r
esul
t.
sulf
ite
pup
lng
is a
far
mor
e h
eavi
ly p
ollu
ting
pro
ces
s.
Any
addi
tion
al
use
oi c
hlor
ine
in b
lea
chi
ng
of s
ulfi
te o
r m
ech
ani
cal
pul
ps
will
0 c
our
se
add
to
resu
ltin
g po
llut
ion.
T e
effi
cien
cy o
f ch
emi
cal
rec
ove
ry
sys
tem
s in
sulf
ite
mill
s is
als
o re
lati
vely
low
er
tha
n in
kraf
t mi
lls.
. R
ecy
cle
d fi
bre
pul
pin
g p
rod
uce
s r
elat
ivel
y lo
w l
evel
s of
effl
uent
. C
orr
uga
tin
g a
nd
boa
rd
mill
s wh
ich
rec
ycl
e fi
bre
wit
hou
t
dei
nki
ng
are
of l
ittle
env
iro
nme
nta
l c
onc
ern
.
De-
ink
ing
effl
uent
s. a
lth
oug
h n
ot
com
par
wle
to
virg
in m
ill
effl
uent
s.
con
tin
ue
to
be difficult to make non-toxic.
9.3 Abatement Technologies
Pr
ose
d n
ew
Can
adi
an
regu
lati
ons
und
er t
he C
ana
dia
n E
nvir
onme
ntal
Prot
ecti
on A
ct w
ill
requ
ire
that
the
rele
ase
of
2.3
.7.
8-
T
DD
or
2.3
.7.
8-
TC
DF
be
pro
hbl
ted
abo
ve
an
as
yet
und
efi
ned
lev
el
of
det
ect
ion
. M
eet
ing
the
se
reg
ula
tio
ns
is a
lso
exp
ect
ed
to
red
uce
AO
X
dis
cha
rge
s b
elo
w 2
.5
kg’
ope
r t
onn
e o
f p
rod
uct
.
McC
ubb
ln
(19
90)
est
ima
tes
tha
t n
ew
Can
adi
an
Re
ulat
ions
rela
ting
to 8
00,
TSM
and
toxi
city
can
met
by t
he i
nsta
llat
ion
of cl
ariil
ers.
acti
vate
d sl
udge
sys
tem
s or
aera
ted
sta
iliz
atlo
n b
asi
ns
and
pro
ps
pla
ced
outf
alls
. H
e a
lso
bel
iev
es
that
the
mp
0s
“ C
ana
dia
n d
ioxi
n a
nd
iur
an
regu
lati
ons
can
be
met
by
inc
rea
sin
g t
he
of
of
dil
orl
ne
dio
xid
e s
ubs
tit
uti
on
in
the
f
chl
ori
nat
ion
sta
ge
of
sof
t w
ood
ble
ach
ing
to
upw
ard
s of
70%
; i
mpr
ovi
ng c
hlor
inat
ion
sta
ge m
ixi
ng
and
cont
rol
equ
ipm
ent
; a
s we
ll a
s u
sin
g ce
rtai
n si
te-s
peci
fic
equ
ipm
ent
.
Aba
tem
ent
mea
sur
es
to l
owe
r o
r el
imi
nat
e t
he
for
mat
ion
of
fur
ans
and
dio
xins
emp
has
ize
s l
owe
rin
g t
he
amo
unt
of
chlo
rine
use
d i
n bl
eac
hin
g.
The
pro
ble
m is
that
red
uci
ng
chlo
rine
cau
ses
a r
edu
cti
on
in p
up
bri
ght
nes
s.
Chl
ori
ne
is u
sed
for
its a
bili
ty t
o se
par
ate
lign
n fr
om
pup
whi
le
rem
ovi
ng
or d
ama
gin
g o
nly
a r
elat
ivel
y li
ttle
of t
he m
ore
usef
ul c
ellu
lose
. C
hlo
rin
e
also has a relatively low unit cost.
Ble
ach
plan
t ef
flue
nts
typi
call
y co
nta
in b
etw
een
3 a
nd
8 k
g of
org
ano
chi
ori
nes
per
ton
ne
of p
ulp
pro
duc
tio
n.
Esse
ntia
lly,
the
se
con
cen
tra
tio
ns a
re
dire
ctly
pro
por
tio
nal
to t
he
leve
ls o
f ch
brin
e u
sed
in a
giv
en
ble
ach
ing
pro
ces
s.
Biol
ogic
al t
rea
tme
nt
can
red
uce
the
se
quan
titi
es
by
bet
wee
n 3
0 a
nd
50%
.
How
eve
r t
her
e a
re
som
e i
ndiv
idua
l o
rga
noc
hio
rin
e c
omp
oun
ds
whi
ch
are
not
red
uce
d a
t al
l by
biol
ogic
al t
rea
tme
nt.
Fur
the
r r
edu
cti
ons
in e
fflu
ent
org
ano
chi
ori
ne
leve
ls
are
ach
iev
abl
e o
nly
by
reducrng the level of chlorine actually used in bleaching.
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The substitution of chionne dioxide lor elemental chlorine In the bleaching process produces si niﬁcant reductions in
organochlonne effluents. in particular dioxins and furans. while maintaining brightness levels. The EB. ddy mill at Espanola
Ontano has increased chlorine dioxide substitution from 10 to 50% at its 975 tonne kraft mill after determining that si niiicant
reductions in organochionne and dioxin and furan production would result. Resulting brightness is unchanged (8 +l and
paper strength actually increased.
TABLE 9.4 Reductions in AOX and Dioxins and Furans from Chlorine Dioxide
Substitution at EB. Eddy. Espanola. Ontario
Chlorine Dioxtde AOX Ikg/tonnel AOX (kg/tonne) 2.3,7,8- 2.3.7.8‘
substitution level Untreated Effluent Treated Eftluent TCDDippt) TC DFlpptI
10% 3.42 1 39 2.2-3.6 7 1-110
28% -- u 1.8 6.4
48% 2.31 1.15 ND ND-6.2
52% -- -- ND ND
58% 1.38 0.68 ND ND
ND . Below detection limit.
Source: Munro (1990)
Untreated effluent AOX is low due to oxygen delignification, hardwood-softwood mix,
. and other process modernization; treated effluent AOX Is low due to primary and
secondary treatment.
Chlorine dioxide substitution methods are quite well known and proven in practice. The addition of small amounts of
oxygen or hydrogen peroxide Into later chlorine bieachingn/stages can be used to reduce chlorine use and may produce
organochlorlne discharges to water by as much as 15 to 2 o. x gen delignliioation can be used as a substitute for part of
the chlorination process. Resulting reductions in organochlortne ell uents are estimated at 40%.
9.4 Abatement Costs
Estimates of the costs of reducing dioxin and furan emissions to non~detection levels at Great Lakes pulp and p er
mills are shown in Table 9.5. The total ai cost for dioxin and turan control In the Canadian portion oi the Great La es
basin is estimated at 03568 million and th emails no slgnilicant change in direct grated costs. In Ontario, which hasa
total chemical pulp production level oi tout 6000 tonnes per day, total costs wi be C 84.7 million, or 034.51 per ton
i amortized capital cost). By roduct. costs will be 034.76 for market kratt, C5476 for integrated kratt and C3203 lor sulphite
pulp. Adding oxygen delign' Ication will reduce the cost or traditional external treatment systems. canal costs and operating
costs would fall in the range of 20 to 25%.
TABLE 9.5 Ontario Great Lakes Basin Dioxin /Furan Control Costs, By Mill
CHEMICAL
PULP AMORTIZED
PRODUCTION CAPITAL COST CAPITAL
MILL AND LOCATION (Tonnes/day) (CS millions) (CS/Tome)
Canadian Pacitic Forest Prod. Thunder 1.323 8.7 $1.63
Domtar Red 50 1.3 $6.45
Kimberly Clark Terrace Bay 1,200 16.1 33.33
James River-Marathon Marathon 433 14.0 38.02
EB. Eddy Forest Products Espanola 910 0.0 $0.00
Domtar Cornwall 450 1.3 $0.72
GREAT LAKES TOTAL/AVERAGE 4,366 41.4 32.35
Avera e, Excluding EB. Eddy $2.97
CANA A TOTAL (45 Mills) 30,808 567.6 34.48
Source: McC ubbin 1990
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Thes
e co
sts
varY
mnsl
defa
biy
amo
ng c
ompa
nies
but,
in co
mpar
ison
with
the
cost
s of
seco
ndar
y tr
eatm
ent
and
othe
r
capit
al i
nves
tmen
ts w
hich
are
bein
g pl
anne
d by
the
indu
stry
in th
e ne
ar t
erm
abat
emen
t co
sts.
they
are
relat
ively
mode
st.
Tabl
e 9.
6 i
ves
repr
esen
tati
ve c
osts
for
the
cont
rol
cost
s of
trad
itio
nal
poll
utan
ts (
e.g.
800
and
sus
pen
ded
soli
dsi.
Sinc
e th
e
cost
s o
f
xin
and
Ma
n
cont
rol
are
rela
tive
ly m
ino
r t
here
is l
ittle
rea
son
for
con
cer
n t
hat
the
se
cos
ts
alo
ne
wou
ld
be
dis
rup
tiv
e o
f a
ny
mill
whi
ch
was
not
alr
ead
in s
eri
ous
fin
anc
ial
difﬁ
cult
y.
ind
eed
. f
ar h
igh
er
aba
tem
ent
cos
ts
tha
n e
ven
tho
se
sho
wn
in
Tab
le
9.5
whi
ch
wer
e m
et
by
U.
. mi
lls
dur
ing
the
diff
icul
t t
ime
s o
f th
e e
arl
y
980
3 d
id
not
a s
ing
le
ope
rat
ion
out
of
bus
ine
ss.
it i
s n
ot
exp
ec
te
d t
hat
the
se
req
uir
eme
nts
wo
ul
d p
ut
any
mil
l o
ut
of
bus
ine
ss
eit
her
.
Furt
herm
ore.
capi
tal
expe
ndit
ures
for
aba
tem
ent
mea
sur
es
at a
ll O
ntar
io f
acili
ties
will
be
red
uce
d si
gnif
ican
tly
by
the
ssib
ilit
y o
f f
ast
tax
wri
te
offs
.
Thi
s a
ssu
mes
tha
t t
he
fir
ms
hav
e s
uffi
cien
t e
xis
tin
g c
ash
flo
ws
to
use
the
wri
te
offs
.
cCu
bbi
n e
sti
mat
es
tha
t th
is w
ill
red
uce
act
ual
cos
ts
to
the
com
pan
ies
by
rou
ghl
y 2
0 t
o 2
5%
ove
r a
nd
abo
ve
the
cos
t w
hic
h
would result where normal tax depreciation rules wplied.
In th
e Uni
ted S
tates
, rev
ision
of th
e Cl
ean W
ater
Act w
ill i
nvolv
e set
ting
simil
ar st
andar
ds fo
r emi
ssion
s of
2.3.7
.8-
TC DD
and
TC D
F and
the i
mplic
ation
s for
the m
ills
of th
e ass
ociat
ed di
alem
ent
costs
are b
eliev
ed si
milar
to th
ose d
escri
bed
for Ontario.
9.5 Applicability of Economic Instruments
As
wit
h m
erc
ury
and
PCB
s,
the
con
tri
but
ion
tha
t e
con
omi
c i
nst
rum
ent
s (
esp
eci
all
y e
mis
sio
ns
tra
din
g a
nd
eff
lue
nt
cha
rge
s)
can
mat
e t
o ac
hie
vin
g vi
rtua
l el
imin
atio
n of
pers
iste
nt t
oxic
s f
rom
pul
p a
nd
pwe
r m
ills
in t
he
Gre
at
ake
s b
asi
n i
s
limi
ted
by
the
ext
ent
ol t
he
reg
ulat
ory
act
ion
s th
at h
ave
alr
ead
y b
een
tdr
en.
in t
erm
s o
f th
e de
cis
ion
tree
in F
igu
re
1. C
ana
da
and
the
US.
are
on
the
ver
ge
of d
ecl
ari
ng
that
virt
ual
elim
inat
ion
of t
hes
e p
ersi
sten
t to
xics
is t
o be
ach
iev
ed
with
in
a v
ery
shor
t ti
me
fra
me.
Hen
ce,
an
outr
ight
ban
(or.
at a
ny
rate
, n
o e
mis
sio
ns
mo
ve
the
det
ect
ion
leve
l) t
hro
ugh
dire
ct r
egul
atio
n is
the
bes
t op
tion
. E
mis
sio
ns t
radi
ng a
nd
effl
uent
cha
rge
s ca
n o
nly
pla
y a
usef
ul
role
if th
e o
bjec
tive
of v
irtu
al e
limi
nati
on
is t
o be
ach
iev
ed
ove
r a
con
sid
era
ble
per
iod
of t
ime.
Onl
y t
on
can
adv
ant
age
be
tak
en
of d
iff
ere
nce
s in
cont
rol
cos
ts
and
the
add
ed
sti
mul
us t
hat
the
se i
nst
rum
ent
s ca
n g
ive
to t
he d
eve
lop
men
t of
new
, c
ost
effe
ctiv
e te
chn
olo
gie
s to
be
dev
elo
ped
.
in vi
ew o
f the
fact
that
thes
e co
ntam
inan
ts h
ave
been
give
n su
ch h
igh
prior
ity b
y th
e pu
blic
and
the
regu
lato
ry a
genc
ies
in b
oth
coun
trie
s,
and
that
the
tech
nica
l m
ean
s f
or t
heir
virt
ual
elim
inat
ion
are
pro
ven
and
affo
rdab
le.
it is
unli
kely
that
the
re
will
be a
ny
retr
ench
ment
in t
he u
rge
ncy
now
bein
g gi
ven
to e
limi
nati
ng t
hem
from
the
was
te s
tre
ams
o
f
and
pwe
r mi
lls.
Con
seq
uen
tly
. t
he
role
of e
con
omi
c i
nst
mme
nts
n a
chi
evi
ng
the
virt
ual
elir
nlna
tion
of
23,
7,8
- T
CD
D
C
F f
rom
pul
p a
nd
pap
er
mill
s m
ay
be
limi
ted
to s
upp
ort
ing
corr
rpii
ance
with
regu
lati
ons.
Und
er
the
se
cir
cum
sta
nce
s t
her
e wo
uld
see
m t
o b
e n
o
role
for
emi
ssi
ons
trad
ing.
(in
any
cas
e.
any
pro
pos
al t
o al
low
tra
des
in e
mis
sio
ns
of d
ioxi
ns
and
fur
ans
wou
ld
dou
btl
ess
run
up against immense opposition.)
An e
fflue
nt c
harg
e le
vied
on d
etec
tabl
e em
issi
ons
coul
d be
a mo
st e
ffect
ive w
ay o
f in
trod
ucin
g a
finan
cial
enfo
rcem
ent
ince
ntiv
e an
d de
mons
trat
ing
the
supp
orti
ve r
ole
that
eco
nom
ic i
nstr
umen
ts c
an
mat
e in
achi
evi
and
main
tain
ing
the
virtu
al
elim
inat
ion
of p
ersi
sten
t t
oxic
s.
Suc
h a
com
pli
anc
e i
ncen
tive
sho
uld
be
bas
ed
on
the
qua
nt
dis
cha
rge
d,
not
just
the
con
cen
tra
tio
n.
Sin
ce
con
cen
tra
tio
n wi
ll h
ave
to b
e m
eas
ure
d m
ere
ly
to t
est
com
pli
anc
e wi
th t
he
pro
pos
ed
r
ulat
ions
and
flow
mea
sme
men
ts
are
com
mon
plac
e,
the
imp
osi
tio
n o
f a
per
unit
drag
g'e
on
dam
med
emi
ssi
ons
of 2
.3.7
.8-
COD
/TC
DF
fro
m
pul
p a
nd
pap
er
mill
s sh
oul
d b
e c
om
arat
ivel
y s
imp
le t
o im
ple
men
t.
e l
evel
of t
he p
er
unit
pen
alt
y s
hou
ld b
e at
leas
t as
hig
h
as t
he c
ontr
ol c
ost
s to
rem
ove
any
i a
ncia
l a
dva
nta
ge
that
mill
s mi
ght
hav
e f
or n
ot i
ncur
ring
the
nec
ess
ary
cos
ts o
f co
mpl
yin
g
with the regulations.
One
pro
ble
m w
ith
defi
ning
virt
ual
elim
inat
ion
in t
erms
of c
once
ntra
tion
s is
that
dilu
tion
of t
he m
ill
effl
uent
s of
fers
a
mea
ns
of c
omp
lia
nce
eve
n t
hou
gh t
he t
otal
load
ings
may
still
be
unde
slrd
ily
high
. T
his
is n
ot t
o sa
y th
at m
ills
will
rely
on
dilu
tion
to m
eet
the
stan
dard
s, o
nly
that
it m
ay
be u
sed
as o
ne
com
nent
of a
com
pli
anc
e st
rate
gy.
An
addi
tion
al p
rob
lem
that
rem
ain
s is
the
poss
biii
ty
of s
pills
and
leak
s th
at a
re h
ard
to
etec
t a
nd
may
be
cons
iste
nt w
ith
the
lega
l te
st o
f du
e
dili
genc
e.
The
se c
onc
ern
s ca
n be
st b
e me
t by
taki
ng f
urth
er s
teps
to r
edu
ce t
he u
se o
f ch
lori
ne i
n th
e bl
each
ing
proc
ess.
Regu
lati
on
offe
rs o
ne
way
of l
irnft
ing
the
use
of c
hlor
ine
but,
as
usua
l.
it su
ffer
s f
rom
the
indii
lity
to m
ake
prop
er
allo
wanc
es f
or t
he d
iffe
rent
oppo
rtun
itie
s an
d co
sts
of e
ach
mill.
The
two
mai
n po
ssbi
liti
es f
or u
sing
eco
nom
ic i
nstr
umen
ts t
o
redu
ce
the
use
of c
hlor
ine
are
a c
hlor
ine
tax
and
trad
edil
e c
hlor
ine
perm
its
(co
m
rail
s to
the
trad
eabi
e le
ad
penn
its
desc
ribe
d in
Cha
pte
r 4)
. T
hes
e m
eau
res
wou
ld
not
only
rein
forc
e th
e re
gula
tion
of 2
. ,7
,8-
TCD
DfT
CDF
but
they
wou
ld a
lso
help reduce the emission of all organochlorines from pup and paper mills.
Refe
rrin
g to
ques
tion
4 in
the
deci
sion
tree
and
the
asso
ciat
ed c
riter
ia fo
r dec
idin
g wh
ethe
r a
quan
tity
limit
is pr
efer
able
to a
chan
ge.
ther
e is
no i
nfor
mati
on t
o su
gges
t th
e ex
iste
nce
of th
resh
olds
in th
e da
mag
e fu
ncti
ons t
hat w
ould
favo
ur a
trad
ing
syst
em o
ver
achlo
rine
tax.
(Eve
n if
such
nfor
rnat
ion
did
exist
. it w
ould
hard
ly s
uppo
rt t
radi
ng o
ver
acha
rge
on c
hlor
ine s
ince
ther
e is
only
an i
ndire
ct r
elati
on b
etwe
en
the
amou
nt o
f ch
lori
ne u
sed
and
the
amou
nt o
f or
gano
chlo
rine
s in
the
wast
e
stre
am.)
On t
he o
ther
hand
. a
chlo
rine
tax h
as t
he a
dvan
tage
of li
mitin
g in
adva
nce
the
addit
ional
cost
s th
at s
uch
a me
asur
e
would impose on any mill.
wms
a (Au
gust
8/91)
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A d
ete
rmm
ed
effo
rt t
o r
edu
ce
the
chlo
rine
use
d b
y m
ills
in t
he
Gre
at
Lak
es
bas
m c
oul
d b
est
be
acc
omp
lis
hed
In a
cost
-eff
ecti
ve w
ay
thro
ugh.
a sy
ste
m of
trad
eabi
e ch
lori
ne p
ermi
ts b
ase
d o
n t
he p
rove
n s
ucce
ss o
f th
e l
ead
trad
ing
syst
em
amo
n
U.S.
petr
oleu
m re
finer
ies.
The
total
quan
tity
of ch
lori
ne u
sed
by m
ills
in th
e Gr
eat
Ld<e
s ba
sin
lTab
le 9
.2) w
ould
be
limit
s a
nd t
his l
imit
woul
d de
clin
e ov
er t
ime
aoco
rdin
to a
pred
eﬁne
d sc
hedu
le.
not
nece
ssar
ily
to ze
ro.
For
simpl
icrty
and
eas
e o
f a
cce
pta
nce
by
"‘9
co"
Wat
tle
s c
onc
ern
ed,
the
init
ial
all
otm
ent
of c
hlo
rin
e p
erm
its
sho
uld
be
bas
ed
on
rec
ent
hist
oric
al
usag
e,
The
only
comp
lica
ting
fact
or m
ight
be t
hat
mills
out3
ide
of t
he G
reat
Lak
es b
asin
woul
d h
ave
a co
mpet
itiv
e ad
vant
age
ove
r th
ose
with
in
the
bas
in
unl
ess
the
y w
ere
also
to b
e i
ncl
ude
d in
the
sch
eme
.
Thi
s co
nsi
der
ati
on g
oes
bey
ond
the
man
dat
e
oi th
e IJ
C bu
t co
uld
be o
f co
ncer
n to
the
regu
lato
ry a
genc
ies
that
woul
d ha
ve t
o im
plem
ent
the
sche
me a
nd t
hey
migh
t be
advr
sed
to ex
tend
the c
hlor
ine t
radin
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A m
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This chapter Summarizes the recommendations that have been put forward in the previous chapters. Despite the
considerable effort that has me into assembling data on emissions. abatement technologies and costs there is much that is
not known especraliy in relation to the discharge of mercury and P085. The absence of this information makes it difficult to
develop firm recommendations for the implementation oi economic instruments for achievrn virtual elimination of these
selected persistent toxics in the Great Lakes basin. This tactor should be born in mind since a ough the recommendations
that are offered are not likely to cause a severe impact on the industry when considered on their own, their impact could be
signiﬁcant in conjunction with other requirements ior abatement and the concerns expressed in Chwter 8 about the lack of
competitiveness of some mills.
Gerrard
1. Efforts should continue to enhance the information on sources, abatement costs and damages that is necessary for
the further appraisal and design of economic instruments.
For mercury. priority should be given to economic instruments that will reduce the use of mercury in manufacturing
process that are not closed cycles. Measurement of the use of mercury is far more relimle than measurement of the
sources and fate of mercury discha as. A tax on mercury might be the simplest incentive to administer. though to be
helpful, it would have to apply to all inns throughout Canada and the U.S. and possibly to imports lrom other countries
as well. ,
3. The feasibility of a deposit/refund System for batteries containing mercury over 30% at all mercury used in consumer
roducts) should be investigated. n particular. the prospects or develop the necessary infrastructure should be
ooked at in detail.
4. Mercury emissions from electrical utilities, copper smelters and incinerators (over 85% of all industrial sourcesi in
Canada and the US. could be subjected to an efiluent charge if the reliability oi monitoring is improved. Revenues
could be used to deal with contaminated sediments in the Great Lakes basin and other bodies of fresh water.
 
P083
5. P083 should be dealt with through regulation. There is no obvious role for the use of an economic instmment.
MN?!”
6. it is in this sector that economic instruments appear to have the most to otter. Priority should be given to the detailed
design and lurther analysis of a program at economic instruments for the pup and pmer industry consisting oi:
- Financial enforcement incentives to sipport regulations designed to virtually eliminate 2.3.7,8- TCDD/TCDF.
- A tradeabie permits scheme to reduce the use of chlorine.
- An efﬂuent charge on AOX.
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ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN USE (BASED ON OECD 1989; Written June 1988)
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MEDIUM COUNTRY SINCE PURPOSE USE OF FUNDS TARGET
FEE
REVENUE
EVALUATION
EFFLUENT CHARGES
Air
France
1985 Revenue
Waer
France
1969 Revenue
waer
Germany
1 981
Water Italy
1976 lncerlive
Stbsidy for air pollution Power generation:
control equ‘pmem (90%). emacity over 50 mw.
Government technological
research (10%).
$01 or NOx discharge:
over 2,500 fairies/year
Operate river basin
agencres.
Agencies finance
local and industrial
efﬂuent treatmem.
Fee pe
r unit of
:
1. Suspended matter
2. Oxidizdile manor
3. Soluble salts
4. Inhbiory matter
(inth STP function)
5. Ammonia, nitrogen
6. Phosphorous
(3.4 not for households)
Fee per unit of:
1. Settling smstances
2. Oxidizing substances
3. Mercury
4. Cadmium
5. Chromium
6. Nidrel
7.
Lead
8. C
9. A0
10. Toxicity to fish
Varies with plant
ECU 19ftonne
ECU 13 million
Varies
ECU 240 million
ECU
19.20!
damage unit
(unit varies
with substance)
Fee reduced
if meet or exceed
standard
or if use
'state of the
art technology'
(See. text)
Fees 9X higher if
left to comply
with standards
ECU 135 million
(I 984)
Charge too low to have incentive
impact.
Estimated that charge would have to
equal ECU 12 billion to induce
achievement of govemment targets.
Moderate effect on innovation.
About 400 plants are affected
Simple system: overhead is
less than 3% of revenues.
Low incentive effect.
Subsidies lower industry abatement
cost by anaverage of 12%.
Subsidies do have incentive effect
on so
me fir
ms.
Rates have not kept pace with
inﬂa
tion
.
Average treatment costs are about
4 times average charges.
There is evidence of incentive
eflects: Many firms have increased
abatement to earn lee discounts and
one-third of municipalities claim
to have improved treatment in
response to charge system.
German water quality is said to
have improved considerably Since
charges were put into effect,
Too little information.
Charge is intended to end upon
achieving full compliance
with standards.
$1/Canadian a 0.65 ECU = $1/U.S. (June 1, 1987)
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ME
DI
UM
CO
UN
TR
Y
SI
NC
E
PU
RP
OS
E
US
E
OF
FU
ND
S
TA
RG
ET
FE
E
RE
VE
NU
E
EVA
L U
ATl
ON
EF
FL
UE
NT
C
H
A
R
G
E
S
,
“
Wat
er
wa
er
Waste
W$
l0
Waste
Was
te
N
e
t
h
e
r
-
lands
U
S
A
.
(Wi
sco
nsr
n)
B
e
l
g
i
um
De
nm
ar
k
US
A.
U
S
A
.
(20
sta
tes
)
1972
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
7
1%3
Revenue
Reve
nue
Sib
sid
y t
or
ma
em
em
(di
rec
t d
isc
har
ger
s).
Pa
y l
ul
cos
t a
t S
TP
s
(in
di
re
ct
di
sc
ha
ge
rs
).
Co
ve
rs
35
% c
l 3
th
wa
er
37
srb
sta
nce
s,
po
ll
ut
io
n
pr
og
ra
m
co
st
s.
Incentive
Incentive
Reve
nue
All
soli
d wa
ste
Re
cy
cl
ed
mat
eri
al
ex
em
pt
Re
st
or
ai
on
oi
clo
sed
ch
em
ic
al
wa
st
e
si
es
.
Haz
ard
ous
was
te
EC
U
0.
12
/t
on
(W
I)
Hou
seh
old
s:
set
lee
EC
U 4
73
mil
lio
n
Me
du
m-
si
ze
fir
ms:
(19
85)
pe
r
uni
t,
se
t
vn‘tti coe
fficient
s
Large
firms:
dir
ect
mon
ito
rin
g.
Pre
tre
atm
em
ma
y
red
uce
cha
rge
Fe
e
r
un
it
of
:
1.
D/
CO
D
2.
S
nda
ble
sol
ids
3.
Tﬁ
es
ms
ta
nc
es
4.
He
av
y m
eta
ls
Var
ies
U.S
.$
1.2
mill
ion
inc
lud
ing
me
rc
ur
y,
PC
Bs
EC
U
0.
02
-2
.1
5/
to
nn
e o
r c
u.
m.
Var
ies
wit
h t
ype
In
ci
ne
ra
od
an
d
co
mp
os
te
d w
ast
e
di
sc
ou
nt
ed
.
All
non
-ha
nnl
ess
was
te
EC
U 5
.20
/to
nne
Exa
m ti
ons i
nclu
de
dem
o"
n wa
ste,
unpa
inte
d wo
od a
nd s
traw
Haz
ard
ous
was
te
EC
U
1.8
5It
on
Var
ies
:
t
o
EC
U
0.
60
/t
on
(M
N)
Stro
ng i
ncen
tive
impa
ct o
n ce
rtai
n
ind
ust
rie
s.
Pollu
tion
level
s for
incl
uded
par
ame
ter
s ar
e si
gnif
ican
tly
lowe
r.
Cha
rge
s h
ave
rise
n st
eadi
ly.
Anti
cipa
tion
oi lu
rthe
r in
crea
ses
has
a s
ign
ifi
can
t i
nce
nti
ve
eite
ct.
Admi
nist
rati
ve c
osts
are
low
(7%)
.
Not
a di
sinc
enti
ve t
o po
llut
e.
Lit
tle
inc
ent
ive
.
Sl/
Can
adi
an
a 0
.65
EC
U =
$1/
U.S
. (
Jun
e 1
, 1
987
)
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ECONOMIC I
NSTRUMENTS
IN USE (BASE
D ON OECD
1989; Written
June 1988)
MEDIUM
COUNTR
Y SI
NCE PUR
POSE
USE OF F
UNDS TARGET
FEE
REVENUE
EVALUATION
PRODUCT
CHARGES
Medium Country
Since Use
at Funds
Flnland 1 976
Purpose
Inco
mive
Finland 1987 Revenue
Finland 1972 Revenue
France 1981 Revenue Infrastructure for
primer
dsposal
.
Germany 1969 Revenue lnlrastmdure lor
to
proper rispos'd.
1 989
Infrastructure for
proper
disposal
.
Italy
1985 Reven
ue
Incentive
Nether— 1988
lands
Revenue
Finances majority ol
lederal environmental
programs.
Target
Non-retumable
beverage
containers
.
Libricant oils
Crude oil and products
Libncant oils
Libricant oils
Libncant oils
Consumer plastic bags
Gasoline (unleaded)
Gasoline (leaded)
Light Iuel oil
Libricaing oil (auto)
Libricaln oil (other
Heavy lue oil/coal
Fee
Revenue
ECU 0.
07 beer
ECU 0.58
salt drink
(in glass/metal)
ECU 0.20 solt drink
(other containers)
ECU 1.6 million
ECU 29nonne ECU 3 million
Up to ECU 6/tonne ECU 3.8 million
ECU 96/ tonne ECU 63 million
ECU 3.20/ton
ne ECU 2
.3 million
ECU 0.06/bag
ECU 0.10/ 100 litre
ECU 1.74/ 100 Litre
ECU 0.10/ 100 litre
ECU 0.70/ 100 litre
ECU 0.10/100litre
ECU 251
/ 1,000 k
g
(rebate it install
ﬂue gas desuph.)
Evalu
ation
Market share of non‘retumahle
bottles 15 low (5%).
But the market lor non—retumzmle
plastic bottles is growing.
Collection and reprocessmg have
increased.
Charge too low to be incentive.
70% 01 waste motor Oil is collected.
1 1% 01 total orl sold is recycled.
Administrative elliciency IS high.
High incentive etlect'rveness.
Charge replaced by regulations
which adequately control waste oil.
System subsidization no longer seen
to be ne
cessary
.
Tax equals 5X manutmtunng cost.
But reduaion in use has been low.
V3 $1/Canadian a 0.65 ECU =31/U.S. (June 1, 1987)
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MED
IUM
CO
UN
TR
Y
SIN
CE
PUR
POS
E
USE
OF F
UND
S
TARGET
FEE
REVEN
UE EV
ALUA
TION
PROD
UCT
CHA
RGE
SM
Swed
en
1973
Reve
nue
USA
.
1981
Rev
enu
e
ADMIN
ISTRA
TIVE
CHARG
ES
Swed
en
Reve
nue
Genera
l reven
ue
Hazardou
s wate s
ite
c
l
e
a
n
u
p
.
Regula
tion o
t
pollu
ting
activ
iies.
Non-retummle
beverage
container
s
Petroleum
Base chemicals
Derivatives
All p
ollut
ing a
ctivi
-
ties r
equir
ing p
ermit
s
ECU 0.01 to 0.03/
cont
aine
r
ECU 1
1 millio
n
ECU
0.07/
bbl.(
dom)
ECU 0.10
/ bbl.(imp
) ECU 4
87 million
ECU 0.02— 0.0
9! ton ECU 2
44 milion
ECU 0.
02- 0.0
9/ ton
ECU 52
million
ECU 55
to 78/h
our E
CU 3 mi
llion
Tax too low to affect
choice at
containers
.
Low charge l
evel results in
minimal
effect on chemical use.
Does not disti
nguish betwee
n better
or worse
manageme
nt.
Expenditures,
estimated at
ECU 12 millio
n/year were ex
pected
to be
bala
nced
by r
even
ues.
But onl
y ECU
3 millio
n was r
aised.
Civil se
rvants,
unused
to billin
g
tor serv
ices, w
ere eit
her una
ble
or unw
iling
to cha
rge lo
r full
tim
e s
pen
t.
Chan
ge to
a ﬁxe
d yea
rly c
harg
e
is e
xpe
cte
d.
St/Can
adian x
0.65 EC
U = $l/
U.S. (J
une I, 1
987)
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MEDIUM COUNTRY SINCE PURPOSE USE OF FUNDS
TARGET
FEE REVENUE
EVALUATION
DEPOSIT-REFUND
Various EC, Incentive
C
a
n
a
d
a
.
US
A.
(some states)
EMISSIONS TRADING
Air
U.S.A.
1977 Incentive Permits not auctioned.
Beverage containers
Particulates, SOx.
CO, 03, N02
ECU 0.06 to 0.30/
co
nt
ai
ne
r
Initially, manufacturers encouraged
container reuse to save money
Return oi deposit bottles is
normally in the 80957.; range.
Higher dwosits are required ior
relatively higher priced beverages.
lmprecise emission inventories make
assessment of effect on emrssrons
highly uncertain.
Cost savings, otten of signiﬁcant
magnitude, are frequently reported.
Administrative eiticiency is low.
$l/Canadian . 0.65 ECU = suns. (June 1, 1987)
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Swe
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Rev
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e
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ist
rai
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and
cont
rol
01
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st
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es
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TA
X
DI
FF
ER
EN
TI
AT
IO
N
Ge
rm
an
y
19
85
Inc
ent
ive
Neth
er-
to
lands
,
1 989
Nor
way
,
Sw
ed
en
Van
‘ou
s E
C
Inc
ent
ive
New pe
sticide
s
Pesti
cides
Automobiles.
la
rg
er
or
higher emitters
Le
ad
ed
gas
oli
ne
ECU
1.4
00 (
no
new
ECU
0.5
mill
ion
acti
ve s
wsta
nce)
ECU
5,6
00 (
new
active s
ubstanc
e)
ECU 700
annual le
e)
ECU
420
chan
ge us
e)
EC
U 0
.02
- 0
.05
/ I.
Nearly
covers
cost at
registra
tion
and c
ontro
l (EC
U 0.6
5 mil
lion).
Mor
e p
ers
onn
el h
ired
,
redu
cing
wait
tor
ermi
ts.
Yean
y lee
is bur
some
tor s
ome
highly
specia
lized
produc
ts.
Pha
sed
out
in 1
989,
whe
n al
l ne
w
med
ium
and
larg
e ca
rs i
n th
e E
C
were
requ
ired
to me
et m
ini
mum
air
pol
lut
ion
sta
nda
rds
.
Suc
ces
slu
lly
use
d to
spe
ed
app
lic
ati
on
at r
egu
lat
ion
.
In m
od
coun
trie
s, d
iffe
rent
iati
on
has
bee
n I
oll
owe
d b
y a
bol
iti
on.
Diff
eren
tiat
ion
has
had
som
e
inc
ent
ive
ell
ect
. e
asi
ng
an
d
sp
ee
di
ng
tra
nsi
tio
n t
o a
ne
w r
ule
.
$l
/C
an
ad
im
a 0
.65
EC
U =
$1/
U.S
. (
Jun
e 1
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